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Preface 
The conference, Putting a price on carbon: Economic instruments to mitigate climate 
change in South Africa and other developing countries, was organised by Associate 
Professor Harald Winkler, Dr Andrew Marquard and Meagan Jooste, who are all 
researchers in the Energy and Climate Change Programme of the Energy Research 
Centre (ERC) at the University of Cape Town. The conference was held at the Uni-
versity on 23 and 24 March 2010. 
There has been extensive debate among researchers in developed countries whether 
an emissions trading scheme or carbon tax is the best means to ‘put a price on car-
bon’. Other economic instruments could contribute to mitigation of greenhouse gas 
emissions indirectly, including tradable certificates for renewable energy or energy 
efficiency. The conference organisers intended to take up the debate on how such 
instruments might apply in South Africa and other developing countries, putting 
carbon pricing in the context of broader policy on climate and development. This has 
not been done in depth previously. 
Specifically, the intentions behind the conference were to: 
• Build on discussions undertaken at a side-event and a workshop at the 
Climate Change Summit 2009 (see the scoping papers on economic in-
struments to mitigate climate change in South Africa at 
www.erc.uct.ac.za), 
• Contribute to the development of climate policy in South Africa, by fur-
ther exploring practical options for putting a price on carbon, 
• Deepen the understanding of economic instruments, 
• Broaden the community of experts working in this emerging field, by at-
tracting papers from researchers and analysts in cognate disciplines who 
are not currently working on carbon pricing – including economics and 
environmental economics, but also researchers working on institutional 
and political dimensions 
• Draw on experiences and lessons from other countries, in particular other 
developing countries in their exploration of the same issues in similar 
contexts, but also looking at the experiences of implementation in devel-
oped countries and examining their applicability in the context of devel-
opment. 
The ERC issued a call for papers in May 2009. In April and May 2009 ERC identified 
and appointed a Review Committee of the following people: 
• Bamikole Amigun, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 
• Prof James Blignaut, Department of Economics (University of Pretoria) 
• Michael Goldblatt, Environmental Economist (Palmer Development 
Group) 
• Dr Yvonne Hansen, African Centre for Cities (University of Cape Town) 
• Dr Andrew Marquard, Energy Research Centre (University of Cape 
Town) 
• Josephine Musango, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research  
• Emily Tyler, Climate Change Economist (Private Consultant) 
• Dr Martine Visser, Environmental Policy Research Unit (University of 
Cape Town) 
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• Assoc Prof Harald Winkler, Energy Research Centre (University of Cape 
Town) 
• Dr Russell Wise, Environmental and Resource Economist (Australia) 
The ERC conducted an internal assessment of the abstracts submitted in response to 
the Call for Papers and requested the committee to comment on the ERC assessment 
and ranking of abstracts. The Review Committee finally chose to rank abstracts as 
follows: 
Category 1: Accepted as is, invite author(s) to submit full paper. 
Category 2: Would like to accept abstract and invite paper, but request a re-
submission which shows a clear alignment with the conference topic (carbon pricing 
and climate change mitigation). 
Category 3: Abstract could be accepted but there is no developing country co-author 
and thus a re-submission of the abstract will be requested which shows such co-
authoring. 
Category 4: Abstract not accepted. On the grounds that it is either no relevance to 
our conference or the developing country context, or the topic does not appear to 
have been well-thought through.  
Authors in categories 2 and 3 were approached to request they amend their abstracts 
accordingly and resubmit. Once authors re-submitted their abstracts, ERC issued a 
request for draft papers by November 2009. In early November 2009 reviewers were 
assigned to review each of the fifteen papers received.  
In mid-November 2009 reviewers were asked to complete a reviewer form in the 
template of the Climate Policy Journal’s Reviewer form by January 2010. ERC 
collated reviewer comments and through discussions with the committee chose to 
reject two of the Draft Papers submitted. During this time one paper’s author had to 
withdraw due to a schedule conflict with the conference. As such, twelve authors 
were approached to complete edits to their conference papers by mid-February 
2010. Authors submitted revised papers based on independent peer review by early 
March 2010. The ERC then compiled this volume.  
The papers in this proceedings address a variety of themes in this area: emissions 
trading, carbon taxes, fiscal and non-fiscal instruments, policy and institutional di-
mensions, and lessons from the Clean Development Mechanism.  
As can be seen from the list of participants, the conference attracted researchers from 
a wide range of disciplines who share an interest in the use of economic instruments 
to mitigate climate change, as well as South African and other developing country 
government decision-makers. 
Five themes emerged from the conference papers, as indicated in the table of con-
tents. All of the academic conference papers are included in this publication; papers 
that were not peer-reviewed but reflect inputs by South African government policy-
makers and a guest researcher from Brazil are not included here. This latter group of 
papers included the following: 
• Lingela, V (Department of Science and Technology). 2010 International 
strategy to develop technology capability in South Africa through the Clean 
Development Mechanism. 
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• Lucena, A et al (Energy Planning Program, COPPE, Federal University of 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil). 2010. Calculating the marginal cost of mitigation in 
various sectors of the Brazilian economy. 
• Visagie, M (Department of Trade and Industry). 2010. Climate change and 
government’s drive to promote green employment’.  
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THEME 1: CARBON PRICING AND THE 
POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
Aligning South African energy and 
climate change mitigation policy 
Emily Tyler 
Abstract  
This paper considers the alignment of energy policy in South Africa with the Cabi-
net’s mitigation vision of a ‘peak, plateau and decline’ greenhouse gas emissions 
trajectory to 2050. First, the term ‘policy’ is defined as having a number of levels and 
components. Following from this definition it is argued that, at the level of written 
and stated energy policy, the intention exists to move towards a more diverse, effi-
cient and less carbon-intensive energy sector. A number of policy instruments are 
being developed which go some way towards achieving this, although targets set are 
too low. However, at a policy paradigm level, the dominant energy policy paradigm 
and the orientation and capacity of the country’s energy institutions are fundamen-
taly misaligned with the Cabinet’s mitigation vision. In particular, vested interests 
within these institutions constrain policy co-ordination and hence alignment.  
The paper then explores how greater alignment could be secured The establishment 
of a single, overarching, co-ordinating energy policy institution through intervention 
at the highest political level appears to be a prerequisite. This institution could then 
govern appropriately oriented institutional capacity, either by creating new institu-
tions, or mandating existing institutions to deliver on low-carbon initiatives. It is 
suggested that, whilst new capacity may be optimal, it could be unrealistic to attain 
this level of sector transformation within the timeframes required by mitigation pol-
icy, given the strongly entrenched energy sector interests in maintaining the status 
quo.  
Keywords: Policy paradigm, peak plateau and decline, mitigation wedges, renewable 
energy, institutional orientation, contested interests 
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1. Introduction and overview 
This paper considers the alignment of existing and emerging energy and related 
policy areas with South Africa’s climate change mitigation aspirations. Areas of 
synergy and conflict with the country’s climate change mitigation objectives are 
explored, and the paper considers how greater policy alignment could be achieved. 
The paper begins by discussing the concept of ‘policy’, and deriving a working defini-
tion for the purposes of the analysis. Climate policy in the current South African 
context is then defined in section three, followed in section four by a consideration of 
the concept of energy policy paradigms, and particularly their application to the 
climate mitigation objectives.  
Sections five and six consider recent energy policy developments from the perspec-
tive of meeting carbon mitigation objectives, with section seven concluding that 
whilst climate mitigation and energy policy are aligned in intent and written form, 
they are strongly misaligned at the level of policy paradigm and institutional orienta-
tion. Section eight explores some possible ways in which this misalignment could be 
addressed, with section nine concluding and identifying areas for future research.  
2. ‘Policy’: a working definition 
There is no universally agreed definition of what constitutes ‘policy’. Policy could 
encompass the set of decisions undertaken by government, but it could also include 
the influences which determine both the way in which these decisions are inter-
preted, and which decisions end up being implemented. Further, it may include the 
context that determines the types of issues considered for decision initially. Policy is 
unlikely to be static, but rather continuously evolve as existing decisions are adapted 
and modified. A more detailed discussion of the definition of policy is beyond the 
scope of this paper. However, for the purposes of this paper, certain concepts are 
drawn from Marquard (2006) and expanded on by the author, for use as a working 
definition:  
 At its broadest conception, policy is governed by the policy paradigm, de-
fined as ‘the system of ideas and standards that specify the goals of policy, 
the kinds of instruments that can be used to attain them, and the very nature 
of the problems they are meant to address’(Menahem quoted in Marquard ( 
2006)).  
 Policy comprises both formal decisions, and informal decisions made during 
the policy development process. These are linked inter-temporally as deci-
sions result in further decisions, and structurally, as decisions are detailed and 
implemented. 
 There is both an administrative and a political function to policy develop-
ment. 
 Institutional capacity is an important determinant of policy direction, encour-
aging or constraining the elaboration of policy along particular paths. 
 Policy development can be contested due to conflict of interests within the 
policy making community. This could result in a lack of coherence between 
the various components of policy.  
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 A policy can be referred to as actualised if it is embedded in an institutional 
context, attracts resources on an ongoing basis for implementation, and re-
sults in further policy development in a similar direction. 
Policy is therefore understood to comprise a range of written policy documents 
(white papers and regulation), statements by policymakers, intentions and directions 
as included in green papers and strategic documents, institutional capacity and 
orientation, and actualized policy. Policy is also continuously evolving, is often con-
tested and incohesive, with the dominant policy paradigm driving policy focus and 
direction.  
3. South African climate mitigation policy  
South Africa is in the early stages of developing climate change mitigation policy, 
with only policy intentions and directions existing at this stage. The major compo-
nents of this policy direction include: the First and Second National Communications 
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 2004 
Climate Change Response Strategy, the 2005 Technology Needs Assessment, the 
Long Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS) process, the African National Congress 
(ANC)’s 2007 Polokwane Resolution on Climate Change, the 2008 Cabinet Re-
sponse to the LTMS, outlining a strategic mitigation vision based on a ‘peak, plateau 
and decline’ trajectory, the March 2009 Climate Policy Summit Discussion Docu-
ment, and international commitments made at the 2009 Copenhagen Conference of 
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. 
The peak, plateau and decline trajectory most succinctly encapsulates the broad 
climate policy direction as it currently stands, described as a shift ‘from an energy-
intensive to a climate-friendly path as part of a pro-growth, pro-developoment and 
pro-jobs strategy’ (van Schalkwyk 2008). The trajectory is depicted in Figure 1 be-
low, together with the LTMS graphs upon which it is based. 
Figure 1: LTMS graphs and Cabinet’s peak, plateau and decline trajectory 
The trajectory, depicted in red, allows emissions to rise to 2020/25, then plateau until 
2035, before declining from 2035 to meet the required-by-science target identified by 
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the LTMS of between 30% and 40% reduction by 2050. This trajectory was con-
firmed on the international stage in 2009 with the South African delegation to the 
Copenhagen COP offering to reduce emissions by 34% of a business as usual trajec-
tory by 2020, and 42% by 2025, subject to international technological and financial 
assistance. 
Combining Cabinet’s strategic vision with direction from other policy processes and 
building blocks, clarity on a number of energy related aspects of climate change 
policy direction emerges, revealing the following current energy-related climate 
change policy direction: 
 Emissions will rise to 34% below current projects by 2020, peak at 42% in 
2025, plateau until 2030 and then decline to 2050. 
 Renewables and nuclear will contribute in equal measure to a long term car-
bon neutral grid, with interim targets by 2030. Feed-in tariffs will support re-
newable energy. 
 CCS will be mandatory for new both coal-fired power generation and will be 
explored for existing coal plants and CTL. 
 Energy efficiency measures will be immediately implemented, building on the 
electricity crisis response. A mandatory national efficiency programme will be 
introduced.  
 Economic (carbon pricing), fiscal instruments and regulation will be em-
ployed to support a low carbon economy 
 In the transport sector, vehicle efficiencies will be pursued, as well as electric 
vehicles, R&D for hybrids and passenger modal shift. 
 Institutional support for the above will be fast-tracked. 
Whether the strength of the Cabinet’s strategic vision is retained as the written and 
institutional climate mitigation policy is developed depends on a number of factors. 
Most important among these is where in government the issue of climate mitigation is 
championed, and what level of influence this champion, or these champions, have. 
Currently the lead department is the Department of Environmental Affairs, and there 
are some indications that the Planning Commission may adopt elements of the 
mitigation agenda. Whilst the ANC and Cabinet appear fully behind the peak, pla-
teau and decline trajectory, the weight this is given will depend on how well it is 
aligned with the overarching policy paradigm within the new government, which is 
strongly pro-poor and pro-jobs. International pressures, stemming from both the 
negotiations under the UNFCCC and Kyoto, and from trade regime developments 
will also influence the strength of the eventual policy framework. 
4. Energy policy paradigms 
Marquard (2006) constructs a set of four possible consecutive energy policy para-
digms to assist in analysing the state of energy policy in South Africa. The paradigms 
and analysis provide insights into the question of climate and energy policy align-
ment at its broadest level. 
The least sophisticated paradigm is termed ‘Autarky’ (0), where there is no co-
ordination of the energy sector. This is followed by (1), ‘Energy supply’ where the 
policy objective is to ensure adequate energy supply to match a growing economy. 
Paradigm (2) ‘Supply-demand’ sees an awareness of energy demand as a factor in 
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policy, and characterises many of the OECD energy systems today. Finally the hypo-
thetical ‘Structural-cultural’ paradigm (3) includes cognisance of societal and behav-
ioural factors as part of the energy system. Marquard proposes that the more sophis-
ticated policy paradigms (2) and particularly (3) are better able to respond to policy 
challenges such as climate change given their expanded view of the energy system 
and its interactions with society as a whole.  
A wider consideration of energy policy such as that envisaged under the Structural-
cultural paradigm is strongly aligned with the Cabinet’s mitigation vision; as the 
country progresses along the peak, plateau and decline trajectory an increasingly 
profound overhaul of the way the country currently uses and thinks about energy will 
be required. Marquard’s paradigms imply an increasing level of co-ordination and 
planning, both within the energy sector and between the energy sector and the rest 
of society.  
Importantly for the analysis in this paper, Marquard writes that the ability to shift 
paradigms is determined by institutional capacity, and the ability for institutional 
innovation within the sector. 
5. South Africa’s historical energy policy, and the 1998 White Paper  
Prior to the 1994 political transition, the South African energy sector could be said to 
be operating within an ‘Energy supply’ (1) policy paradigm (Marquard 2006), with 
the individual energy supply communities of electricity, coal, liquid fuels and nuclear 
dominating the policy development and implementation process, and largely acting 
in silos. Energy services were almost solely delivered through the provision of cheap 
electricity powered by coal, with a third of liquid fuels also coming from the abun-
dant coal reserves via Sasol’s coal-to-liquids process. Very little thought was given to 
energy efficiency or planning for any alternative mode of energy service delivery in 
the future. 
The 1994 political transition opened a policy window as the political landscape was 
transformed, and the individual energy supply communities influence was relaxed 
(Marquard 2006). Within this window, the 1998 Energy Policy White Paper was 
developed, which has yet to be superceded. The Paper identifies five policy objec-
tives: increasing access to affordable energy services, improving energy governance, 
stimulating economic development, managing energy-related environmental and 
health impacts, and securing supply through diversity. These are significantly broader 
than the historical focus on securing energy supply, and extend to environmental and 
societal concerns, particularly the issue of electrification. Energy demand is addressed 
explicitly, as is the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Demand subsectors are 
even considered before the supply side is addressed in the paper. The White Paper 
itself follows an integrated energy planning structure, which ‘recognises that energy is 
not an end-good in itself, but is rather consumed as a means to some end…. The 
role of policy is thus to facilitate the optimal consumption of energy resources to 
meet social needs’ (DME 1998: 19). As such it contains elements of a Supply-
demand type policy paradigm, and potentially even a Structural-cultural paradigm. 
The Paper therefore holds considerable promise in laying the policy basis for a sector 
well equipped to respond to the challenges of climate change mitigation. From a 
paradigm perspective, it can be seen to be progressing the existing energy policy 
paradigm (1) towards (2) or even (3). On a written policy level, it sets out objectives 
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relating specifically to energy efficiency, renewables, energy diversification and sector 
level planning, all of which are essential for climate mitigation. 
6. Policy developments between 1998 and the present  
The period 1998–2009 was dominated from a South African energy perspective by 
electricity: the electrification programme, the reversal of electricity sector liberalisa-
tion, and the 2007 electricity supply crisis. On the sidelines there have been the 
financing difficulties of the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor, the transport infrastructure 
bottlenecks in the coal subsector, and hints of a pending supply crisis in the liquid 
fuels subsector. From a policy perspective, there has been a noticeable lack of sector 
co-ordination and guidance, and slow and low levels of mitigation-aligned policy 
implementation.  
6.1  Failure of energy planning, co-ordination and liberalisation 
The 1998 White Paper made provision for both integrated energy planning (IEP) 
and national integrated resource planning (NIRP) in the electricity sector, acknowl-
edging that capacity and data limitations in South Africa made this difficult. The 
Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) conducted a first IEP in 2003, but the 
second has not progressed past draft status. NERSA was identified to undertake 
NIRP in conjunction with Eskom, and successfully managed the first two NIRP, with 
the process having been transferred to Eskom for the third, with limited consultation 
(Winkler, 2009). Therefore, whilst the exercise has been undertaken on paper to 
some extent, a national process of energy planning and co-ordination has not been 
embedded. This can be argued to be due to lack of government capacity, with the 
result that dominant planning in the sector is being undertaken by Eskom. A poten-
tial paradigm 2 policy tool therefore has been subverted to a that of a paradigm 1 
(Energy supply) tool, focused solely on an individual energy supply sub-sector in 
isolation of substantive consultation with the broader energy community or society at 
large. This reduces the electricity sector’s ability to respond to climate mitigation 
challenges to that of the utility, whose objectives are not necessarily directly aligned 
with national objectives.  
The 1998 White Paper spoke of the need to address the lack of data and transpar-
ency of information in the energy sector for the purposes of planning and co-
ordination. However, little progress has been made in this regard. Skills and capacity 
are still largely concentrated in the dominant supply-side institutions, informing the 
incumbent energy policy paradigm, and perpetuating the status quo. Some data 
capability has been incorporated under the proposed South African National Energy 
Development Institute (SANEDI)’s functions, but at the time of writing SANEDI still 
has not received the resources or institutional backing to operate. 
On the objective of securing energy supply through diversification and liberalisation 
as envisaged in the White Paper, the situation has, if anything, regressed since 1998. 
Attempts were made at liberalisation early on in the decade but the lack of direction 
on new generation capacity, resistance by municipalities and the electricity supply 
crisis sharply reversed this with Eskom being confirmed as the sole purchaser of 
generated power by Cabinet in 2007. More recently, government has announced an 
independent systems operator (ISO) outside of Eskom in the State of the Nation 
Address (The Presidency 2010) which may represent a renewal of the liberalisation 
objective. To date, little appears to have been done to address the energy efficiency 
opportunities raised by the 2007 electricity crisis, nor to manage or prevent the 
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pending liquid fuels supply crisis. Initial forays into nuclear by Eskom and the gov-
ernment (PBMR) have been postponed or appear directionless. This lack of co-
ordination and prioritisation is demonstrated in the experience of NERT, which was 
tasked with driving all inititiatives relating to the electricity crisis (Rossouw 2009). 
Despite its important energy security mandate, it is being rendered impotent due to a 
lack of financing and a lack of staffing continuity since the DME was split into Energy 
and Minerals (Creamer 2009).  
Governance in the sector has been improved with the establishment of the National 
Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA), but co-ordination between government 
departments and policies has not progressed, nor has government capacity been 
strengthened. 
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, planning, co-ordination and liberalisation 
in the energy sector has failed dismally over the past decade. In some cases this is 
due to a lack of capacity within government, in others to a lack of sufficiently re-
sourced and appropriately oriented institutions. Particularly, there is no one over-
arching, capacitated and powerful co-ordinating policy institution to drive a coherent 
policy direction with a national agenda. This state of affairs remains unchallenged by 
powerful supply side focused vested interests, as it maintains the status quo of a 
centralised supply side oriented oligopolistic energy sector based on coal.  
6.2 Slow and low levels of implementation of climate mitigation-aligned 
energy policy  
Progress on managing greenhouse gas emissions in the energy sector has been slow 
in the past decade, although a foothold has been established. Subsectoral white 
papers, strategies and masterplans refer consistently to the need to diversify the 
energy mix, and to support renewable and nuclear energy, and energy efficiency (for 
example the Electricity Regulation Act of 2007 and 2008 Energy Act). Targets have 
been identified, and whilst these are consistently much lower than what is required to 
implement the peak, plateau and decline trajectory, they are in place, with the 
mechanisms to realise them slowly being developed.  
Little has been done around the use of energy-efficient and off-grid renewable inter-
ventions for the poor, whilst electrification was relatively effective. The low-income 
subsidised housing sector is still composed of highly energy-inefficient dwellings with 
residents using dirty fuels with correspondingly high incidence of poor health. The 
electrification campaign extended the country’s reliance on centralised coal gener-
ated grid electricity. 
The 2003 Renewable Energy White Paper commits the country to 10 000 GWh 
contribution of renewable energy to final energy demand by 2013. NERSA is devel-
oping a Renewable energy feed-in tariff (REFIT), which pays a subsidy to renewable 
energy generators, and which is expected to provide a long awaited kick-start to the 
renewables sector in the country, enabling South Africa to meet its renewable energy 
target. Whilst the pricing structure has been agreed, with the Department of Energy 
(DoE) providing the regulatory framework in the regulations on new generation 
capacity (5 August 2009), Eskom is reportedly still to sign off on the power purchase 
agreements which would give effect to the first renewable energy generation under 
the REFIT. 
There is a renewable energy subsidy office (REFSO) within DoE, established in 
2005, which administers a subsidy for assisting in the capital financing of both grid 
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and non-grid renewable energy projects. By 2009 only six projects, with a total 
installed capacity of 24MW had been subsidised, to a value of R15 million (DoE 
2009).  
The World Bank has funded a Renewable energy market transformation (REMT) 
project of the DoE, which is hosted by the Development Bank of Southern Africa. 
The project aims to assist the country meet its 2013 renewable energy target by 
supporting DoE develop a regulatory and policy framework for renewable energy, 
and developing institutional and financing support within the economy for renewable 
energy uptake. 
Treasury has levied a 2c/kwh charge on electricity generated from non-renewable 
sources, implemented in July 2009. Eskom, as the sole purchaser of electricity for the 
national grid faces this charge, and whilst it can be passed on to consumers, the 
utility has to absorb the charge within its tariff schedule. This is essentially the coun-
try’s first ‘carbon tax’, and whilst it pales into insignificance against the 35% increases 
requested by Eskom, the tax is now established and can be escalated in future. 
The 2005 Energy Efficiency Strategy stipulates a national energy efficiency target of 
12% by 2015, disaggregated to include sectoral targets. The electricity crisis resulted 
in immediate mandatory electricity rationing for the country’s large power users, 
which have now been transformed into targets under the Power Conservation Pro-
gramme (PCP) of an average of 10% reduction from a baseline consumption. This 
programme, identified as a key part of the crisis response is a government initiative 
with a suggested timeframe of 2008–13 (NERSA, 2008). It consists of three compo-
nents, the Energy Conservation Scheme (ECS), which envisages the inclusion of 
pricing interventions to encourage energy efficiency, the Energy Growth Manage-
ment component, which aims to allocate power to new connections efficiently, and 
the trading Rights to Consume scheme, which enables electricity consumers to trade 
energy efficiency rights in order to cost efficiently meet their targets under the ECS. 
NERSA published a draft consultation paper on the PCP rules in December 2008, 
and the programme has been reverted to the National Energy Response Team 
(NERT) to commission a review and make recommendations for Cabinet (Rossouw 
2009). NERT is a public-private structure which has all but ground to a halt due to 
fudning issues and a lack of continuity during the restructuring of the DoE (Creamer 
2009). Potentially one of the strongest instruments for aligning climate mitigation and 
energy policy has therefore been derailed through a lack of policy prioritisation and 
institutional focus. 
NERSA has regulated that a component of electricity tariffs are allocated to demand-
side management (DSM) activities, which are managed and undertaken by Eskom. 
Eskom has itself implement an Accelerated Energy Efficiency Plan (AEEP) which 
focuses on reducing electricity demand by 3000MW by 2012, and a further 5000MW 
by 2025 (www.eskomdsm.co.za, accessed 16 December 2009). However, given that 
Eskom generates its primary source of revenues from electricity sales, the AEEP does 
not appear to be aligned to the utility’s business model. 
The 1998 White Paper specified the establishment of institutional capacity to enable 
energy efficiency targets to be met. The National Energy Efficiency Agency (NEEA) 
was established in 2006 by the DME, and located within the Central Energy Fund 
(CEF). It has been agreed that part of the funds raised through the DSM levy will be 
allocated to energy efficiency initiatives, although these funds appear still to be 
largely under the control of Eskom. The intention exists for a NEEA governance 
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body to oversee the use of the funds (www.cef.org.za). However, the NEEA still has 
not been given the mandate and resources to function effectively. 
SANEDI, established by the 2008 Energy Act may provide the institutional capacity 
required to drive both renewables and energy efficiency. It is intended as the institu-
tion which is mandated to increase energy efficiency throughout the economy, re-
ducing energy intensity and optimising the use of finite energy resources and also has 
functions in energy research and development in all fields of energy other than nu-
clear (Government Gazette 2008). SANEDI is currently hosted by CEF to avoid the 
costs of a new entity to the country, but remains without resources and with a num-
ber of institutional issues still to be resolved before it can function effectively. 
A Biofuels Industrial Strategy of 2007 has been developed, with a target of 2% pene-
tration of biofuels in the national fuel supply by 2013. Integrated rapid transit (IRT) 
systems, which encourage modal shifts away from private vehicles towards public 
transport, are being developed for eight South African cities prior to the 2010 Soccer 
World Cup, and some rural networks. The implementation of these systems is a 
result of co-operation between national, provincial and local government, initiated by 
the transport departments. It appears that this initiative is happening without in-
volvement of the energy sector, which remains restricted to a supply-side approach 
of providing liquid fuels. 
The country has established a carbon capture and storage (CCS) centre, in March 
2009. Under CEF, it aims to have a pilot CCS plant in place by 2020 for coal and 
liquid fuels, capturing 40 million tonnes per year (SANERI 2009).  
The National Nuclear Energy Policy of 2008 envisions a fleet of nuclear generators in 
the country, with Eskom identified as the operator of this fleet. However, both the 
PBMR company and Eskom are delaying further progress on nuclear due to a lack of 
financing.  
The discussion in this section demonstrates that low-level targets and instruments 
aligned to Cabinet’s mitigation vision have been established by written energy policy. 
However, this section has also argued that the targets are currently woefully inade-
quate to meet the scale of the mitigation challenge. In addition, progress on imple-
mentation is both typically slow and often resisted by the dominant energy institu-
tions, or is stalled due to lack of co-ordination and prioritisation between institutions. 
The discussion demonstrates too that there are a number of different institutions 
operating in the same space, with no clarity on which one is driving an initiative. For 
example, the NEEA is tasked with ensuring energy efficiency is promoted throughout 
the economy. SANEDI has a similar function, and the most promising energy effi-
ciency initiative in terms of its alignment with Eskom’s capacity and influence, and 
seriousness of targets is being undertaken by NERT as the PCP. All three institutions 
and initiatives are in limbo due to a lack of resources, mandate and institutional 
strength. The overriding reason why the energy sector has underperformed on the 
implementation of climate mitigation aligned policies to date is argued, therefore, to 
be the continuing orientation of the well resourced energy institutions towards a 
centralised, fossil based supply approach. There is limited institutional capacity to 
support energy efficiency, renewable energy or planning responses to climate change 
mitigation, and where these are attempted they are thwarted by lack of co-
ordination, or more sinisterly, by well established institutions with vested interests in 
maintaining the status quo.  
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7. Is current energy policy aligned with climate change policy? 
The current status of energy and climate policy alignment can therefore be summa-
rised as being strong on a high level written policy level, but weak in the 1998 En-
ergy White Paper’s realisation in regulation, targets and implementation. Where 
there is alignment, it is still emerging, with targets and ambitions which are orders of 
magnitude lower than what is required by the climate change policy direction cur-
rently being pursued. Implementation is lacking, and a transition to an energy policy 
Paradigm 2 (Supply-demand) or even 3 (Structural-cultural) has been severely con-
strained.  
The immediate context of severe domestic energy capacity constraints, dysfunctional 
governance in the parastatals and a slowly growing indication that a low-carbon 
future is inevitable for the international economy implemented either unilaterally 
through trade barriers or, more ideally, through a multilateral climate policy agree-
ment, has strengthened the government’s statements of intent to diversify the electric-
ity sector, bringing in renewables and nuclear. Less has been said in the areas of 
liquid fuels and coal.  
Under President Zuma’s leadership, the DoE has been decoupled from the Depart-
ment of Minerals, which, although largely symbolic at this stage, does provide for the 
consideration of energy policy as separate from minerals policy, perhaps signifying a 
move away from the historical interdependence of the two and the emphasis on 
cheap, coal-generated power.  
However, this recent progress should be considered in the light of both the past 
decade and the more distant past. Dominance of a supply side, centralised, coal 
focused approach has been sustained and entrenched through the institutional estab-
lishment. Despite various ‘policy windows’ (Marquard 2006) having opened up 
during the past decade, moments where there is an opportunity for deep policy 
change, all have closed without serious challenge to the (1) type Energy supply 
policy paradigm. After 1994, the political transition provided a shake up of the routes 
to power of those with vested interests in maintaining the status quo, enabling the 
1998 White Paper which contained paradigm (2) and (3) type elements. However, 
before the policy changes could be supported by corresponding insitutional capacity 
and co-ordination, the paradigm (1) type institutions reasserted their dominance, and 
there has been little follow-through on the White Paper’s promise subsequently. The 
2007 electricity supply crisis also presented a window of opportunity for energy 
efficiency, liberalisation and diversification, but this too seems to have passed the 
sector by, with NERT rendered impotent and SANEDI still struggling for resources. 
The REFIT is promising, but is being held back by Eskom’s reluctance to sign the 
PPAs. The resultant sector structure is vulnerable to climate change mitigation chal-
lenges, which ideally require an energy service approach (Structural-cultural para-
digm 3) to efficiently and resourcefully reduce the country’s reliance on fossil fuels.  
The building of institutional capacity and influence, a critical component of a para-
digm transition, is a long and slow process, particularly when skills are scarce and 
vested interests and cultures are entrenched. SANEDI may well represent the begin-
nings of the institutional counterweight required to elevate the critical climate mitiga-
tion options of planning, energy efficiency and renewable energy, and enable the 
implementation of written policy. However, no change has yet been proposed to the 
policy context within which SANEDI will be required to operate; there has been no 
progress on systematic energy sector co-ordination or planning, and DoE has not 
proven itself has having sufficient capacity and influence to effectively manage the 
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contested interests of the existing institutions to enable SANEDI to function effec-
tively.  
The primary causes of the lack of alignment between climate mitigation policy and 
energy policy can therefore be summarised as: 
1. the lack of a single, overarching, co-ordinating energy policy institution which 
has sufficient power and influence to deal with the vested interests of the ex-
isting energy institutions; and 
2. existing and entrenched institutional orientation and capacity. 
8. Considering possibilities for achieving alignment 
So how could this entrenched misalignment be addressed? Firstly, the intervention of 
an overaching policy institution with sufficient power to override the vested interests 
which may be resisting progress in these areas currently, and with the ability to en-
force co-ordination between both existing energy sector institutions and associated 
non-energy institutions, appears to be essential.  
Secondly, institutional capacity of appropriate weight and oriented towards low-
carbon energy sector interventions is likely to be required. The creation of this capac-
ity is both a slow process and very costly. In South Africa, the challenge of skills 
scarcity compounds the issue. Institutional change takes time, and the capacity and 
orientation of institutions determines the ability of a country to shift energy policy 
paradigms (Marquard 2006).  
The first requirement appears non-negotiable. It will require a determined interven-
tion, with the highest possible political support and clarification of the lines of respon-
sibility and reporting within the energy sector currently, especially the roles of the 
Departments of Public Enterprises, Energy, and Science and Technology. An inter-
vention of this nature would require tremendous political will. There is the potential 
that this may be possible under the proposed National Planning Commission, which 
has announced climate and energy as areas of focus. However, this depends on the 
prioritisation of these amongst other policy priorities. Given that the Planning Com-
mission is based within the Presidency, and assuming therefore that it operates with 
the highest authority, it may have sufficient weight to override the various vested 
interests which are entrenched within the sector. Currently though, the Planning 
Commission remains in early stages of conceptualisation and development, and the 
proposal has faced some political opposition. It may therefore be some time before it 
is able to fulfill this role. Alternatively, or in addition, the inter-ministerial Energy 
committee recently announced in the State of the Nation address (The Presidency 
2010) and tasked with developing a twenty year IRP, provides an opportunity for the 
leadership requried in this area.  
The second requirement of institutional capacity could be achieved in two ways. 
Optimally, new capacity with sufficient weight to counteract the existing capacity 
which is oriented towards traditional coal-based supply approaches could be estab-
lished. At best, this is the path of energy planning and liberalisation, and will enable a 
Supply-demand policy paradigm 2 or Structural-cultural paradigm 3 to be achieved. 
The IEP and NIRP would be revived and institutionalised, and would be contextual-
ised within a national plan to align economic and social development within the 
peak, plateau and decline trajectory. The dominance of the energy supply communi-
ties in policy-making would have to be dismantled, together with the long-standing 
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cultures of secrecy and non-transparency within these institutions. Such an energy 
system will place the country in an optimal position to both respond to mitigation 
pressure from the international community and take advantage of the opportunities 
which a low-carbon future offers. 
However, this is a substantial and possibly overwhelming task, and one which may 
be beyond the capacity and priorities of the government and ruling party at this time, 
and particularly given the timeframes within which early mitigation investments need 
to be achieved. Certainly, substantial international support in terms of funding and 
specialist skills is likely to be required.  
The second way of achieving the prerequisite institutional capacity is to accept the 
entrenched nature of the current energy policy paradigm and institutions, and to seek 
climate mitigation alignment within these constraints in the short to medium term. So 
for example, in the renewables area, Eskom would be mandated to achieve ambi-
tious renewable and nuclear targets, and for industrial energy efficiency, ways would 
have to found of combining the institutional weight of existing parties such as Eskom, 
SANEDI, NERSA, the Energy Intensive Users Group, industry and the DoE with a 
high level of co-ordination and policy direction from the overarching policy institu-
tion.  
This second way would require a thorough and experienced understanding of the 
nature of the status quo, and the levers which could be accessed in order to align the 
agendas of the current institutions with those of Cabinet’s mitigation vision. This is 
likely to constitute a highly strategic, sensitive and negotiated process, which may 
result in a solution comprising Eskom driving renewables and nuclear, Sasol and the 
refineries maintaining their special ‘energy company’ status, but assisting in a cen-
trally driven transport emissions mitigation solution, and a mandatory energy effi-
ciency programme being overseen by a number of institutions carefully co-ordinated 
and aligned by the overarching policy institution. Given that this centralised way is 
unlikely to be optimally aligned to the deeper mitigation objectives contained in the 
Reach for the goal trajectory post-2030, a plan to transition to this type of energy 
sector environment and Structural-cultural policy paradigm (3) in the medium-to-
long term is likely to prove necessary. 
Timing for mitigation interventions is critical. In order to reach a peak 2020 / 25, 
planning must begin immediately. Challenging the existing order of vested interests 
which date back for decades is likely to take time. This may necessitate the second 
way in the shorter term. 
9. Conclusions and areas for further research 
This paper has argued that overall, energy and climate change policy in South Africa 
are not currently aligned. Whilst written and stated energy policy is to some extent 
aligned with a low-carbon future, both the dominant energy policy paradigm and the 
orientation and capacity of the country’s energy institutions are fundamentally mis-
aligned. In particular, conflicts between these institutions constrain policy co-
ordination and hence alignment. However, on the level of policy mechanisms, a 
basis exists on which to build alignment in future. This includes mechanisms such as 
the renewable energy and energy efficiency targets, the PCP, the REFIT and the 
attempts at energy sector level planning. 
The primary causes for the misalignment are, to repeat, firstly, the lack of a single, 
overarching, co-ordinating energy policy institution which has sufficient power and 
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influence to deal with the vested interests of the existing energy institutions; and, 
secondly, existing and entrenched institutional orientation and capacity. 
In line with this, the establishment of such an overarching, co-ordinating energy 
policy institution is a pre-requisite for any progress to be made towards aligning 
energy policy with climate policy. On the institutional capacity and orientation front, 
two alternatives are proposed. Optimally, there should be a dismantling of the cur-
rent energy institutional structure and its vested interests, and new climate mitigation 
oriented institutional capacity developed. However, South Africa is a developing 
country, with scarce resources, particularly energy sector skills. As such, and particu-
larly considering the timeframe for adopting some of the main mitigation interven-
tions, this approach may well not be possible. The second proposed alternative is 
then that policy-makers and energy sector participants consider how best to deliver 
mitigation within the constraints of the existing institutional structures.  
The indicative policy alignment requirements require further testing and exploration. 
A quantitative and modelled approach would substantially deepen the analysis. 
Reference to international experiences, particlarly the experiences of other develop-
ing countries in aligning their energy sectors with a low carbon future may yield 
significant learnings. In addition, further research on how the second-best institu-
tional alternative could be constructed in each energy sub-sector and for each mitiga-
tion wedge will be informative. To this end, research into the various energy institu-
tions’ corporate cultures, and how this could be transformed, would give useful 
insights. The weakening of the Cabinet’s mitigation vision has not been considered in 
this analysis, but the implications of this for energy policy would be useful to under-
stand, particularly if the high level intervention option is attempted. Finally, this 
paper has not dwelt on the implications of and for industrial policy of a significant 
energy policy paradigm and institutional shift, which is expected to be a valuable 
addition. 
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Abstract  
Economic instruments to mitigate climate change alter the relative cost structures of 
sectors within economies and between economies internationally. This will lead to 
structural changes within economies benefitting less carbon-intensive goods and 
services. One area of government policy that is particularly important in this context 
is industrial policy, which aims to facilitate structural changes in economies towards 
higher productivity activities. To ensure that industrial policy places South Africa on a 
low-carbon growth path, it needs to start favouring less carbon-intensive industries. 
Industrial policy must align with the use of economic instruments to mitigate climate 
change in South Africa to ensure that industrial strategies are implemented that will 
be sustainable in a carbon-constrained world. This interplay between carbon pricing 
and industrial policies in South African is investigated by considering, on the positive 
side, the opportunities created by climate change and, on the negative side, the 
potential impact of carbon pricing on industrial competitiveness. The paper con-
cludes by recommending ways in which climate change considerations can be incor-
porated into industrial policy in order to move South Africa towards a sustainable 
low-carbon growth path. This will ensure that the economic costs of carbon pricing 
are minimised while potential long-term competitiveness advantages are maximised. 
Keywords: industrial policy, climate change mitigation, structural change, knowledge-
based industrialisation, competitiveness 
 
1. Introduction 
Economic instruments to mitigate climate change, whether carbon taxes or cap-and-
trade schemes, place a price on carbon. This affects the relative cost structures of 
sectors within an economy and between economies internationally by effectively 
making carbon ‘a factor of production that needs to be paid for in the same way as 
labour or raw materials’ (Smale et al 2006: 33; Wooders et al 2009). In a carbon-
constrained world with significant carbon prices, it is thus important that countries 
move to low-carbon economies to preserve their international competitiveness. In 
order to start moving South Africa towards a low-carbon economy, climate change 
objectives need to be integrated into all areas of government policy (DEAT 2009). 
One area of government policy that is particularly important from a climate change 
perspective is industrial policy.  
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This paper seeks to evaluate the interplay between policies to combat climate change 
and policies to support industrial development in a South African context. More 
specifically, the impact of putting a price on carbon on the implementation of indus-
trial policy in South Africa will be considered. The paper begins by providing an 
overview of industrial policy in South Africa. It then moves on to consider potential 
synergies between climate change policy (in the form of a price on carbon) and 
industrial policies. The possible negative impact of carbon-pricing on industrial com-
petitiveness is also discussed. The paper concludes by recommending ways in which 
climate change considerations can be incorporated into industrial policy in order to 
move South Africa towards a low-carbon growth path. This will ensure that the 
economic costs of carbon pricing are minimised.  
2. Industrial policy: definition and purpose 
Industrial policy encompasses measures aimed at increasing the efficiency of an 
economy (Presidency 2009). More specifically, Hausmann, Rodrik and Sabel (2007: 
1) believe the purpose of industrial policy is to ‘speed up the process of structural 
change towards higher productivity activities’. Flatters and Stern (2008: 15) feel that 
industrial policy should aim to ‘expand the economic activities available to a coun-
try’s citizens’, while Kaplan (2008: 40) contends that the focus of industrial policy is 
to ‘enhance the productivity and efficiency of firms’.  
Theoretically, industrial policy can be defined as different points along a continuum 
(Chang 1998). The broadest definition of industrial policy includes all government 
policy that influences industrial performance, while the narrowest definition of indus-
trial policy includes only specific policy measures aimed at developing specific sec-
tors. The latter approach is commonly referred to as ‘sector targeting’ or ‘picking 
winners’. At the midpoint of the continuum, industrial policy can be defined as con-
sisting of ‘core’ policies targeting specific priority sectors supported by ‘general’, non-
sector specific policies aimed at increasing the competitiveness of all industries. 
‘General’ policies usually include measures like broad support for research and 
development or training activities throughout the economy.  
3. Industrial policy in South Africa: overview 
The Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative – South Africa (AsgiSA) suggested an 
active industrial policy approach to move the economy to a more ‘inclusive’ growth 
path (DTI 2007a; Presidency 2009). A national framework guiding industrial policy, 
the National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF), and the accompanying Industrial 
Policy Action Plan (IPAP) were completed in 2007 (DTI 2007a; 2007b; MEDS 
2007). The NIPF aims to provide a ‘framework rather than a blueprint’ to guide 
industrial policy to support South Africa’s industrialisation and to facilitate structural 
change in the economy, (DTI 2007a: 9). The IPAP sets out a prioritisation of indus-
trial policy key actions to be undertaken within rolling three-year medium-term 
expenditure frameworks (MTEFs).  
The main objectives of industrial policy in South Africa (DTI 2007a: 10-11; 2007b: 
2) are:  
 to facilitate diversification of the South African economy beyond traditional 
commodities and non-tradable services; 
 to intensify industrialisation towards a knowledge economy; 
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 to promote labour-intensive industrialisation; 
 to promote broader-based industrialisation also benefitting historically disad-
vantaged individuals and marginalised regions; and 
 to support industrial development on the African continent. 
The NIPF also identifies the need to ‘identify and act upon critical constraints and 
opportunities at both the cross-cutting and the sectoral levels of the economy [em-
phasis added] (DTI 2007a: 10).1 The first IPAP prioritises six cross-cutting areas (DTI 
2007b: 33-41):  
 Improving the design and administration of industrial financing; 
 Leveraging public procurement; 
 Reducing intermediate input costs through the use of competition policy and 
a review of import tariffs; 
 Improving support mechanisms for innovation, technology and research and 
development; 
 Improving infrastructure and logistics; and  
 Linking skills development to sector strategies. 
The effective implementation of industrial policy is premised on the coordination and 
commitment of a wide range of government departments and agencies. This is true 
even for ‘narrow industrial policy’, given that it often requires departments other than 
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) – which is tasked with implementing 
industrial policy and sector strategies – to play an important supporting role. The 
NIPF thus aims to provide a point of intersection between industrial policy and com-
plementary policies and programmes within government to create an environment 
conducive to industrial development. 
Sometimes, however, very selective industrial interventions are undertaken by gov-
ernment departments other than the DTI and presented outside of the national 
industrial policy framework (Kaplan 2008). Kaplan (2008: 37) refers to these inter-
ventions as ‘hidden industrial policy’ and mentions that they are often undertaken 
with little consideration of industrial policy objectives, implementation plans and 
selection criteria. Examples of ‘hidden industrial policy’ would include the role of the 
Department of Public Enterprises in supporting very selective interventions like direct 
support to the armaments industry, support for the development of the Pebble Bed 
Modular Reactor (PBMR) and subsidised infrastructure and energy to the Coega 
industrial development zone. 
The NIPF prescribes that all sector development work should be based on (DTI 
2007a):  
• A detailed, realistic and verifiable economic analysis of the sector taking account 
of the relative size and growth prospects of the sector as well as the potential for 
employment creation, additional value-added, diversification and growth of ex-
ports and production, development of new technologies and broad based em-
powerment. 
                                                 
1  The definition at the midpoint of the continuum highlighted in the previous section thus seems to currently 
be the most appropriate description of industrial policy in South Africa. 
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• A serious ‘self-discovery’ process that aims to identify the constraints and oppor-
tunities in the sector. The self-discovery processes can take many forms, but es-
sentially involves a robust consultation between the firms in a sector, govern-
ment, labour, civil society and other relevant stakeholders. The process should be 
informed by extensive sector research and analysis. 
• An analysis of the viability and sustainability of the sector in the medium to long 
term. 
• An economic cost-benefit analysis of the alternative policy responses available to 
address identified constraints and opportunities within the sector. 
• An assessment of institutional arrangements that impact on both the sector’s 
ability to engage with government and assist in implementing policy measures, 
and government’s capacity to implement policy measures in the relevant sector. 
Based on the criteria listed above, the NIPF advocates the prioritisation of about five 
‘high-impact priority sectors’ to focus on within every MTEF period (DTI 2007: 34-
35). Emphasis should also be placed on sectors that can support South Africa’s 
structural transition to a ‘technology sophisticated and knowledge-driven economy, 
have made significant progress in ‘self-discovery’ and have sufficient information 
available to craft effective policies. 
4. Synergies between carbon pricing and industrial policy  
Climate change was not addressed in the NIPF or the original IPAP. Putting a price 
on carbon is likely to have a significant impact on industrial policy initiatives. There 
are a number of areas where a price on carbon may support the objectives of indus-
trial policy in South Africa, and these are considered below.  
4.1  Structural change in the South African economy 
Hausmann, Rodrik and Sabel (2008: 2) refer to the process through which firms 
identify the markets which they are (or may be) able to serve as ‘self-discovery’. They 
suggest that self-discovery externalities are ubiquitous in emerging markets. The 
process of learning how to produce new products profitably is under-supplied in most 
emerging economies since it is a risky endeavour and the social value of success 
exceeds the private return. By forcing the private sector to consider the implications 
on their activities of having to pay for their GHG emissions, carbon pricing can assist 
the ‘self-discovery’ process that is one of the cornerstones of industrial policy in 
South Africa. Firms will need to evaluate new production techniques and technolo-
gies to either reduce their GHG emissions, or to increase the efficiency of other areas 
of their production process to try and offset the increase in their production costs as a 
result of carbon pricing. This may lead to the development of new technologies, 
processes or products which that could eventually become part of the firm’s product 
mix.  
In a relatively new area like climate change the potential social value (and the poten-
tial for private returns) of successful self-discovery is very high, given that the devel-
opment of new global markets for environmental goods and services2 is likely to offer 
                                                 
2  Environmental goods and services ‘measure, prevent, limit, minimise or correct environmental damage’, and 
include activities as diverse as renewable energy generation, environmental consulting, environmentally 
friendly construction techniques and energy efficiency (European Commission 2008: 9). 
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significant opportunities for growth (Demailly 2009; DTI 2007a). Becker and Shad-
begian (2009) find that environmental products manufacturing firms in the US are 
more likely to be exporters than general manufacturers, indicating the international 
nature of these markets. Countries and firms that identify and act upon these oppor-
tunities quickly will have a significant first-mover advantage. This could lead to a 
strong competitive advantage which may prove highly lucrative since these markets 
are expected to grow significantly in the medium-to-long term (Demailly 2008; DTI 
2007a; MEDS 2007). As international commitments to reduce GHG emissions start 
to become more onerous, and developing countries are party to these commitments 
(as happened recently with the signing of the Copenhagen Accord) a first-mover 
advantage in environmental goods and services linked to climate change is expected 
to increasingly translate into a competitive advantage.  
Blueprint (2006) identifies climate change as one of the key factors expected to drive 
growth in the environmental goods and services sector in South Africa, and identifies 
three main areas of opportunity linked to climate change, namely analytical and 
consulting services (eg. data generation and interpretation); commercialisation of 
new technologies (eg. carbon capture and storage technologies); and renewable 
energy (eg. wind farm and solar energy). One possible outcome of climate change 
measures may be to incentivise the creation of new areas of low-carbon competitive 
advantage within the economy based on local resource endowments (Winkler & 
Marquard 2007). One potential such area of competitive advantage in South Africa 
may be the solar energy industry, given that South Africa has some of the best condi-
tions for solar energy generation in the world.  
By favouring less energy- and carbon-intensive sectors, climate change policy will 
assist in diversifying the South African economy away from its historical reliance on 
energy- and capital-intensive upstream resource-based manufacturing (DTI 2007a; 
Winkler & Marquard 2007). This will support the NIPF objective of moving the South 
African economy towards non-traditional tradable goods and services and potentially 
diversifying exports. 
4.2 Continued access to export markets 
Credible carbon pricing will play an important role in supporting industrial develop-
ment by facilitating continued access to South Africa’s current export markets (DTI 
2007a). Developed countries implementing (or considering implementing) relatively 
stringent climate change policies are increasingly concerned that putting a price on 
carbon my lead to ‘carbon leakage’. Carbon leakage refers to a relocation of produc-
tion activities to jurisdictions with less stringent climate change policies as a result of, 
for instance, a shift in consumption of carbon-intensive goods from local production 
to cheaper imported products (Van Asselt et al 2009). Carbon leakage thus refers to 
a situation where the competitiveness of firms is reduced as a result of a price on 
carbon existing in some countries, but not in others (Garnaut 2008).  
Carbon leakage can be addressed in a number of ways. Countries where a price of 
carbon exists may consider implementing border adjustment measures. Border 
adjustment measures aim to remove the cost advantage of imported goods produced 
under less stringent climate change policies by levying a tariff on imported goods 
equal to the differential between the local price of carbon and the price on carbon in 
the country where the imports originated. Alternatively, importers may be required to 
surrender permits or certificates equal to the value of the carbon embodied in im-
ports, which will then in turn lead them to require exporters to provide the required 
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permits/certificates so as to not impact on their margins (Frankel 2009; Van Asselt et 
al 2009). Given that there is a precedent of allowing trade measures to combat 
global externalities (trade restrictions relating to products linked to CFC emissions 
under the Montreal Protocol, for instance), Frankel (2009) and Bordoff (2009) be-
lieve that border adjustment measures linked to GHGs may well be WTO compliant, 
depending on how they are designed and implemented. Frankel and Bordoff, how-
ever, both mention the possibility that border adjustment measures may be imple-
mented as protectionist tools given the discretion that individual governments will 
have to define: whether trade partners are meeting their carbon responsibilities; how 
to measure the carbon content of manufactures; what sectors are susceptible to 
border adjustment measures; etc. Another way to combat carbon leakage is to use 
labelling and product specifications to allow local consumers to differentiate between 
more and less environmentally damaging goods. The US is currently considering the 
implementation of broad border adjustment measures (potentially covering energy-
intensive products and all other final products), while the EU is in favour of sub-
sector-specific trade measures to address carbon leakage (targeting energy-intensive 
products) (Van Asselt et al 2009). The EU has already adopted environmental label-
ling regulations and minimum requirements on energy-related products. (European 
Commission 2008). 
If a realistic local price on carbon is not in place and border adjustment measures are 
applied to South African goods, it could significantly affect the ability of South Africa 
to grow (or even sustain) exports to its main export markets, namely the EU and US. 
The situation will be exacerbated if a combination of labelling requirements and 
consumer preferences in export markets lead to a reduction in demand for relatively 
high carbon South African goods. 
4.3 Knowledge-based industrialisation 
The imposition of a price on carbon may offer significant opportunities for technol-
ogy development, innovation and adoption as firms attempt to reduce their carbon 
liabilities. The European Commission (2008: 2) states that efforts to increase sustain-
ability and global pressures to increase resource efficiency ‘could become an impor-
tant source of innovation and ... an asset for industry’s competitiveness’. The extent 
of the opportunity is highlighted by the fact that MEDS (2007) places climate change 
mitigation and adaption at the centre of the Western Cape’s innovation strategy. An 
environment that incentivises low-carbon production technologies (by placing a price 
on carbon, for example) may also lead to significant technology spill-over effects as 
new low-carbon technologies available internationally are adopted and adapted 
locally (Demailly 2008).  
Knowledge industries are often established in response to market forces that increase 
the returns on new technologies and innovation (a price on carbon would increase 
the monetary value of carbon abated through a reduction in carbon costs) and other 
incentives like government support for specific technologies and their implementation 
(MEDS 2007). A regulatory environment where climate change considerations are 
incorporated into investment and policy decisions through a price on carbon, under-
pinned by appropriate public sector support programmes, should thus create the 
right incentives for private sector players to exploit the opportunities offered by cli-
mate change (MEDS 2007; Winkler & Marquard 2007). Winkler and Marquard 
(2007) believe that, with the right support measures, South Africa could become a 
‘world leader’ in solar thermal energy in a similar way that Denmark became the 
leading developer and exporter of wind technology. In addition to solar energy, 
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DEAT (2009) believes investment in research and development related to electric 
and hybrid vehicles, carbon capture and storage, and clean coal technologies should 
be prioritised.  
An opportunity to secure international funding for the development of new environ-
mental goods and services, and to facilitate technological spill-over effects, which has 
been underutilised in South Africa, is the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) (Sangena Investments, 2004). In 2006 the value of trade in CDM 
credits was €6bn while only 12 out of the 839 CDM projects registered internation-
ally, were registered in South Africa (Van den Berg 2008). According to the 
UNFCCC CDM registry (http: //cdm.unfccc.int), as at the 12th of November 2009, 
only 17 out of a total of 1895 (0.9%) CDM projects were registered in South Africa. 
In contrast, 165 projects were registered in Brazil, 467 in India and 663 in China. 
The CDM is only available to South African firms for a limited period of time (until 
South Africa enters into binding international commitments to reduce its GHG emis-
sions), and measures should thus be put in place speedily to assist South African 
firms to make the most of this opportunity while it is still available (Sangena Invest-
ments 2004; Van den Berg 2008). The Environmental Finance function that was 
established in the wood, paper and other strategic business unit of the Industrial 
Development Corporation during 2009 to specialise in the funding of CDM projects, 
and the Africa Carbon Asset Development (ACAD) Facility that was launched by the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and Standard Bank in October 
2009, should help to provide much needed impetus to the development of CDM 
projects in South Africa (IDC 2009; Standard Bank 2009). 
4.4 Labour-intensive and broad-based industrialisation 
A move towards a low-carbon economy facilitated by a price on carbon has the 
potential to create a number of ‘green jobs’.3 Winkler (2007b) mentions that energy 
efficiency measures generate significant employment opportunities. Not only are 
people employed directly in energy efficiency initiatives, but savings on energy ex-
penditures enables greater expenditure on non-energy goods and services (the pro-
duction of which is generally more labour-intensive than the energy sector) which 
leads to employment gains throughout the economy (Geller et al 1992; UNEP 2008, 
Winkler 2007b). UNEP (2009) mentions that opportunities for employment creation 
linked to energy efficiency are particularly significant in developing countries as a 
result of large stocks of energy inefficient buildings that will require retrofitting.4 The 
European Trade Union Confederation (EUTC 2007) believes that on the whole 
climate change mitigation actions will have a modest positive impact on employ-
ment. Locally, the Minister of Energy recently commented that the programme to roll 
out a million solar water heaters locally within the next 5 years has the potential to 
create up to 100 000 jobs across the value chain including installation and mainte-
nance (van der Merwe 2009a). In addition, Winkler (2007a) mentions that renew-
able energy technologies are more labour intensive than non-renewal technologies. 
AGAMA (2003) calculated that adding renewable energy to the generation mix to 
meet energy demand in 2020 (70% of the estimated 62TWh additional supply pro-
vided from renewable sources) will lead to an 21% increase in the number of direct 
                                                 
3  UNEP (2008: 3) defines ‘green jobs as work in agricultural, manufacturing, research and development 
(R&D), administrative, and service activities that contribute substantially to preserving or restoring envi-
ronmental quality’. 
4  For a discussion of employment creation linked to energy efficiency initiatives, see UNEP (2008). 
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jobs created in the electricity supply industry compared to a situation where all addi-
tional capacity is generated from coal-fired power stations (52 000 new jobs versus 
43 000).5  
Not only will the additional jobs include a significant number of unskilled and semi-
skilled workers6 (mainly in the biofuels, biogas and solar water heaters sectors), but 
the distribution of jobs will also support the NIPF’s stated objective of creating em-
ployment in marginalised regions. The jobs created by renewable sources will be 
more decentralised than will be the case with gas, nuclear and coal generation and 
will largely be located in rural areas (AGAMA 2003). The provision of off-grid elec-
tricity to remote areas could also stimulate rural economic activity (AGAMA 2003). 
4.5 Continued access to financing 
One of the cross-cutting themes addressed in the NIPF is ensuring that sufficient 
developmental industrial financing is available to finance new industries (DTI 2007a 
and 2007b). The NIPF mentions that industrial financing should target new activities 
and should include explicit ‘sunset clauses’ that limit the period for which it is ex-
tended to firms, while the IPAP states that industrial financing has an important role 
to play in leveraging private sector investment. Industrial financing should thus serve 
as seed capital to initiate new activities or sector with a high potential to achieve 
industrial policy objectives. Once these areas are established, private sector funding 
and investment should drive its further development.  
Financial institutions have the greatest impact on GHG emissions via their lending 
and investment portfolios (RiskMetrics Group 2009). The impact of carbon pricing on 
the profitability of creditors and investment projects could thus have a serious impact 
on the performance of the loan portfolios of financial institutions. In addition to 
measuring emissions resulting from their investment and financing activities, RiskMet-
rics Group (2009) recommends that financial institutions in emerging markets should 
begin to factor carbon costs into their financing and investment decisions. They 
mention that this is particularly important for energy-intensive projects which em-
body potential financial risks as a result of the implementation of more widespread 
(and more substantial) policies to reduce GHG emissions internationally. Cogan 
(2008) finds that out of a sample of 40 of the world’s largest banks, 14 banks have 
adopted lending procedures or risk management policies that systematically address 
climate change. Cogan adds that a ‘small but growing number of banks also are 
formally calculating carbon risk in their loan portfolios’. These banks include Citi, 
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Mizuho Financial 
Group, Royal Bank of Canada and Wells Fargo. In addition, Bank of America has 
announced a target to reduce the GHG emissions associated with its utility corporate 
finance portfolio.  
Locally, Nedbank has recently indicated that it ‘may make calls on whether or not to 
finance projects and businesses based on their carbon emissions and their willingness 
to make environmentally-friendly choices’ (Shumacher 2009: 1). A number of finan-
cial institutions also indicated concerns that financing to emissions-intensive indus-
                                                 
5  The results of this study are consistent with that of the European Commission’s MITRE project. The 
project found that employment creation in the renewable energy sector more than compensates for em-
ployment losses elsewhere in an economy, and that ‘pro-active encouragement of renewables give rise to 
significant net employment gains’ (EC 2004: 13). 
6  For a detailed assessment of the types of skills required for individual renewable energy technologies, see 
AGAMA (2003). 
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tries by be regulated in future (NBI 2009). The emissions intensity of industries and 
projects could thus potentially affect their ability to raise financing in future, and a 
price on carbon that incentivises industries to reduce their emissions intensity could 
thus play an important role in facilitating continued access to funds for industrial 
policy focus sectors in future. 
5. Carbon pricing and industrial competitiveness 
There is, however, one area where carbon pricing may undermine industrial policy 
objectives: the potential impact of a price of carbon on industrial competitiveness. 
5.1 Overview 
In addition to the potential opportunities available to firms from climate change 
mentioned above, carbon pricing may lead to increased competitiveness as firms are 
forced to audit their production process for unexploited efficiencies (MEDS 2007; 
Demailly 2008). The use of the instruments of industrial policy, particularly mecha-
nisms to support investment in updated machinery and equipment to replace ageing 
capital stock and more general support for industrial upgrading to deepen manufac-
turing capacity (DTI 2007), could be used to further leverage unexploited efficiencies. 
There are, however, concerns that having to internalise the cost of GHG emissions 
may reduce the international competitiveness of firms relative to countries with less 
strict carbon policies and lower carbon production processes. This may lead to a 
reduction in employment and tax revenues (Demailly 2008; Neuhoff 2008). 
Different sectors typically have different comparative advantages, and are often faced 
with divergent regulatory regimes – often even within the same country. In terms of 
international competitiveness, the emphasis should thus be on the sectors or even 
firms within countries that compete in international markets, rather than the competi-
tiveness of a country (Krugman 1994). Climate change policies will reduce the com-
petitiveness of carbon-intensive sectors relative to less carbon-intensive sectors within 
an economy. They may also reduce the competiveness of-carbon-intensive sectors in 
a country relative to carbon-intensive sectors in countries with less stringent climate 
change polices (Demailly 2008). Only the relative competitiveness of tradable sectors 
in countries with different levels of climate change policies in place will be affected 
(Demailly 2008). In practice, however, climate change (and other environmental) 
policies are only one of many factors influencing competitiveness.  
The impact of climate change policies on industrial activities have to-date been 
relatively small, and are currently dwarfed by factors like trade barriers, transport 
costs, exchange rate fluctuations, investment climate factors, etc for most sectors 
(Desmailly 2008; Oikonomou et al 2006; Neuhoff & Mathes, 2008;). This may, 
however, largely be a function of carbon commitments internationally being rela-
tively modest to-date. As international commitments become more onerous and 
widespread, the impact of carbon costs on industrial competitiveness may become 
more pronounced. 
Factors like sunk costs and regulatory requirements (like limits on foreign ownership 
of enterprises) also limit the ability of firms to relocate (Desmailly 2008). Firms that 
wish to relocate also run the risk that a price on carbon may be implemented (or 
become more significant) in the jurisdiction that they are contemplating relocating to 
during the pay-back period on their new investment (Neuhoff & Mathes, 2008). As a 
result of international pressure, border adjustment measures in export markets etc 
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this scenario is quite likely– particularly for projects/investments with long pay-back 
periods. Sijm et al (2006), based on a survey of the empirical literature, and Barker 
et al (2007: 20), based on an econometric assessment of carbon leakage within the 
European union, both find that environmental policy to date has not generally had a 
significant effect on the competitiveness or the investment and relocation decisions of 
firms in energy-intensive industries. The reason for the relatively insignificant leakage 
impact in practice is that carbon leakage effects have largely been offset by technol-
ogy diffusion and spillover effects (Desmailly, 2008; Barket et al 2007). 
The cost impacts of climate change policies do however vary widely between sectors, 
and there are usually a minority of sectors in a country that are significantly affected 
by climate change policies like carbon pricing (Neuhoff & Mathes, 2008). Figure 1 
shows the sectors in the UK which are expected to experience an increase of more 
than 2% in their production costs (relative to gross value added [GVA] – this meas-
ure is referred to as ‘value at stake’) as a result of a carbon price of €20/t and a 
€10/MWh increase in the price of electricity (Houcade et al 2008). Sectors account-
ing for slightly more than 1% of economic activity in the UK will experience an in-
crease of 2% or more. These sectors contribute 11% of the UK’s total GHG emis-
sions and 0.5% of its employment.  
 
Figure 1: Sectors potentially exposed to significant CO2 price effects  
(UK 2004 data) 
Source: Houcade et al (2008) 
Neuhoff and Mathes (2008) believe that the results shown in Figure 1 are very similar 
to results from other studies dealing with OECD countries. Figure 2 shows the emis-
sion intensity of the Australian economy. Five Australian traded goods and services 
sectors stand out as very emissions-intensive in comparison with the rest of the econ-
omy, namely: aluminium, beef cattle; cement and lime; sheep; and dairy cattle. The 
10 industries with the highest emissions intensity accounted for a combined 37% of 
Australia’s total emissions, around 4% of GDP, 3% of total employment and 15% of 
total exports in 2001-2002. For the five most emissions intensive industries, a carbon 
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price in the vicinity of $20/t CO2 would increase production costs by 10–15%. Sec-
tors that would experience production cost increases of 4% or more contributed 25% 
of Australia’s national emissions, and around 2% of GDP and employment in 2001-
2002 (Australian Government 2008). 
 
 
Figure 2: Emission intensity of traded sectors in the Australian economy 
(2001-2002) 
Source: Australian Government (2008) 
 
Figure 3: Assessing vulnerability of US sectors to carbon price based on 
trade and energy intensity 
Source: WRI (2008) 
Figure 3 shows imports as a share of local consumption (as a proxy for the tradability 
of a sector and thus also the ability of firms to pass on cost increase) relative to the 
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energy intensity (as a proxy for carbon intensity) for a number of US sectors (WRI 
2008). The figure indicates that the most energy-intensive sectors in the US are 
relatively shielded from international cost pressures in the form of imports, non-
ferrous metals being a notable exception. The non-ferrous metals sector is thus likely 
to be much more constrained in its ability to pass on carbon costs than a sector like, 
for instance, ferrous metals, and is likely to be relatively vulnerable to competitive-
ness impacts as a result of a price on carbon. This analysis does however not take 
into account the availability and cost of abatement options available to the non-
ferrous metal industry in the US. If there are a number of low-cost and low-risk 
abatement options available to the non-ferrous metals sector in the US, it may be less 
vulnerable to competitiveness impacts than indicated in Figure 3. 
5.2 Addressing competitiveness concerns 
Neuhoff and Mathes (2008) state that potential negative competitiveness concerns 
tend to be concentrated in upstream sectors, and particularly in sub-sectors that 
utilise energy and emission-intensive processes to produce low value-added prod-
ucts. Hourcade et al (2008) mention that potentially highly affected sectors contribute 
relatively small shares of GDP and employment within a given country. They believe 
that this provides the opportunity to focus on a few specific subsectors of limited size, 
which in turn allows for the development of customised technical solutions to address 
valid competitiveness and leakage concerns. Governments can thus craft interven-
tions that support robust economic performance while addressing climate change 
concerns. Addressing valid carbon leakage concerns in specific sectors is also impor-
tant since these sectors may play an important role in supplying downstream sectors. 
It is also important to consider political economy considerations. Determined opposi-
tion by highly affected industries, particularly if they are provide significant employ-
ment, may be sufficient to prevent credible climate policies from being implemented. 
The socio-economic challenges facing South Africa mean that climate change mitiga-
tion must be balanced with the need for sustained economic growth and employ-
ment creation (DEAT 2009). Industrial policy in South Africa aims to diversify the 
South African economy away from its current over-reliance on energy- and capital-
intensive upstream resource-based manufacturing. Based on international experi-
ence, these areas are likely to include the sectors that will be most vulnerable to 
climate change policies and may find it hard to compete in a carbon-constrained 
world. So while this goal makes sense from a climate change perspective as well, it 
should be borne in mind that these sectors are currently core to South Africa’s inter-
national competitiveness. Energy-intensive upstream resource-based manufacturing 
currently constitutes a large part of the economy, attracts significant local and foreign 
investment, and contributes disproportionately to exports (Winkler & Marquard, 
2007). Given the energy- intensive (and more importantly emissions- intensive) 
nature of the South African economy as a result of mispriced energy prices in the 
past, these industries are expected to face significant adjustment costs to be able to 
compete in a carbon-constrained world. It is thus important that carbon leakage 
concerns in these sectors be adequately addressed and that these sectors are assisted 
to transition as effectively as possible to a low (or at least lower) carbon production 
path. 
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6. Aligning industrial and climate change policies: conclusions and 
recommendations 
To facilitate the transition of South Africa to a low-carbon growth path, industrial 
policy needs to start favouring less GHG emissions intensive industries (DEAT 2009). 
Climate change considerations need to be included in the overarching framework 
that guides the implementation of industrial policy in South African (future IPAPs 
and any revisions of the NIPF) to ensure that industries are supported that will be 
sustainable in a world with a universal price on carbon. This can be done in the ways 
given below.  
6.1 Climate change considerations should inform sector targeting  
Climate change considerations should inform the selection and prioritisation of 
sectors for support. Customised sector programmes, or whatever instruments form 
the basis for the implementation of industrial policy in future, should include a man-
datory climate change section to provide baseline information on GHG emissions to 
inform sector prioritisation. This will also facilitate self-discovery with respect to 
climate change opportunities and the range and cost of mitigation technologies 
available to sectors. The provision of information about a firm’s carbon footprint 
should become a necessary step to qualify for any form of government support 
(MEDS 2007). Considering the emissions-intensity of production reduces the risk that 
chosen sectors will not be able to remain competitive in a carbon-constrained world. 
6.2 Generate information to assist policy formation 
It is important that detailed emissions profiles are created for all South African sectors 
to identify sectors and subsectors that are at risk of experiencing significant competi-
tiveness issues, and to be able to calculate the impact and effectiveness of climate 
policies on individual sectors. It is thus important to generate emissions data in a 
form that is useful for the analysis of individual sectors, for instance according to 
Statistics South Africa’s Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) of all economic activi-
ties. The requirement that GHG emissions data is generated as a prerequisite to be 
considered for government support would create a powerful incentive to generate the 
data required to implement effective climate change policies. 
6.3 Incorporate climate change into the implementation of industrial 
policy 
Climate change considerations need to inform all industrial policy actions to instil a 
mindset that moves away from defining competitive advantage in terms of energy-
intensive sectors and cheap electricity (DEAT 2009). The climate change implications 
of every industrial policy project supported needs to be considered (Winkler & 
Marquard, 2007). This should include not only general incentive programmes, but 
also industrial financing by the IDC, industrial upgrading and ‘hidden industrial 
policy’ in the form of support provided by departments other than the DTI. Where 
there are trade-offs between environmental and growth objectives, these trade-offs 
should be considered explicitly (MEDS 2007). The recently published draft regula-
tions relating to tax incentives for large industrial projects include energy efficiency 
criteria in the qualifying criteria and are a useful example in this context. Environ-
mental and energy efficiency standards should now be applied to all incentives.  
During the implementation of cross-cutting aspects of industrial policy in South 
Africa, like industrial upgrading, support for research, development and innovation 
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etc, special attention should be paid to financial and technical support for the adop-
tion and adaptation of GHG mitigation technologies.  
The implications of government’s strategy to focus on high value-added products 
through the beneficiation of natural resources and ways to effectively fast-track this 
strategy should be considered. If additional value-add can outweigh additional en-
ergy use or carbon emissions, this will help to reduce the energy- and carbon-
intensity of the economy as a whole (Winkler & Marquard, 2007).  
Public procurement is considered as a tool to support industrial policy in South 
Africa. The European Union’s example should be followed. South Africa should 
move to a ‘Green Public Procurement’ paradigm where energy efficiency and envi-
ronmental standards for public procurement are specified to help support the devel-
opment of carbon-efficient products (European Commission 2008: 7). 
6.4 Exploit climate change opportunities 
Climate change opportunities should be exploited directly and environmental goods 
and services should be prioritised as a sector for development. The European Union 
is currently undertaking a comprehensive screening of regulatory barriers and market 
failures in environmental industries that hamper their uptake and competitiveness as 
a precursor to public support (European Commission 2008). The self-discovery 
process will assist in the identification of potential new areas of advantage in ‘climate-
friendly’ technologies locally. Government should seek to support firms to build new 
low-carbon competitive advantages in identified areas and become market leaders in 
promising new technologies (like solar energy or carbon capture and storage) that 
leverage local resources (DEAT 2009; Winkler & Marquard). Given the overlap with 
current industrial policy objectives identified earlier, the renewable energy sector 
should be identified as a key growth sub-sector within environmental goods and 
services (DEAT 2009).  
6.5 Address valid carbon leakage concerns 
It is important to identify the extent to which particular sectors are exposed to com-
petitiveness issues as a result of carbon pricing.7 In order to reduce the adjustment 
costs to the South African economy of moving towards a more environmentally 
sustainable growth path (built around higher value-added and knowledge-based 
production), vulnerable sectors should receive transitional support to move towards 
more carbon-friendly production processes. Support should be linked to technical 
measures to reduce the carbon emissions of firms or sectors to prevent interference 
with the overall structural adjustment path of the economy. This is consistent with the 
NIPF’s view that interventions should focus on ‘addressing specific constraints and 
opportunities ... [r]ather than generically subsidising a particular sector or activity’ 
(DTI 2007a: 17). Specific measures will differ from industry to industry and depend 
on factors like the abatement technologies and options available to the industry, but 
in general should include measures linked to support for research and development, 
industrial upgrading, the adoption of new technologies, energy efficiency etc. These 
measures overlap with many of the cross-cutting issues already included in the NIPF 
                                                 
7  See Cloete et al (forthcoming) for a detailed methodology, applied to a number of local sectors, for indenti-
fying South African sectors that could potentially be vulnerable to negative competitiveness impacts as a re-
sult of a carbon pricing. 
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and should thus be relatively easy to implement within the current industrial policy 
framework in South Africa.  
Reinaud (2009), however, highlights that it is important to design measures to ad-
dress short-term competitiveness concerns as a result of carbon pricing in a way that 
does not over-compensate firms. Measures to address carbon leakage should not be 
used to compensate for other factors that may impact on the competitiveness of a 
sector like exchange rate movements, demand conditions, labour productivity etc. 
Policymakers should guard against the risk of ‘using climate policy as a tool for 
industrial policy and undermining the effectiveness of climate policy’ (Reinaud 2009: 
10). The purpose of measures to address carbon leakage is thus to reduce the short 
to medium term adjustment cost of moving to a low-carbon growth path. They 
should thus be implemented as a tool to reduce the potential short-term negative 
impact of carbon pricing on industrial competitiveness, not as a tool of industrial 
policy that promotes industrial development at the expense of climate change mitiga-
tion. 
6.6 Allow structural changes to the economy 
Reinaud (2008) emphasises that carbon leakage refers only to the artificial competi-
tiveness disadvantage experienced by industries in countries where carbon is priced 
into the production process relative to carbon ‘unconstrained’ producers in countries 
where carbon does not have a price. Gradual changes in the comparative advantage 
of countries as the cost of carbon is being internalised into the production process 
should thus not be viewed as carbon leakage. 
In the long run, it is quite possible that the introduction of a price on carbon emis-
sions will mean that some industrial activities will no longer be viable in South Africa. 
These activities should be allowed to migrate to other parts of the world. The best 
example of an industry that may be unviable in South Africa in a carbon-constrained 
world is aluminium smelting. Winkler and Marquard (2007) mention that the alumin-
ium smelting industry is based in South Africa primarily as a result of electricity prices 
that have been very low historically. The industry imports its feedstock and exports 
most of its production. This stands in contrast to other mineral beneficiation indus-
tries like coal, iron and steel, ferrochrome etc, that beneficiate minerals that are 
mined locally and of which a large proportion of production is consumed locally. 
Winkler and Marquard (2007: 20) contend that ‘aluminium smelting in South Africa 
is thus really another form of coal beneficiation or electricity export’. In a world 
where the cost of carbon is fully priced into the production of goods and services, it is 
likely that the production of aluminium will be concentrated in countries like Canada, 
where on average 200g of CO2 is emitted per kilowatt-hour of electricity generated, 
rather than South Africa, where on average 960g of CO2 is emitted per kilowatt-hour 
of electricity generated (Winkler 2008). 
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THEME 2: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES OF 
CARBON PRICING  
What is fair? Meeting a national 
emission reduction target in an 
experimental setting 
Kerri Brick and Martine Visser 
Abstract 
In this paper, we use a one-shot public goods framework with heterogeneous groups 
and a climate change framing to analyse the public good-dichotomy between social 
welfare and individual incentives. Using a variant of the standard Voluntary Contri-
bution Mechanism (VCM), we examine the cooperative behaviour of different 
player-types in meeting a national emission reduction target when players can invest 
in mitigation or continue with business-as-usual. The experiment consists of four 
treatments: the standard VCM, a VCM with communication opportunities and two 
VCM variants which specify minimum contributions to the public good and sanction 
free-riding. We find that voluntary cooperation results in insufficient cooperation in 
the context of meeting a national target. With the introduction of communication, 
cooperation is significantly improved, indicating that stakeholder participation is 
important in facilitating compliance. With the introduction of taxation, cooperation in 
the context of meeting the target is near universal. Importantly, we find that tax 
crowds out contributions in excess of the target.  
Keywords: climate change, national target, public good, communication, tax 
1. Introduction 
Given that mitigation is a public good, climate change poses the ultimate social 
dilemma: curtailing greenhouse gas emissions entails a private cost while the benefits 
are shared equally by all – creating an incentive for individuals to free-ride, ultimately 
emitting more green-house gases than is optimal (Brekke & Johansson-Stenman 
2008). In this paper, we use a one-shot public goods framework with heterogeneous 
groups and a climate change framing to analyse this public good-dichotomy between 
social welfare and individual incentives. 
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While the dominant strategy in linear public good games is for each player to con-
tribute nothing, subjects make positive but suboptimal contributions to public good 
provision (Cherry & Kroll 2005). Similarly, in the application to mitigation as a public 
good, despite no individual incentive to do so, governments, businesses and indi-
viduals around the world are taking steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. As 
Irwin (2009) notes, this attempt at reducing greenhouse gas emissions certainly does 
not imply that emission levels will be reduced to optimal levels, but it suggests that 
potential for cooperation exists. In this paper, we use behavioural economics to offer 
insights into the potential for cooperation in the context of this social dilemma.  
When faced with a social dilemma, an institutional structure to enforce a cooperative 
norm in a group or society can be imposed exogenously; conversely, the institutional 
structure may emerge endogenously as the outcome of a social choice process 
(Noussair & Tan 2009). In this paper, we use evidence from the lab to consider the 
effectiveness of different exogenously imposed institutions in fostering cooperation 
among asymmetric agents.1  
Using a variant of the standard Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM), we exam-
ine the cooperative behaviour of different player-types in meeting a national emis-
sion reduction target when players can invest in mitigation or continue with business-
as-usual. The experiment consists of four treatments: the standard VCM, a VCM with 
communication opportunities and two VCM variants which specify minimum contri-
butions to the public good and sanction free-riding.  
The significant reduction in greenhouse gases needed to avoid catastrophic climate 
change requires a great degree of cooperation among asymmetric agents. For exam-
ple, the Kyoto Protocol requires countries with large income and historical emission 
disparities to reach consensus on individual targets for the reduction of emissions. On 
a national scale, so too does meeting a national abatement target require collective 
action from asymmetric individuals. In the literature, asymmetry has been introduced 
into the public good framework by varying subjects’ participation fees (Anderson et 
al 2004), endowments (Rappoport & Suleiman 1993, Bagnoli & McKee 1991, 
Cherry et al 2005, Chan et al 1996, Buckley & Croson 2006, Hofmeyr et al 2007, 
Isaac & Walker 1988, Chan et al 1999), marginal per capital returns (MPCRs) (Fisher 
et al 1995, Tan 2008) and private account valuations (Palfrey & Prisbrey 1997). 
While the impact of heterogeneity on cooperative behaviour has been examined 
using a variety of methods and game settings, results from the literature are mixed. 
Various authors report that heterogeneity improves group contribution levels (Chan 
et al 1999, Chan et al 1996), while others find the opposite effect (Anderson et al 
2004, Rappoport and Suleiman 1993, Cherry et al 2005, Isaac & Walker 1988).  
The experimental evidence from public good games with symmetric players and 
sanctioning reflect the norm of equal contributions (Reuben & Riedl 2009). For 
example, Fehr and Gächter (2000), Fehr and Gächter (2002) and Anderson and 
Putterman (2006) find that punishment increases as the differential between individ-
ual contributions and average group contributions widens, while Gächter et al (2008) 
conclude that deviations from the punisher’s contribution are sanctioned. Con-
versely, few studies report on the effect of heterogeneity on individual contributions. 
In this context of individual contributions among asymmetric players, it is not evident 
what contribution norm will arise in a public good context. Fisher et al (1995), who 
                                                 
1  Brick and Visser (forthcoming) test whether endogenous institutional choice enhances public good 
provision by allowing subjects to endogenously select an institution (through a voting process).  
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examine the impact of asymmetric MPCRs in a linear public good setting, find that 
low-MPCR players contribute less to public good provision relative to high-MPCR 
players. In terms of the impact of endowment heterogeneity on individual contribu-
tions, Chan et al (1996) find that low income players over-contribute in terms of 
public good provision while high income players under-contribute, Buckley and 
Croson (2006) report that low income players contribute a higher proportion of 
income to the public account relative to high income players and Hofmeyr et al 
(2007) conclude that wealthy players contribute the same percent of income to the 
public account as their wealthier counterparts. In this paper, we examine whether 
different contributions norms emerge across different player types.  
In this paper, we introduce heterogeneity by varying subjects’ marginal contributions 
to the public good. As high-types have lower marginal costs of abatement relative to 
low-types, one token invested in mitigation (public good) translates into more units of 
emissions reduced relative to low-types. We denote each additional token invested 
by high-types in mitigation as making a larger marginal contribution to the public 
good relative to an additional token invested by low-types. To the best of our knowl-
edge this is the first paper to introduce heterogeneity in such a manner. The impact 
of heterogeneity on cooperation is particularly significant in the context of mitigation 
given that suboptimal levels of cooperation will not subvert the potentially catastro-
phic effects of climate change, and optimal reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
will require significant feats of cooperation. 
As international climate talks revolve around the question of how to distribute an 
abatement burden, equity and distributive fairness considerations have become 
important subtexts in global climate change negotiations (Dannenberg et al 2007). 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) under-
scores the need for ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (UNFCC 1992; 
1998), while climate negotiators subscribe to a number of equity arguments including 
polluter-pays, equal percentage reduction and equal per-capita emissions (Lange et 
al 2007). Discussion on the role of equity considerations in global climate talks and 
the importance of fairness for sustaining international cooperation is extensive: Ca-
zorla and Toman (2000); Lange et al (2007a, 2007b); Ringius et al (1998, 2001); 
Torvanger and Ringius (2002); Dannenberg et al (2007), Winkler et al (2001), Pos-
ner and Sunstein (2007). Conversely, on a national scale, despite the fact that reduc-
ing a national greenhouse gas inventory will require a change of behaviour from 
industry and individuals (Vandenberg and Ackerly 2007), the literature addressing 
equity issues in a domestic context is far more limited.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the experimental literature on 
heterogeneity. Section 3 introduces the experimental framing while the experiment 
design, procedures and parameters are discussed in Section 4. The experimental 
results are examined in Section 5. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the possi-
ble policy implications.  
2. Experimental evidence 
A number of studies examine the impact of heterogeneity on group contribution 
levels. Anderson et al (2004) introduce inequality by varying subjects’ participation 
fees. The authors find that when information is complete and subjects are made 
aware of the unequal payment distribution, cooperation is decreased.  
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When examining the effect of asymmetric endowments in a threshold public good 
setting with incomplete information, Rappoport and Suleiman (1993) report hetero-
geneous groups to be less successful in meeting the threshold relative to homogenous 
groups, while Bagnoli and McKee (1991) find heterogeneous groups acting in an 
environment of complete information to be just as capable. Cherry et al (2005) 
examine the impact of endowment heterogeneity and origin on cooperation. Their 
results indicate that endowment heterogeneity significantly reduces group contribu-
tion levels. Using a linear public good setting with asymmetric endowments, incom-
plete information and communication, Isaac and Walker (1988) find that contribu-
tion levels are lower under conditions of heterogeneity. Chan et al (1999) analyse the 
impact of asymmetric endowments and preferences on group contribution levels in a 
non-linear public good environment with communication and incomplete informa-
tion. The authors find that heterogeneity increases cooperation.  
Turning the discussion to literature reporting the effect of heterogeneity on individual 
contribution levels, Fisher et al (1995) examine the impact of asymmetric marginal 
per-capita returns (MPCRs) in a linear public good setting with symmetric endow-
ments. While subjects were told not to assume that all participants have the same 
MPCR, subjects were not explicitly told that within-group MPCRs differed. The au-
thors conclude that contributions to the public good are strongly incentivised by the 
MPCR, with low-MPCR players contributing less relative to high-MPCR players.  
Chan et al (1996) find that (known) endowment heterogeneity results in high group 
contribution levels; however, in terms of individual contributions, low income players 
over-contribute in terms of public good provision while high income players under-
contribute.  
Buckley and Croson (2006) examine the impact of (known) income heterogeneity in 
a linear public good setting. In contrast to theories of inequality-aversion and altru-
ism, low income players are found to contribute a higher proportion (same absolute 
amount) of income to the public account relative to high income players. Hofmeyr et 
al (2007), who also analyse the effect of endowment asymmetry in a linear public 
good game, find no significant effects from endowment heterogeneity on contribu-
tions. Furthermore, as consistent with reciprocity models, less wealthy players con-
tribute the same percent of income to the public account as their wealthier counter-
parts.  
3. Experiment framing 
In the environmental economics sub-class of the experimental economics literature, 
the use of framed lab experiments is common in the areas of emissions trading 
(Bohm and Carlén 2002, Wråke et al 2008, Croson et al 2005, Klaassen et al 2005) 
and green certificate trading (Schaeffer and Sonnemans 2000). While framed public 
good games are not as prevalent, ours is not the first experiment to utilise an envi-
ronmental (climate change) framing: using a linear public good setting, Millinski et al 
(2006, 2007) examine whether subjects would cooperate so as to prevent dangerous 
climate change. Subjects could invest €0, €2 or €4 in a climate account, where the 
sum total of contributions would be used to publish the experiment results and in-
formation on climate change in a local newspaper. Hasson et al (2009) used a 
framed lab experiment to examine the trade-off between country investments in 
mitigation versus adaptation. Subjects were asked to consider themselves as their 
respective country’s principle climate practitioner. Participants had to decide whether 
to invest their entire climate budget in mitigation versus adaptation.  
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We now turn to the experimental framing used in this experiment. Upon entering the 
lab, participants were allocated a factor of production and told to think of themselves 
as representing either capital or labour. It was explained that government has set a 
national emission reduction target2 in line with its multilateral obligations and that the 
experiment investigates how the responsibility of meeting this target could be divided 
between different sectors of society (capital or labour).  
Subjects had to decide how much of their endowment to invest in the environment 
(public account), where, investing in the environment is synonymous with investing 
in mitigation. Players earn a return from investing in mitigation. Given that this study 
assumes the setting of the national target is part of a multilateral voluntary commit-
ment to reduce emissions, the return from mitigation includes a decrease in the risks 
related to climate change (such as environmental disaster). At a local level, a focus 
on demand-side management by the local utility, to reduce peak-time consumption, 
will benefit consumers by reducing the probability of costly black-outs. Because the 
environment is a public good, and no one can be excluded from deriving these 
benefits, each member of the group receives the same income from the public ac-
count – irrespective of his or her contribution level. Thus the MPCR from investing in 
mitigation is the same for all players.3  
Alternatively subjects could invest in other income generating activities by directing 
their endowment towards the private account. The private account represents in-
vestment opportunities other than investing in mitigation. Because capital can more 
easily invest in productive (income-generating) activities as compared to labour, 
capital earns a higher return from money invested in the private account relative to 
labour.4  
The total sum of tokens in the public account represents the emission reduction of 
each group. We assume that capital (firms) have lower marginal costs of abatement 
relative to labour (households). Intuitively, because capital emits more pollution 
relative to labour (is dirtier), it is relatively cheaper for capital to reduce a unit of 
emissions. This means that capital is able to reduce more emissions with one token 
relative to labour. We therefore denote each additional token invested by capital in 
                                                 
2  As discussed in Section 4, the target was binding in only two of the treatments. However, through-
out the experiment, players were told that government is committed to meeting this target and asks 
capital and labour players to ensure that the target is met. 
3  Note that this differs from studies that have varied the MPCR. Ruben and Riedl (2009) implement 
a linear public good game where group members differ in terms of the marginal benefit from public 
good provision. Specifically high-type players derive a marginal benefit from the public good of 
0.75 while low-types have a marginal benefit of 0.50. Fisher et al (1995) vary MPCR between 
groups, where high and low groups have a MPCR of 0.75 and 0.30, respectively. Tan (2008) in-
troduces the notion of productivity heterogeneity, whereby subjects within a group have asymmet-
ric impacts on the public good. Players have different MPCRs to the public good – with high and 
low types having a MPCR of 0.9 and 0.3 respectively. This work is similar in specification to our 
study in that subjects, irrespective of type, benefit equally from contributions to the public good. 
Income for player i is denoted as:  
 .  
 Thus, player i’s income from the public account is calculated as 90% of the contributions of high 
types plus 30% of the contributions of low types. The same experimental specification is used in 
Noussair and Tan (2009).  
4  The parameters used in the experiment are outlined in Section 4.  
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mitigation as making a larger marginal contribution to the public good relative to an 
additional token invested by labour.  
4. Experiment design and parameters 
The game was played in groups of four that were randomised at the start of each 
treatment. Each group consisted of two capital and two labour players. 
In the standard VCM (the baseline treatment), participants, who are either represent-
ing capital or labour, are endowed with 10 tokens which must be allocated between 
a private and public account. Players are aware of a national emissions reduction 
target and are told that, while government is committed to meeting the target, players 
will not be penalised if the target is not met. Communication is prohibited. Subjects’ 
payoffs are given by 
 (1)  
 
 (2)  
 
where  reflects investments in the public good.  
As evident from Equations 1 and 2, each token contributed to the private account 
generates a private return of 12 and 6 tokens for capital and labour, respectively.  
Capital and labour’s contributions to the public account are multiplied by 20 and 10, 
respectively. As such, capital is able to contribute more to emissions reductions rela-
tive to labour, at the same personal cost. This is reflected in Table 1, which tabulates 
emissions reductions, per token invested in the public account, for both player types. 
Note that the cumulative sum of contributions to the public account denotes the units 
of emissions reduced. 
In terms of the returns from investing in mitigation, one token invested in the public 
account by capital generates a return for each group member of 5 tokens; similarly, 
one token invested in the public account by labour generates a return for each group 
member of 2.5 tokens.5  
As usual, the dominant strategy is for players to contribute nothing to the public 
account whereas the social optimum is achieved when all players contribute their full 
endowment to the public account; this is reflected in the symmetric payoff tables 
reproduced in Appendix A.  
An explicit national emission reduction target of 240 units was specified. Table 1 
illustrates that the target can be met via Capital and Labour contributing different 
combinations of tokens to the public good. 
                                                 
5  For both capital and labour, the ratio between the marginal value of a token invested in the public 
account and the marginal value of a token invested in the private account (the MPCR) is 0.42. 
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Table 1. Emissions reductions, per token invested in the public account 
Tokens Units emissions reduced 
 K L 
0 0 0 
1 20 10 
2 40 20 
3 60 30 
4 80 40 
5 100 50 
6 120 60 
7 140 70 
8 160 80 
9 180 90 
10 200 100 
 
We extend this standard VCM by way of four experimental variants which are out-
lined below:  
Variant 1. Introduce the possibility of communication with group members. The 
communication treatment is identical to the baseline treatment except that subjects 
were able to communicate with each other via an online chat program in order to 
decide, as a group, how best to meet the target. However, players were informed 
that the group decision was not binding and that players were still free to decide on 
their own contribution. In this treatment we are obviously examining the role of 
stakeholder participation in promoting cooperation.  
Variant 2. Specify minimum contributions to the public good and sanction free-
riding. Capital players must each contribute a minimum of 3 tokens to the public 
account whereas labour players must each contribute a minimum of 6 tokens. Capi-
tal and labour players each reduce emissions by 60 units. This treatment is hereafter 
referred to as Tax36. 
In the Tax36 treatment, all sectors in the economy reduce emissions equally, irre-
spective of the difference in the cost of abatement. In this treatment, players are 
taxed on the quantity of emissions; the implied contribution norm is that capital and 
labour players each reduce emissions by the same quantity. If capital and labour 
must meet the target of reducing emissions by 240 units and reduce emissions by the 
same quantity, then all four players must reduce emissions by 60 units each. This is 
equivalent to each capital player contributing 3 tokens to the public account and 
each labour player contributing 6 tokens (Table 1). In the advent that a subject con-
tributes less than the minimum contribution, he or she is taxed.  
Subjects’ payoffs are given by: 
 (3)  
 
 (4)  
 
 (5)  
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 (6)  
The corresponding payoff tables are replicated in Appendix B. As evident from these 
tables in Appendix B, the Nash Equilibrium is moved inwards to (3,6) for (capital, 
labour), respectively.  
Variant 3. Specify minimum contributions to the public good and sanction free-
riding. Capital and labour players must each contribute a minimum of 4 tokens to 
the public account. Capital and labour players each reduce emissions by 80 and 40 
units, respectively. This treatment is referred to as Tax44.  
In the tax44 treatment, capital and labour are taxed on their monetary contribution 
to emissions reduction. Capital and Labour can reduce emissions by different quanti-
ties as long as they are contributing the same amount in tokens. If each capital and 
labour player contributes 4 tokens, each group will collectively meet the emission 
reduction target (see Table 1). In this case, capital players must reduce emissions by 
80 units each, while labour players must reduce emissions by 40 units each. If sub-
jects contribute less than 4 tokens to the Public Account they are taxed. Subjects’ 
payoffs are given below.  
  (7)  
 
  (8)  
 
  (9)  
 
 (10)  
 
The reader is referred to Appendix C for the corresponding payoff tables. As evident 
from the tables in Appendix C, the Nash Equilibrium is moved inwards to (4,4) for 
(capital, labour), respectively.  
4.1  Procedures 
The experiment was conducted with 204 students recruited from the University of 
Cape Town (UCT) in the Western Cape of South Africa. The reader is referred to 
Table 2 for a summary of sample statistics. On average, subjects were 21 years old. 
Over 60% of subjects were male. Around three-quarters of participants classified 
themselves as Black, while the remaining subjects classified themselves as Coloured, 
White and Indian. Around 30% of subjects’ classified their family’s financial situation 
as lower income, while 67% classified their family as middle income. Subjects were 
recruited via announcements made in lecture theatres and posted on the course sites 
of an online UCT student administration system. Students from a broad spectrum of 
faculties were targeted for participation including commerce, humanities and the built 
environment.  
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Table 2. Sample statistics 
 Subjects 
n=204 
Gender  
•  Male 0.63 
•  Female 0.37 
Race  
•  Black  0.78 
•  Coloured 0.07 
•  Indian 0.05 
•  White 0.07 
•  Other 0.02 
Schooling   
•  Public 0.65 
•  Private 0.35 
Nationality  
•  South African 0.69 
•  Other 0.31 
Age 20.92 (1.76) 
Household size 5.56 (2.55) 
Family’s financial situation  
•  Upper income 0.05 
•  Middle income 0.67 
•  Lower income 0.28 
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis 
 
The mechanics of the experiment are outlined in Table 3. The experiment consisted 
of three different sequences. Sequence 1 merely consisted of the baseline treatments 
and acts as a control. Sequence 2 and 3 consisted of the baseline, communication 
and tax treatments, and differed only in the ordering of the treatments.6 Each session 
was completed over 2 sessions.  
The experiments were performed manually. Upon entering the laboratory, each 
participant randomly drew an experiment number and factor of production. It was 
explained that, unless told otherwise, communication was prohibited with anyone 
except the experimenter.  
While subjects were aware that each group consisted of two capital and two labour 
players, the identities of their group members were never revealed. Information 
relating to their group members' individual contributions was also not made avail-
able. During the communication treatment, group members chatted with one an-
                                                 
6  All experiment sessions commenced with treatment 1 (baseline treatment) given that it was crucial 
for subjects to understand the context of the experiment and the fairness issues at play.  
Meeting a national emission reduction target in an experimental setting 44 
Putting a price on carbon: Conference proceedings 
other via an online chat program. Participants were assigned to new groups at the 
start of each treatment. 
In each experiment session, the instructions for the 5 different treatments were sealed 
in separate envelopes. At the start of a treatment, subjects opened the envelope 
corresponding with that treatment. The instructions were read aloud by the experi-
menter while the subjects followed on their own hard copies. As such, payoffs were 
common knowledge. An exchange rate for the conversion of experimental tokens 
into South African rands was specified at the beginning of the session (1 token = 
R0.2).  
During each treatment, subjects recorded their contributions on a decision-making 
sheet which was collected by enumerators who calculated each groups’ total contri-
bution to the public good and each players’ payoff.  
While the experiment had a climate change framing, the instructions were neutrally-
worded in relation to issues around distributive justice: words such as equity, equality 
and fair were never referenced. In addition, language referring to capital and labour 
remained neutral: subjects were simply told to think of capital as representing firms 
and labour as representing households. No mention was made of historical responsi-
bility for the current inventory of emissions or to the differential emission levels of 
dirty industry versus households.  
Table 3. Experiment overview 
Treatment Sequence 1 Sequence 2 Sequence 3 
Treatment 1 Baseline 1 Baseline Baseline 
Treatment 2 Baseline 2 Comm. Tax44 
Treatment 3 Baseline 3 Tax36 Tax36 
Treatment 4 Baseline 4 Tax44 Comm. 
Sessions 2 2 2 
Sample 68 68 68 
 
Apart from the instructions, students were provided with summary sheets and payoff 
tables to assist them in making their decisions. Before commencing with the experi-
ment, examples were conducted with the participants. In addition, an excel-
spreadsheet calculator was provided to students for use during the experiment; this 
meant that students were not preoccupied with the mathematical component of 
calculating their payoffs. An example of the calculator is provided in Appendix D. 
Each experimental session lasted less than three hours (including payment). At the 
end of the experiment, participants filled out a post-experiment questionnaire.  
Mann-Whitney tests can’t reject the null hypothesis that the contributions in Session 
1 and 2 (for each sequence) are drawn from the same distribution (p > 0.110 for all 
sequences) (See Appendix E). As such, when discussing the experimental results for 
each treatment, mean contributions are averaged across Session 1 and 2 for each 
sequence. In addition, like-treatments in Sequence 2 and 3 will be pooled given that 
Mann-Whitney tests do not find them to be significantly different (Appendix E).  
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5. Experimental results 
Average earnings for participating in the experiment (including the R20 show-up fee) 
were approximately R132 (S$17, at an exchange rate of R1 = $7.70 as per 1 March 
2010). Capital players fared better at R152 (US$20) while Labour players averaged 
R111 (US$14).  
5.1  Contribution levels and norms 
Table 4 reflects the average contributions of players across the various treatments.  
5.1.1 Baseline (Sequence 1) 
As reflected in Table 4, average contribution levels (across player-types) range be-
tween 22 – 29 percent for the 4 treatments in Sequence 1 (Baseline). These contribu-
tion rates undershoot those typically seen in the literature, where, in one shot public 
good games, contributions to the public good generally range between 40-60 percent 
of endowments (Ledyard 1995). Contribution levels are more in line with those seen 
in repeated play, where contributions decay over time (Hermann et al 2008) but 
remain between 15-25 percent of individual endowments in the final round (Isaac 
and Walker 1988). While the Spearman rank-order correlation between mean con-
tributions and treatments is negative but insignificant ( , the 
decreasing pattern for the first three treatments is significant at the 10 percent level 
(  
Observation 1. Player heterogeneity has no significant impact on contribu-
tions to the public good 
As a token contributed by capital has a greater marginal impact on the public good 
relative to labour, we would expect capital contributions to be higher. Figure 1 pre-
sents a plot of the average contributions of both player-types in each of the 5 treat-
ments in Sequence 1 (Baseline). There is little difference in the average contribution 
levels of capital and labour across the four treatments. Specifically, the average 
contribution of labour players in the first treatment of the experiment is 3.1 tokens, 
decreasing to 2.3 tokens in the final treatment. In contrast, capital players contribute 
an average of 2.7 tokens in treatment 1, reducing contributions to 2.4 tokens in the 
final treatment. Mann-Whitney tests confirm there to be no significant difference 
between Capital and Labour contributions in each treatment (p>0.080 for all four 
treatments). Kruskall-Wallis tests comparing the contributions of each player-type 
across all treatments cannot be rejected (capital: ; labour: ), 
indicating there to be no statistically significant difference in contributions among the 
different treatments.  
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Table 4. Average contributions 
Panel A: average contributions, by Sequence 
 
Seq. 1 
n=68 
 
Seq. 2 
n=68 
 
Seq. 3 
n=68 
 Avg. K L  Avg. K L  Avg. K L 
Baseline 
1 
2.9 2.7 3.1 Baseline 2.82;3 2.92;3 2.72;3 Baseline 3.61;2;3 4.01 3.32;3 
Baseline 
2 
2.3f 1.8a;f 2.9f Comm. 3.8 3.6a 4.1 Tax44 4.63;f 4.3f 5.03;f 
Baseline 
3 
2.2c;d 2.3c;d 2.1c;d Tax36 5.22;c 3.72;c 6.72;c Tax36 5.32; d 4.2 d 6.42; d 
Baseline 
4 
2.4b;e 2.4b;e 2.3e Tax44 4.83;e 4.53;e 5.13;e Comm. 5.11;b 5.91;b 4.2 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
1 Significant difference between Baseline and Comm.  
2 Significant difference between Baseline and Tax36  
3 Significant difference between Baseline and Tax44  
Mann-Whitney test 
a Significant difference between Baseline2 and Comm.  
b Significant difference between Baseline4 and Comm.  
c Significant difference between Baseline3 and Tax36  
d Significant difference between Baseline3 and Tax36  
e Significant difference between Baseline4 and Tax44  
f Significant difference between Baseline2 and Tax44  
Panel B: average pooled contributions (Sequence 2 and 3) 
 
Pooled 
Seq. 2 and 3 
 Avg. K. L 
Baseline 
3.2 1; 
2;3 
3.4 1;3 3.0 1;2;3 
Comm. 4.4 1 4.8 1 4.1 1 
Tax36 5.32 3.9 6.62 
Tax44 4.73 4.43 5.03 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
1Significant difference between Baseline and Comm. 
 
2 Significant difference between Baseline and Tax36 
 
3 Significant difference between Baseline and Tax44 
 
 
Observation 2. Free-riding emerges as the contribution norm – irrespec-
tive of player heterogeneity 
We have found no significant difference in the average contributions of capital and 
labour players. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of capital and labour contributions, 
by treatment, in Sequence 1. The figure suggests that the most apparent contribution 
norm, irrespective of player-type, is to contribute zero tokens (free-ride).  
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Figure 2. Subject contributions, by player-type and treatment,  
Sequence 1 (baseline) 
The predilection towards free-riding is likely explained by the high opportunity cost 
associated with investing in mitigation. For capital, 1 token invested in the private 
Percent 
Percent 
Contribution Contribution Contribution Contribution 
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[0; 
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account returns 12 tokens, outpacing the public account return of 5. Likewise, for 
labour, the private account return of 5 exceeds the return of 2.5 from investing in the 
environment. As such, in an approximation of reality, the individual return to mitiga-
tion, for both player-types, is less than the return earned on alternate investment 
opportunities.  
5.1.2 Communication 
Observation 3. Communication significantly increases cooperative behav-
iour  
Communication significantly (but unremarkably) increases average contributions 
across both player-types (Wilcoxon signed-rank test:  for pooled data; 
Table 4). As evident from the pooled data in Table 4, average contributions across 
player-types increased by 1.2 tokens to 4.4 tokens when compared to the Baseline 
treatment. Capital increased contributions on average by 1.4 tokens; this is compa-
rably similar to that of labour where contributions increased by an average 1.1 to-
kens. Again, while expecting capital to contribute more towards the public good, a 
Mann-Whitney test indicates there to be no significant difference between capital and 
labour contributions (pooled data; Table 4; .  
An examination of individual (as opposed to mean) contribution rates yields some 
interesting observations. Table 5 reflects the frequency of contributions at each pos-
sible contribution level for the Baseline and Communication treatments, by player-
type. It is evident that the opportunity to communicate increases the frequency of 
plays of ten tokens (full-cooperation) as well as the frequency of plays of zero tokens 
(free-riding). A plot of the frequency distributions in Appendix F confirms that the 
presence of communication polarises contribution levels at 0 and 10 tokens. 
To examine whether the presence of communication makes free-riding and full-
cooperation more likely, we collapse the data in Table 2 into 3 categories of 0, 1-9 
and 10 tokens. For capital, the corresponding frequencies for the Baseline treatment 
are 0.21, 0.74 and 0.06, as compared to 0.27, 0.42 and 0.31 for the communication 
treatment. A statistically significant goodness of fit test confirms that these two fre-
quencies do in fact differ from one another ( ). Likewise, a com-
parison of the frequency of plays of 10 tokens between the Baseline and Communi-
cation treatments is significant at the 1 percent level7 confirming that communication 
encourages cooperative behaviour. Conversely, a comparison of the frequency of 
plays of zero tokens between the two treatments is insignificant 
( ). 
                                                 
7  We use a Fisher exact test given that the frequency of plays of ten tokens in the baseline treatment 
is less than 5. 
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Table 5: Frequency distribution of contributions to the public good, by 
treatment and player-type 
Treatment Contribution 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Capital 
(n=68) 
           
Baseline 0.206 0.103 0.059 0.191 0.162 0.074 0.059 0.029 0.059 0.000 0.059 
Comm. 0.265 0.044 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.088 0.029 0.029 0.015 0.000 0.309 
Labour 
(n=68) 
           
Baseline 0.338 0.074 0.088 0.059 0.132 0.132 0.074 0.015 0.029 0.000 0.059 
Comm. 0.456 0.029 0.029 0.000 0.044 0.029 0.044 0.029 0.044 0.044 0.250 
Note: Sequence 2 and 3 
In the case of labour, in the baseline treatment, figures for the same three categories 
are 0.34, 0.60 and 0.06 versus 0.46, 0.29 and 0.25 in the communication treatment. 
This difference is significant at the 1 percent level ( ). Likewise, a 
comparison of the frequency of plays of 10 tokens between the Baseline and Com-
munication treatments is highly significant ( )8, while a comparison of the 
frequency of plays of zero tokens between the two treatments is insignificant 
( ). We can therefore draw the same conclusion that communica-
tion encourages cooperative behaviour in labour.  
As reflected in Table 6, the absolute spend on the public good increased in the 
communication treatment to 604 tokens relative to 436 tokens in the pooled baseline 
treatments.  
Table 6: Absolute spend on the public good 
Sequence 1 
(17 groups) 
Baseline* 
(34 groups) 
Comm.* 
(34 groups) 
Tax36* 
(34 groups) 
Tax44* 
(34 groups) 
Baseline 1 197 436 604 714 642 
Baseline 2 158     
Baseline 3 148     
Baseline 4 160  
Max. spend per treatment: 
680 tokens 
Max. spend per treatment: 1360 tokens 
Note: * Sequence 2 and 3 
 
Observation 4. Labour free-rides significantly more than capital  
We now consider whether contributions differ by player-type. The frequency of plays 
of zero tokens in the baseline treatment is 21% for capital as compared to 34% for 
labour. This difference is significant at the 10% level ( ). A similar 
                                                 
8  We use a Fisher exact test given that the frequency of full-cooperators in the baseline treatment is 
less than 5. 
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comparison for the communication treatment reveals that labour free-rides signifi-
cantly more than capital ( ).  
The frequency of plays of ten tokens in the in the baseline treatment is 6% for both 
capital and labour. In the communication treatment, capital plays ten tokens 31% of 
the time as compared to 25% for labour. This difference is not significant 
( ).  
5.1.3 Taxation 
The emission reduction target of 240 can be met through capital and labour players 
contributing different combinations of tokens towards public good provision (Table 
7). In the context of a homogonous group-setting, where equal contributions to the 
public good would imply equal emissions reductions and earnings, a reasonable 
contribution norm would dictate that all players contribute the same amount in 
tokens (Ruben and Riedl 2009), however, in the context of heterogeneous groups 
such as ours, it is not immediately clear what allocation principle should apply.  
Table 7. Emissions reductions, per token invested in the public account 
Tokens Units emissions reduced 
 K L 
0 0 0 
1 20 10 
2 40 20 
3 60 30 
4 80 40 
5 100 50 
6 120 60 
7 140 70 
8 160 80 
9 180 90 
10 200 100 
 
We implement two different taxation schemes: Tax36, where players reduce emis-
sions by equal quantities, and Tax44, where players reduce emissions in proportion 
to their relative abatement costs and split the cost of reducing emissions equally.  
In determining an allocation rule, we use an application of the general fairness con-
cepts of equity and equality developed by Konow (2000; 2003; 2009).  
Equality refers to an equal share of some outcome (such as income). An allocation 
principle based on equality would entail subjects’ sharing the burden equally. In this 
instance, each player reduces emissions by 60 units (Table 7). This is more costly for 
Labour given his higher marginal cost; this burden sharing formula implies a cost of 3 
tokens to each Capital player and a cost of 6 tokens to each Labour player. The 
climate justice and fairness implications are obvious: while ensuring that emissions 
reductions are commensurate with the target, this tax does not promote social equal-
ity.  
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The concept of equity is derived from the accountability principle which states that a 
fair allocation is one which is proportional to factors within an individual’s sphere of 
influence (such as effort). A discretionary variable is one that the individual can 
influence and which affects production. Conversely, an exogenous variable, while 
affecting production, is outside the individual’s locus of control. An individual’s 
entitlement (or fair allocation) is proportionate to the discretionary variables within 
his control.9 We use the accountability principle to characterize the fair distribution of 
the abatement burden. Note that we assume marginal cost to be an exogenous 
variable: it was assigned during the experiment by the experimenter and, although it 
affects the outcome, it is unrelated to any actions or decisions that the subjects could 
take. In terms of equity, no subject must benefit or be punished for an exogenous 
variable. As such, under equality, emission reduction must be proportionate to the 
marginal cost of abatement; as such each capital player must reduce twice as many 
units of emissions relative to each labour player – given that Capital’s marginal con-
tribution to public good provision is double that of labour. So each capital player 
must reduce emissions by 80 units while each labour player must reduce emissions 
by 40 units. This will cost both player-types 4 tokens. Such a scheme promotes social 
equality.  
Observation 5. Taxation reduces the frequency of contributions below the 
specified contribution rate 
In the baseline treatment, the Nash equilibrium was (0, 0) for both capital and labour 
players. In the case of the Tax36 treatment, the Nash is moved inwards to (3, 6) for 
capital and labour, respectively. Likewise, in the Tax44 treatment, the Nash becomes 
(4, 4) for capital and labour, respectively.10  
From Table 4 (pooled data), average contributions across-player types increase 
significantly from 3.2 tokens in the Baseline treatment to 5.3 tokens in the Tax36 
treatment (Wilcoxon signed-rank test: ). By player-type: capital contributes 
an average 3.9 tokens while labour contributes an average of 6.6 tokens. In the 
tax44 treatment, average contributions increased significantly to 4.7 tokens relative 
to the baseline treatment (Wilcoxon signed-rank test: ); capital contributed 
4.4 tokens on average as compared to an average contribution of 5.0 for labour.  
Table 8 reflects the frequency of contributions for capital and labour players, by 
treatment. The baseline and communication treatments have been replicated in 
Table 8 for ease of reference. In the Tax36 treatment, 65% of capital players contrib-
ute 3 tokens while 74% of labour players contribute 6 tokens. In the Tax44 treat-
ment, 56% of capital and labour players contribute 4 tokens.  
We consider whether the introduction of taxation reduces the frequency of contribu-
tions below the specified contribution, relative to previous treatments.  
                                                 
9  Konow (1996) gives the example of two island castaways who collect bananas. If one of the 
castaways worked twice as hard as the other, he would deserve twice the number of bananas. 
However, none of the castaways are rewarded or punished for any exogenous variables that may 
affect output. For example, if one of the castaways has a disability that saw him collect fewer ba-
nanas than his counterpart despite the fact that he worked twice as hard, as he is only accountable 
for the factors that he can influence, he is deserving of an equal number of bananas.  
10  The Nash equilibrium become (3,6) and (4,4) in the Tax36 and Tax44 treatments, respectively, as 
capital and labour can never do better than contributing their corresponding amounts since con-
tributing less when faced with a tax will result in losses.  
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Capital contributes between 0-2 tokens 4% of the time in the Tax36 treatment, 
versus 37% and 38% in the baseline and communication treatments, respectively. A 
comparison of the frequency of plays of 0-2 tokens between the tax and baseline 
treatments ( ) and tax and communication (Fisher exact, 
) is highly significant. In terms of the implications for full free-riding, the 
frequency of plays of zero tokens in the Tax36 treatment are 1.5% as compared to 
21% and 27% in the baseline and communication treatments, respectively, a com-
parison of these frequencies confirms that taxation significantly reduces the frequency 
of free-riding (Tax36 compared to Baseline: ; Tax36 compared to 
communication: ). 
Table 8. Frequency distribution of contributions to the public good, by 
treatment and player-type 
Treatment Contribution 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Capital (n=68)            
Baseline 0.206 0.103 0.059 0.191 0.162 0.074 0.059 0.029 0.059 0.000 0.059 
Communication 0.265 0.044 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.088 0.029 0.029 0.015 0.000 0.309 
Tax36 0.015 0.000 0.029 0.647 0.074 0.059 0.074 0.029 0.015 0.000 0.059 
Tax44 0.044 0.015 0.000 0.074 0.559 0.132 0.103 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.044 
Labour (n=68)            
Baseline 0.338 0.074 0.088 0.059 0.132 0.132 0.074 0.015 0.029 0.000 0.059 
Communication 0.456 0.029 0.029 0.000 0.044 0.029 0.044 0.029 0.044 0.044 0.250 
Tax36 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.735 0.074 0.059 0.015 0.103 
Tax44 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.559 0.250 0.044 0.044 0.015 0.015 0.074 
Note: Sequence 2 and 3 
 
Staying with capital and examining the effect of the Tax44 treatment: the frequency 
of plays between 0-3 reduces to 13% in the Tax44 treatment versus 56% in the 
baseline case and 46% with communication; the difference in these frequencies is 
highly significant ( . The frequency of free-riding reduces to 4% in the same 
treatment. A comparison of the frequency of free-riding in the tax treatment relative 
to the baseline (Fisher exact ) and communication (Fisher exact ) 
treatments is once again significant.  
We now examine the implications for labour. The frequency of plays between 0-5 
reduces to around 2% in the Tax36 treatment versus 82% in the baseline case and 
62% with communication. A comparison of the frequency of plays of 0-5 tokens 
between the tax and baseline treatments ( ) and tax and com-
munication (Fisher exact, ) is highly significant. The frequency of free-riding 
declines to 1.5% in the Tax36 treatment from 34% and 46% in the baseline and 
communication treatments, respectively. A comparison of the frequency of free-
riding in the Tax36 treatment relative to the baseline ( ) and 
communication ( ) treatments is also significant.  
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Staying with labour, the frequency of plays between 0-3 reduces to around 0% in the 
Tax44 treatment versus 57% and 51% in the baseline and communication treat-
ments, respectively; this difference in frequencies between the tax and baseline 
treatment (Fisher exact, ) and the tax and communication treatment (Fisher 
exact, ) is significant. A comparison of the frequency of free-riding in the 
Tax36 treatment (or the absence thereof) relative to the baseline (Fisher exact, 
) and communication (Fisher exact, ) treatments is also signifi-
cant.  
After this discussion it is clear that the tax discourages contributions below the speci-
fied floor and that free-riding in particular is significantly reduced. This was to be 
expected given that the interior Nash equilibrium in both tax treatments forces coop-
eration. These results serve to confirm that subjects fully understood the payoffs 
associated with the experiment.  
5.1.3.1 Crowding out of voluntary contributions11 
Observation 6. Taxation discourages contributions in excess of the Nash 
equilibrium for capital players 
While the presence of taxes certainly reduces free-riding, it is necessary to examine 
whether the introduction of a tax reduces the likelihood of subjects contributing in 
excess of the regulated floor.  
Capital contributed 4 or more tokens 31% of the time in the Tax36 treatment as 
compared to 44% in the baseline treatment ( ) and 54% in the 
communication treatment ( ); the fact that these differences are 
highly significant indicates that the presence of the tax discourages cooperative 
behaviour. Likewise, capital plays 5 or more tokens 31% of the time in the Tax44 
treatment as compared to 28% in the baseline treatment and 47% 
( ); the introduction of the tax discouraged cooperative behav-
iour relative to the communication treatment.  
Labour contributes 7 or more tokens 25% of the time in the Tax36 treatment, as 
compared to 10% for the baseline treatment and 37% for the communication treat-
ment. Comparison of the tax treatment with the baseline treatment yields a statisti-
cally significant result ( ), while comparison with communication is 
only significant at the 15% level. Relative to the baseline treatment, the presence of a 
tax encourages cooperative behaviour! Finally, capital contributes 5 or more tokens 
44% of the time in the Tax44 treatment, versus 31% in the baseline case and 44% in 
the presence of communication. A comparison between the tax and baseline fre-
quencies is significant at the 11% level ( ). 
The effect of the tax thus differs according to player-type. Taxation discourages 
contributions in excess of the Nash equilibrium for capital. Conversely, in the case of 
labour, taxation encourages cooperative behaviour beyond the Nash equilibrium. 
                                                 
11  A pre-requisite for complete crowding-out is that the pre and post-taxation Nash equilibrium is an 
interior solution. As we are testing for the frequency of free-riding, in our design, the Nash equilib-
rium before taxation is for each subject to contribute zero to the public good. Thus, we simply 
comment on the degree to which rising taxes partially crowd out voluntary contributions.  
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Observation 7. Taxation crowds out voluntary contributions 
We test the significance of the different tax schedules on contributions more formally 
by performing a pooled OLS regression using the pooled data from the baseline and 
tax treatments in Sequence 2 and 3. The regression is run separately for capital and 
labour. Following Benzing and Andrews (2004) the model is specified as: 
  
where  signifies the contribution in excess of the specified tax rate.  
Note, this analysis differs from the analysis above – where we considered the implica-
tions of different tax schedules on the frequency of contributions above the contribu-
tion floor. In this case we consider the implications of the tax schedules on voluntary 
contributions, starting with the baseline treatment as an example of lump-sum tax of 
zero. As such, the constant term, , signifies (voluntary) average contributions when 
the tax is 0 (in the advent of a tax of zero, any contribution greater or equal to one is 
voluntary). For capital,  = 1 if the tax is 4 and 0 otherwise, while  = 1 if the tax 
is 3 and 0 otherwise. For labour,  = 1 if the tax is 4 and 0 otherwise, while  = 
1 if the tax is 6 and 0 otherwise. The results from the regression are replicated in 
Table 9. 
Table 9: Estimates of crowding-out 
 Capital Labour 
 Value S.E. Value S.E. 
 *  *  
 *  *  
 *  *  
     
     
Observations 204  204  
Notes: Standard errors are adjusted for clustering;* significant at the 1% 
level; inclusion of control variables such as treatment, sequence and session 
are insignificant. 
 
The expected values of  for the three different taxation specifications are reported 
in Table 10. 
The results indicate that the voluntary contribution levels decline as the burden of the 
tax rises. As average voluntary contributions decline as the tax increases, there is 
crowding out. In a seminal paper, Andreoni (1993), using a linear public good game, 
finds evidence of incomplete crowding out. 
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Table 10: Expected voluntary contribution12 
Capital Labour 
Category Expected 
value = E(H) 
Exp. vol. 
contribution 
Category Expected value 
= E(H) 
Exp. vol. 
contribution 
0   0   
3  1.014 4  1.044 
4  0.691 6  0.647 
 
5.2  Public good provision 
Observation 8. Communication and taxation increase compliance with the 
target  
Table 11 reflects the percentage of groups that met the target across the various 
treatments. With respect to Sequence 1: in treatments 1 and 2, respectively, only 24 
percent of the groups met the emission reduction target; this percent decreased to a 
meagre 12 in the final two treatments.  
With respect to the pooled data (Sequence 2 and 3), 35% of groups in the baseline 
treatment met the target. With the introduction of communication, 50% of groups 
met the target. While an improvement, in the context of climate change, 50% com-
pliance would not be sufficient to subvert catastrophic climate change. Compliance 
with the target increases markedly with the introduction of taxation. 
Table 11: Percentage of groups that met the emission reduction target 
 Sequence 1 
(17 groups) 
Baseline1 
(34 groups) 
Comm.1 
(34 groups) 
Tax361 
(34 groups) 
Tax441 
(34 groups) 
Baseline 1 0.24 0.35 0.50 0.91 0.88 
Baseline 2 0.24     
Baseline 3 0.12     
Baseline 4 0.12     
Note: 1Sequence 2 and 3 
 
Table 12 indicates the total emissions reduction from each treatment (emissions 
reductions summed across groups). The greatest reduction occurred in the tax treat-
ments, followed by the communication treatment.  
                                                 
12  Note that Benzing and Andrews (2004) attribute differences between the expected voluntary 
contribution and actual reported contributions (in our case the estimates reported in Table 4) to the 
error term . 
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Table 12: Total emissions reduction 
Sequence 1 
(17 groups) 
Baseline1 
(34 groups) 
Comm.1 
(34 groups) 
Tax361 
(34 groups) 
Tax441 
(34 groups) 
Baseline 1 2880 6690 9270 9820 9410 
Baseline 2 2190     
Baseline 3 2250     
Baseline 4 2410  
Max. emission reduction per 
treatment: 10 200 units 
 
Max. emission reduction per treatment: 20 400 units 
Note: 1Sequence 2 and 3 
6. Discussion 
With reference to meeting an emissions reduction target, the results indicate that 
voluntary cooperation may not be sufficient to reach a national target and subvert 
catastrophic climate change. In the Baseline treatment, only 35% of groups met the 
target. Furthermore, free-riding emerges as the singular contribution norm for both 
player-types. The baseline treatments in Sequence 1 confirm that voluntary coopera-
tion decays over time. With the introduction of communication, cooperation is sig-
nificantly improved. Specifically, the percent of groups that reach the target increase 
to 50%. This result emphasises that stakeholder participation plays an important role 
in facilitating compliance. Two contribution norms emerged when players were able 
to communicate: free-riding and full-cooperation, with free-riding being the prevalent 
behaviour for labour relative to capital.  
Regulated cooperation results in near universal compliance with the target. With the 
introduction of taxation (both treatments), around 90% of groups met the target. 
Taxation significantly reduces the frequency of free-riding and the frequency of 
contributions below the tax floor. Thus regulation could be a useful way to promote 
compliance with the target. Importantly, taxation crowds out contributions in excess 
of the target.  
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Appendices  
A: Standard VCM – symmetric payoff tables 
 Capital total payoff 
 Capital contribution 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 120 118 116 114 112 110 108 106 104 102 100 
1 125 123 121 119 117 115 113 111 109 107 105 
2 130 128 126 124 122 120 118 116 114 112 110 
3 135 133 131 129 127 125 123 121 119 117 115 
4 140 138 136 134 132 130 128 126 124 122 120 
5 145 143 141 139 137 135 133 131 129 127 125 
6 150 148 146 144 142 140 138 136 134 132 130 
7 155 153 151 149 147 145 143 141 139 137 135 
8 160 158 156 154 152 150 148 146 144 142 140 
9 165 163 161 159 157 155 153 151 149 147 145 
Labour 
contribution 
10 170 168 166 164 162 160 158 156 154 152 150 
 
 Labour total payoff 
 Labour contribution 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 60 59 58 57 56 55 54 53 52 51 50 
1 70 69 68 67 66 65 64 63 62 61 60 
2 80 79 78 77 76 75 74 73 72 71 70 
3 90 89 88 87 86 85 84 83 82 81 80 
4 100 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90 
5 110 109 108 107 106 105 104 103 102 101 100 
6 120 119 118 117 116 115 114 113 112 111 110 
7 130 129 128 127 126 125 124 123 122 121 120 
8 140 139 138 137 136 135 134 133 132 131 130 
9 150 149 148 147 146 145 144 143 142 141 140 
Capital 
contribution 
10 160 159 158 157 156 155 154 153 152 151 150 
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B: Treatment tax36 – symmetric payoff tables 
 
 Capital Total Payoff 
 Capital contribution 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 90 98 106 114 112 110 108 106 104 102 100 
1 95 103 111 119 117 115 113 111 109 107 105 
2 100 108 116 124 122 120 118 116 114 112 110 
3 105 113 121 129 127 125 123 121 119 117 115 
4 110 118 126 134 132 130 128 126 124 122 120 
5 115 123 131 139 137 135 133 131 129 127 125 
6 120 128 136 144 142 140 138 136 134 132 130 
7 125 133 141 149 147 145 143 141 139 137 135 
8 130 138 146 154 152 150 148 146 144 142 140 
9 135 143 151 159 157 155 153 151 149 147 145 
Labour 
contribution 
10 140 148 156 164 162 160 158 156 154 152 150 
 
 Labour Total Payoff 
 Labour contribution 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 0 9 18 27 36 45 54 53 52 51 50 
1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 63 62 61 60 
2 20 29 38 47 56 65 74 73 72 71 70 
3 30 39 48 57 66 75 84 83 82 81 80 
4 40 49 58 67 76 85 94 93 92 91 90 
5 50 59 68 77 86 95 104 103 102 101 100 
6 60 69 78 87 96 105 114 113 112 111 110 
7 70 79 88 97 106 115 124 123 122 121 120 
8 80 89 98 107 116 125 134 133 132 131 130 
9 90 99 108 117 126 135 144 143 142 141 140 
Capital 
contribution 
10 100 109 118 127 136 145 154 153 152 151 150 
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C: Treatment tax44 – symmetric payoff tables 
 
 Capital total payoff 
 Capital contribution 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 80 88 96 104 112 110 108 106 104 102 100 
1 85 93 101 109 117 115 113 111 109 107 105 
2 90 98 106 114 122 120 118 116 114 112 110 
3 95 103 111 119 127 125 123 121 119 117 115 
4 100 108 116 124 132 130 128 126 124 122 120 
5 105 113 121 129 137 135 133 131 129 127 125 
6 110 118 126 134 142 140 138 136 134 132 130 
7 115 123 131 139 147 145 143 141 139 137 135 
8 120 128 136 144 152 150 148 146 144 142 140 
9 125 133 141 149 157 155 153 151 149 147 145 
Labour 
contribution 
10 130 138 146 154 162 160 158 156 154 152 150 
 
 Labour Total Payoff 
 Labour contribution 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 20 29 38 47 56 55 54 53 52 51 50 
1 30 39 48 57 66 65 64 63 62 61 60 
2 40 49 58 67 76 75 74 73 72 71 70 
3 50 59 68 77 86 85 84 83 82 81 80 
4 60 69 78 87 96 95 94 93 92 91 90 
5 70 79 88 97 106 105 104 103 102 101 100 
6 80 89 98 107 116 115 114 113 112 111 110 
7 90 99 108 117 126 125 124 123 122 121 120 
8 100 109 118 127 136 135 134 133 132 131 130 
9 110 119 128 137 146 145 144 143 142 141 140 
Capital 
contribution 
10 120 129 138 147 156 155 154 153 152 151 150 
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D: Calculator 
Capital’s calculator 
 
Labour’s calculator 
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E: Mann-Whitney test  
 
Mann-Whitney test 
  
 Sequence 1 Sequence 2 Sequence 3 
Treatment 1 
   
Treatment 2 
   
Treatment 3 
   
Treatment 4 
   
 
Mann-Whitney test 
  
Baseline 
 
Communication 
 
Tax36 
 
Tax44 
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F: Frequency distributions, by player-type and treatment  
0
5
10
15
20
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
 
Baseline
Capital
0
10
20
30
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
 
Communication
Capital
0
20
40
60
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
 
Tax36
Capital
0
20
40
60
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
 
Tax44
Capital
0
10
20
30
40
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
 
Baseline
Labour
0
10
20
30
40
50
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
 
Communication
Labour
0
20
40
60
80
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
 
Tax36
Labour
0
20
40
60
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
 
Tax44
Labour
Note: Sequence 2 and 3; n=136 
   
Percent 
Percent 
Contribution Contribution Contribution Contribution 
   
65 
Estimating the demand elasticity for 
electricity by sector in South Africa 
Roula Inglesi and James Blignaut  
 
 
Abstract  
This paper analyses electricity consumption patterns in South Africa in an attempt to 
understand and to identify the roots of the current electricity supply crisis. This is 
done by investigating various economic sectors’ responses to price changes using 
panel data for the period 1993-2004. Positive and significant price elasticities over 
this period were found for the transport (rail) and commercial sectors while there are 
positive but small responses to price changes in the agriculture and mining sectors. 
Only the industrial sector responded to changes in electricity prices according to 
theory, namely illustrating negative demand elasticities. These results explain, in part, 
the current electricity crisis. Given the historic low level of electricity prices in con-
junction with a real price decline, i.e. price increases lower than the inflation rate, 
there was no incentive to reduce electricity consumption and/or to be efficient. This 
result supports the notion that prices do have an important signalling effect in the 
economy. Hence, they should be considered not only from an economic growth or 
social vantage point, but also from a supply and technocratic perspective, that in-
cludes environmental factors such as CO2 emissions. Prices cannot be determined 
without considering the system-wide implications thereof.  
Keywords: Sectoral electricity consumption, price elasticity, energy economics 
 
 
1. Introduction 
How sensitive has the demand for electricity been to changes in electricity prices in 
South Africa? This study seeks to answer this question based on the hypothesis that 
the demand elasticity for electricity explains, at least in part, the current mismatch 
between the demand for and supply of electricity.  
Investigating the demand response sensitivity in the electricity sector is becoming a 
global trend. Internationally there has been increasing interest in analysing the trend 
of electricity consumption on an aggregate and industrial level. Special attention has 
also been paid to developing economies. Ghaderi et al (2006), for instance, investi-
gated the electricity demand function of the industrial sector in Iran. A similar sectoral 
analysis on Russian industries was conducted by Egorova and Volchkova (2004), 
who found that the electricity prices were a factor of energy consumption –although 
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other factors such as the output of the industries proved more significant. Studies 
were also carried out for developed countries, by, for example, Lundberg (2009), 
who derived a demand function of Swedish industrial electricity use as well as the 
changes in demand trends over time. By dividing the sample into two periods (1960-
1992 and 1993-2002), his findings showed that output was a more significant factor 
in the first period while price had become more significant in the second. A possible 
explanation for this change was the more efficient use of energy in the latter period. 
Locally, Blignaut and de Wet (2001) examined the manufacturing sector’s electricity 
consumption with regard to the price by estimating the price elasticities for the vari-
ous industrial sectors between 1976 and 1996. They found weak relationships be-
tween electricity price and consumption, some of them positive. Ziramba (2008) 
analysed residential electricity demand, showing that price did not have a significant 
impact on the residential sector for the period 1978-2005; instead, income was an 
important determinant of electricity demand. These results, however, are challenged 
by Inglesi (2010) who showed, for 1980-2005, that price is a significant factor of total 
electricity demand, but at an aggregate level.  
Given the conflicting evidence, this paper attempts to expand the work done by 
Blignaut and de Wet (2001) and Inglesi (2010). The electricity consumption of the 
main industrial sectors and their responses to price changes may be considered 
among the factors contributing to the current electricity crisis. This was done by 
employing panel data for the period 1993-2004 to determine the sectoral price 
elasticities and electricity intensity levels. The rest of the paper is structured as fol-
lows: the next section describes the situation of South African electricity consumption 
and electricity prices, in its entirety and per sector. The succeeding section presents 
the research method and data to be used in the analysis, while the empirical results 
are presented and discussed thereafter. Finally, the conclusions and policy implica-
tions of the findings are discussed.  
2. Background 
2.1 Electricity consumption 
Electricity is a low value yet necessary good within any economy and is one of the 
pillars of development (Blignaut 2009). The generation, supply and distribution of 
electricity, and access to it, have the potential to unlock economic development. 
South Africa, with almost 50 million residents, has about 39 000MW of installed 
electricity capacity. Nigeria, in contrast, has an installed capacity of 4 000MW serving 
150 million. This comparison indicates a key reason why South Africa could develop 
in the way it has, while Nigeria, despite its natural resources, climate and arable land, 
could not.  
Electricity consumption in South Africa has increased significantly over the past 
decade: 11.96% between 1995 and 2000, and 33.79% between 2000 and 2005. 
This unprecedented rise has created serious concerns regarding the environmental 
effects, including higher CO2 emissions as a result of the increased combustion of 
coal. This matter is, however, not elaborated further here, but it is sufficient to say 
that there is a direct link between the demand elasticity for electricity and CO2 emis-
sions and that one possibly effective mechanism to reduce CO2 emissions is to reduce 
the demand for electricity by strengthening the demand response or demand elastic-
ity for electricity. But has the electricity sector been responsive to price changes in the 
past? This question is investigated in this study. 
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Every year, the National Department of Energy in South Africa releases an Aggregate 
Energy Balance of the country, which includes the electricity consumption by sectors 
in MWh. Electricity consumption for the years 1995, 2000 and 2005 by sector as well 
as by the sector’s share to total consumption are presented in Table 1. It shows that 
the industrial sector has been the largest consumer of electricity for all the years. The 
industrial sub-sectors that showed the strongest growth through the years were 
‘Chemical and Petrochemical’ and ‘Non-metallic Minerals’. The ‘Construction’ sec-
tor, although not a big consumer in its own right, has almost doubled its electricity 
consumption over the period, an indication of the growth in the sector in the 2000s. 
The residential sector’s electricity consumption has also increased, while keeping its 
share to total consumption fairly constant at about 17%. Moreover, the residential 
sector was the single largest consumer of electricity in 2005. The electricity consump-
tion of ‘Commerce and Public Services’ rose in 2005. In comparison to other sectors, 
‘Commerce and Public Services’ share however, remained at 12%.  
Table 1: Sectoral electricity consumption in South Africa:  
1995, 2000 and 2005 
Source: DME (1995; 2000; 2005) 
1995 2000 2005  
MWh % MWh % MWh % 
Total consump-
tion 
143 172 628 100 160 299 858 100 214 464 369 100 
Industry sector 80 657 330 56.336 99 702 977 62.198 113 028 378 52.703 
Iron and steel 16 250 811 11.351 20 913 350 13.046 21 341 990 9.951 
Chemical and 
petrochemical 
3 602 879 2.516 2 640 440 1.647 10 081 160 4.701 
Non-ferrous 
metals 
6 956 009 4.858 15 037 710 9.381 18 640 120 8.691 
Non-metallic 
minerals 
1 190 263 0.831 1 153 690 0.720 2 604 680 1.215 
Transport 
equipment 
8 590 0.006 69 250 0.043 92 350 0.043 
Machinery 104 087 0.073 53 170 0.033 41 800 0.019 
Mining and 
quarrying 
33 176 049 23.172 29 038 108 18.115 31 506 930 14.691 
Food and 
tobacco 
454 207 0.317 639 090 0.399 760 440 0.355 
Paper pulp and 
print 
975 054 0.681 1 493 630 0.932 1 753 580 0.818 
Wood and 
wood products 
534 173 0.373 412 370 0.257 296 580 0.138 
Construction 13 805 0.010 34 010 0.021 52 350 0.024 
Textile and 
leather 
475 421 0.332 376 340 0.235 518 960 0.242 
Non-specified 
(industry) 
16 915 982 11.815 27 841 819 17.369 25 337 438 11.814 
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1995 2000 2005  
MWh % MWh % MWh % 
Transport 
sector 
4 297 357 3.002 5 411 009 3.376 5 544 622 2.585 
Domestic air 
transport 
6 803 0.005 31 280 0.020 49 970 0.023 
Road 6 795 0.005 33 740 0.021 19 210 0.009 
Rail 3 456 076 2.414 3 433 160 2.142 3 279 980 1.529 
Pipeline trans-
port 
56 251 0.039 62 260 0.039 78 890 0.037 
Internal naviga-
tion 
0 0.000 6 190 0.004 50 220 0.023 
Non-specified 
(transport) 
771 432 0.539 1 844 379 1.151 2 066 352 0.963 
Other sectors 58 217 941 40.663 55 185 872 34.427 95 891 369 44.712 
Agriculture 5 301 173 3.703 3 954 372 2.467 5 519 706 2.574 
Commerce and 
public services 
17 306 899 12.088 17 164 007 10.707 27 103 280 12.638 
Residential 24 369 099 17.021 28 680 001 17.891 36 970 239 17.238 
Non-specified 
(other) 
11 240 770 7.851 5 387 492 3.361 26 298 144 12.262 
 
2.2 Electricity prices 
The real prices of electricity for the years 1995, 2000 and 2004 are shown in Table 
2. The increases from 2000 to 2004 were very low, even negative, in most instances.  
Table 2: Average electricity prices in South Africa in 1995, 2000 and 
2004 
Source: DME ( 2005) 
 Real prices (c/kWh) 
 Industry Mining Transport Agriculture Commerce Average 
1995 14.36 14.67 20.23 30.37 25.76 15.4 
2000 11.94 12.91 15.35 28.88 22.65 13.23 
2004 11.28 12.41 15.65 24.9 17.67 12.96 
 Real prices (% annual change) 
1995 7.405 -3.296 -5.776 -4.226 -1.529 0.000 
2000 7.278 -2.786 -4.063 3.143 -3.453 0.915 
2004 -2.759 0.567 0.708 4.315 4.618 -1.370 
 
With its historically low electricity prices, South Africa offers no means of predicting 
what would be the demand response to price increases such as those proposed by 
Eskom in September 2009. With specific focus on future effects of changes in elec-
tricity prices, van Heerden et al (2008) estimated the effect of a 10% increase in 
electricity prices on main economic indicators, keeping the elasticities constant. 
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Under such a scenario, the economic consequences would be alarming in the long 
run, with an estimated reduction of investment by 0.37%, a decrease of 0.16% of 
GDP, and a rise in the CPI of 0.5%. In addition, Inglesi (2010) forecast the behav-
iour of total electricity consumption to 2030, assuming that the electricity price would 
double over the period 2008-2011 and then remain constant until 2030: her findings 
showed that electricity demand decreased substantially after the implementation of 
higher prices (-24%, assuming average economic growth of 4% over the period 
2009-2030; -27%, assuming average economic growth of 6% over the same period). 
She assumed, however, that the price elasticity remained constant at -0.56 on elec-
tricity consumption until 2030.  
In summary, before implementing any type of policies or changes in price regimes, 
the price sensitivity of each of the sectors should be taken into consideration because 
each of the sectors responded differently in the period when the prices were kept low 
(mainly until 2004-05). 
3. Method and data 
To apply modern panel data techniques for the analysis, local sources of data were 
used. Sectoral electricity consumption is derived from the Energy Balances of the 
DME (DME 1993 to 2004). The series on the sectoral electricity prices is obtained by 
the Energy Price Report, 2005 (DME, 2005); while the data series on gross value 
added was obtained from the Quarterly Bulletin of the South African Reserve Bank 
(SARB, various issues). 
For an investigation of the effects of prices and industrial output on electricity con-
sumption of different economic sectors a balanced panel data of five production 
sectors for the period 1993-2004 was developed. First, a pooled panel test was 
employed to investigate the overall relationship between electricity prices and output 
with electricity consumption. To capture sector specific effects, fixed effects analysis 
was employed to account for cross-section dynamics.  
Secondly, to determine how the various sectors respond to electricity price changes, 
in terms of their own production output, and to describe inter-sectoral dynamics, a 
seeming unrelated regression (SUR) model is estimated. The equation used is of the 
following functional form: 
LCons= α0 + α1 Lpriceit + α2 loutputit     (1) 
Where cons is the electricity consumption, price is the price of electricity and output 
is the gross value added of the sector i at time t; all the variables are in their natural 
logs. The sources for the respective variables are listed in the Appendix (Table A1). 
The letter L in front of the variable notates that all the variables are linearised. A 
summary of the variables’ descriptive statistics is also presented in Table 3.  
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Table 3: Data descriptive statistics  
  Lcons Lprice Loutput 
 Mean 16.5517 -4.0346 11.2849 
 Median 16.7040 -4.1192 11.1958 
 aximum 18.4361 -3.4287 12.2162 
 Minimum 14.9495 -4.5153 9.9451 
 Std. dev. 1.0459 0.3297 0.6994 
 Skewness 0.0721 0.3072 -0.3986 
 Kurtosis 1.6018 1.7372 1.9647 
 Jarque-Bera 4.9392 4.9307 4.2679 
 Probability 0.0846 0.0850 0.1184 
 Sum 993.1041 -242.0740 677.0927 
 Sum sq. dev. 64.5440 6.4118 28.8580 
 Observations 60 60 60 
 Cross sections 5 5 5 
 
The univariate characteristics of the variables were tested according to the unit root 
test proposed by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002). The null hypothesis of both tests is that 
all series contain a unit root contrary to the alternative that at least one series in the 
panel contain a unit root. The results of the tests are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4: Unit root test of Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) 
Variable 
Possible determinis-
tic structure Statistic p-value 
Level of 
significance 
Conclu-
sion 
Lcons None 2.5175 0.9941    
  Intercept -0.6123 0.2702    
  Intercept and trend -1.6379 0.0507 * 
 Station-
ary 
Lprice None 1.5857 0.9436    
  Intercept -3.9083 0.0000 *** 
 Station-
ary 
  Intercept and trend 0.4857 0.6864     
Loutput None 8.0831 1.0000    
  Intercept -0.6446 0.2596   stationary 
  Intercept and trend -5.1429 0.0000 ***   
Note: *, **, *** denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively 
 
Figures 1-5 below show the behaviour of each of the sectors’ electricity consumption 
in combination with its exclusive electricity prices. From Figure 1 it is clear that the 
electricity consumption in the industrial sector has a distinct negative relationship 
with electricity prices. In the commercial sector, the graph indicates a positive rela-
tionship between electricity consumption and electricity prices for the sector. The 
agricultural and mining sectors show an ambiguous relationship: prices had a down-
ward trend while the electricity consumption fluctuated. This is likely due to other 
factors such as production output. The situation in the transport sector is also am-
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biguous. The sample was thereafter divided into two smaller ones (1993-1997 in 
Figure 5a and 1998-2006 in Figure 5b). This exercise showed the existence of a 
positive relationship in some of the years, namely 1994-1996 and 2001-2004.  
 
Figure 1: Industrial sector 
 
 
Figure 2: Agricultural sector 
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Figure 3: Mining sector 
 
Figure 4: Commercial sector 
 
Figure 5: Transport sector  
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Figure 5a. Transport sector: 1993-1997 
 
Figure 5b. Transport sector: 1998-2004 
4. Empirical results  
The results of the pooled and fixed effects are presented in Table 5. The pooled 
effects model is considered to be limited for a number of applications since it does 
not take into account any cross section heterogeneity among the sectors. The fixed 
effects model, on the other hand, does allow for cross-section heterogeneity and 
assumes a different intercept for each sector. The results show that both price and 
output of the industries are significant factors of electricity demand in its entirety. 
Output has a positive impact while an increase in price leads to a decrease in the 
electricity use. However, when the effects of the different sectors (fixed effects model) 
are taken into account, the coefficient of electricity prices becomes insignificant while 
output becomes much more significant. 
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Table 5: Pooled and fixed effects results 
Lcons Pooled effects Fixed effects 
Loutput 0.604 
(0.000) 
0.753 
(0.001) 
Lprice -1.568 
(0.000) 
-0.062 
(0.800) 
Constant 3.410 
(0.000) 
 
Constant of industrial 
sector 
 8.632 
(0.000) 
Constant of transport 
sector 
 6.722 
(0.000) 
Constant of commercial 
sector 
 7.485 
(0.000) 
Constant of agricultural 
sector 
 7.525 
(0.000) 
Constant of mining 
sector 
 8.650 
(0.000) 
R2 0.635 0.98 
LM (heteroskedasticity)  28.990 (Heteroskedasticity) 
Hausman test  1.377 (No misspecification) 
LM (serial correlation)  2.863 (No serial correlation) 
 
The p-values are shown in parentheses below the regression coefficients; while the 
last three rows show the results of tests for misspecification, heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation (the conclusions of these tests are indicated in parentheses).  
The results of the fixed effects analysis show that inter-sectoral dynamics might be the 
cause of the insignificance of the electricity prices. Therefore, a SUR model is esti-
mated next to capture the importance of electricity prices in each of the sectors sepa-
rately and their inter-sectoral dynamics, knowing that the sample is characterised by 
heterogeneity in their behaviour towards electricity use (see Table 6). White-
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariances were used to correct for 
heteroskedasticity, as proposed by Baltagi (2008).  
The coefficients of the variable Lprice are considered to be the price elasticities of 
electricity demand for each of the sectors. The results are in accordance with the 
expectations following a careful study of the graphs (Figures 1-5). The industrial 
sector has negative price elasticity for the period 1993-2004, the transport and com-
mercial sectors have positive price elasticities and finally, in the agriculture and min-
ing sectors, the price does not play a significant role in the demand for electricity. 
In stark contrast, sectoral output is found to be a significant factor that influences 
electricity consumption of the sectors positively (the coefficients in all the sectors are 
positive and significant). The results are, for the most part, in conflict with standard 
economic theory since, according to theory, the price elasticity of goods is expected 
to be negative since as the price of the good increases (decreases), the quantity 
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demanded will decrease (increase). Some of the plausible reasons for this behaviour 
are discussed below. 
Table 6: SUR model results 
Lcons Industrial  Transport  Commercial  Agriculture  Mining 
Lprice  -1.692 
(0.000)  
1.667  
(0.001)  
1.018 
(0.000)  
0.039 
(0.950)  
0.099 
(0.5581)  
Loutput  0.874 
(0.000)  
1.979 
(0.000)  
1.729  
(0.000)  
1.529  
(0.000)  
1.596 
(0.000)  
Adj R2 =0.98       
Total number of observations: 60       
Corrected for heteroskedasticity       
Note: Numbers in brackets show the p-values. 
 
5. Discussion: policy implications 
The fact that prices and consumer behaviour follows the path they have as analysed 
above can be explained in a number of ways. Firstly, in South Africa low prices have 
caused a lack of behavioural response to price changes. There was a long period 
during which consumption increased more rapidly than prices due to other factors, 
such as product demand. Miketa (2001) attributed the positive price elasticities in his 
analysis to the fact that energy prices were not constructed as an industry specific 
energy price.  
Another reason is that electricity could be considered as a Giffen good. The prerequi-
sites for a good to be characterised as a Giffen good are the following: a) the good is 
considered inferior; b) lack of close substitute goods; and c) the good must be a 
significant ratio of the consumer’s income but not as much as any of the other nor-
mal goods demanded. Although, the existence of Giffen goods is considered a rarity, 
Bopp (1983) and Abrasmksy (2005) have argued that kerosene and gasoline behave 
as Giffen goods in some applications. In the case of electricity in South Africa, the 
income effect from a price change is higher than the substitution effect. Therefore, 
the price and quantities demanded present the same trend (upward or downward), 
hence, price elasticity is positive. It would therefore be fair to say that electricity in 
South Africa, at least historically, can be categorised as resembling the characteristics 
of Giffen goods. 
The price policies followed in the country, in addition to the results of the above 
analysis on electricity, resulted in an enhancement of electricity consumption as 
reflected through positive price elasticities in all but the industrial sector. The positive 
demand elasticity, a rarity in economics, can at least be considered to have been a 
contributing factor to the current electricity crisis. Moreover, the stronger the demand 
for electricity, given the electricity supply mix, which is heavily, dominated by coal, 
the stronger the demand for power and the more the CO2-emisisons. The positive 
behavioural response to changes in price, implying that prices and consumption 
move in the same direction, has not only led to the rapid crowding-out of electricity 
capacity, but also to a strong increase in CO2-emissions.  
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6. Conclusion 
The main argument in this study is that in order to address the mismatch between 
electricity supply and demand such as the one South Africa currently experiences, 
one must understand, among other things, the underlying behavioural responses due 
to changes in price. The sector-specific approach employed in this paper clarifies 
each of the sectors’ behaviour to price changes before the recently proposed in-
creases. 
Using Panel data, this study examined the price effect on electricity consumption by 
sector and their respective price elasticities were estimated. The findings of the analy-
sis indicate ‘abnormal’ behaviour towards price changes in all but the industrial 
sector, which is the only one in which consumption declined with price increases and 
vice versa.  
According to this analysis, a lack of behavioural responses to price changes was a 
contributing reason for the insecure and uncertain environment in which the current 
policy-makers find themselves. In the future, a structural change is expected to be 
experienced due to the high increases in the electricity tariffs with different sectors 
turning to more efficient technologies and other – cheaper – forms of energy. More 
disconcerting, however, is that the positive demand elasticity has also acted as a 
strong stimulus for the growth in CO2-emssions. If South Africa wishes to curb the 
emissions of CO2 from electricity generation it will do well to induce change that 
would enhance a behavioural response to price changes.  
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Modelling the impact of CO2 taxes in 
combination with the Long Term 
Mitigation Scenarios on emissions in 
South Africa using a dynamic 
computable general equilibrium model 
Marna Kearney 
Abstract 
A dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is used to analyse the 
impact on the economy of taxes on CO2 emissions combined with the Long Term 
Mitigation Scenarios. A sales tax is used to model the impact of a CO2 tax. The 
mitigation scenarios modelled include structural shifts (for example switching from 
coal-fired electricity plants to nuclear power stations), changes in energy efficiency 
and changes in investment required. The extent of the structural shifts, changes in 
energy efficiency and investment required differs from scenario to scenario. 
The results for the mitigation scenarios indicate that the mitigation scenarios have a 
positive impact on GDP when investment is large. Although economic activity ini-
tially declines due to improved energy efficiency, it is followed by a period of eco-
nomic expansion as lower prices increases output in most industries – this is espe-
cially the case when it is combined with higher investment. When CO2 taxes are 
levied the economic impact is again positive if this is combined with either tax relief 
or reinvestment of the additional tax revenue. The scenarios have varied impact on 
labour, in general employment for semi- and unskilled labour rise if investment is 
higher. In most scenarios the demand for energy declines, especially for coal and 
petroleum. However, the demand for electricity increases if investment rises signifi-
cantly. 
When the mitigation scenarios is combined with a CO2 tax the results indicate that 
the CO2 tax is effective in reducing output of CO2 producing industries as it changes 
the relative price of the commodities produced by these industries. However, the 
sales tax is distortionary as it introduces price wedges in the economy while consum-
ers may end up paying large portions of the tax. A CO2 tax may not be the most 
appropriate tool to achieve the desired results considering the economic develop-
ment objectives of South Africa. However, when combined with the LTMS frame-
work its negative impact is negated by higher investment and GDP growth. 
Keywords: CO2 tax, computable general equilibrium model, economic impact; long 
term mitigation scenarios 
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1. Introduction 
Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto 
Protocal, South Africa has been exempt from taking mandatory action to reduce 
emissions. However, South Africa has identified strategies through its Long Term 
Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS) to reduce emissions. In this process the Department of 
Environment Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) identified two scenarios, the first being the 
base scenario against which all other scenarios are compared. This is the Growth 
without constraint (GWC) scenario, and measures the level of emissions if the econ-
omy continues to grow at current trends without any significant attempts to mitigate 
emissions. The second scenario is the Required by science scenario’ (RSS) and 
estimates the required interventions to mitigate emissions to target levels. Within the 
RSS four strategies have been identified, namely Start-now, Scale-up, Use-the-
market, and Reach the goal. Each of these strategies has different investment and 
cost implications, technological improvements and tax and other incentive packages 
in mind. (DEAT 2007). Meeting the rising demand for energy in South Africa poses 
certain challenges which include (1) investment to increase the capacity to produce 
energy; (2) switching to more environmentally sustainable sources of energy; and (3) 
increasing energy efficiency. All of these challenges have an impact on the economy, 
on production and ultimately on the level of CO2 emissions produced. This paper 
focuses on a further challenge, looking at the impact of taxes on CO2 emissions as an 
effective means to reduce emission output. The reasoning is that a tax on CO2 emis-
sions will increase their relative price so that production declines. This is measured 
within the framework set by the LTMS. A dynamic computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model is used to analysie the impact on the economy of taxes on CO2 emis-
sions combined with the LTMS. 
Various authors contributed to this topic in the past, including Van Heerden et al 
(2006), Paauw (2007), and Devarajan et al (2009); they all attempted to measure 
the impact of taxes on emissions and/or mitigation strategies in South Africa. The 
paper by Van Heerden et al focuses on finding double or triple dividends from the 
revenues raised from energy related taxes if recycled to households and industry by 
lowering existing taxes, while Paauw focused on the impact of the LTMS scenarios 
specifically. Devarajan et al, in turn, focused on the economic impact of various taxes 
aimed at reducing carbon emissions. In all these papers a static CGE model was used 
to evaluate the impact of the strategies and taxes. This paper attempts to add value 
to this debate by using a dynamic CGE model to assess the combined impact of the 
LTMS scenarios and taxes on energy emissions. 
The advantages of using a dynamic CGE model compared to a static CGE model 
include the following: 
• Comparative-static CGE models estimate the reaction of the economy to cer-
tain policy shocks or economic events at only one point in time. A compara-
tive static approach has limitations when linked to scenarios from energy 
modeling, which project energy demand and emissions up to 2050. Since the 
purpose is to understand the economic implication of long-term mitigation 
scenarios, dynamic effects are particularly relevant. The dynamic CGE model 
on the other hand can trace the impact of a policy shock or economic event 
on a period-by-period basis (usually over annual periods).  
• A further advantage of the dynamic CGE model is that it captures growth in 
capital stock and therefore productive capacity over time. Capital accumula-
tion is modeled endogenously so that previous period investment generates 
Modelling the impact of CO2 taxes using a dynamic CGE model 80 
Putting a price on carbon: Conference proceedings 
new capital stock for the next period. The allocation of new capital stock 
across sectors is influenced by the sectors’ share in aggregate capital income, 
the depreciation rate, and on sectoral profit rates from the previous period. 
Sectoral profit rates may be important in mitigation scenarios, if investment 
flows to sectors with different levels of capital stock. Sectors with above-
average capital returns will receive a larger share of the new capital stock 
relative to their share in capital income (and vice versa). A predetermined 
macroeconomic forecast is used to determine the benchmark growth path of 
the model against which policy shocks can be compared. All exogenous vari-
ables in the model are updated within the macroeconomic forecast frame-
work. 
The dynamic CGE model used in this analysis is based on a model developed by 
James Thurlow for TIPS (Thurlow 2004). It is an extension of the comparative static 
CGE model used by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). The 
IFPRI standard model is based on the neoclassical-structural modelling tradition as 
introduced by Dervis and De Melo (1982). Various adaptations have been made to 
the dynamic model as developed by Thurlow, including changes to the specification 
of labour demand and supply, the determination of wages, and the determination of 
the base growth path in the model. The two main sources of data used in the dy-
namic CGE model are a social accounting matrix (SAM) and a macroeconomic 
forecast.  
Designing or evaluating environmental policy requires detailed understanding of the 
relationship between the economy and the environment. Mathematical models 
provide the quantitative links between economic activity and the environmental 
impact. These models allow one to quantitatively measure the impact of policies that 
restructure the economy to achieve emission reductions in a multi-sectoral economy. 
2. Methodology 
2.1 The model 
The model consists of two basic components, namely the within-the-period and the 
between-the-period components. In the within-the-period component the standard 
IFPRI model is solved. The standard IFPRI model consists of a set of non-linear 
equations, which are simultaneously solved. Behaviour is captured by non-linear first 
order optimality conditions where producers maximise profits and consumers utility. 
The model makes provision for both goods and factor markets. The institutions 
included are households, firms, the government, and the rest of the world. The 
model is in equilibrium when demand is equal to supply. A number of macro con-
straints are also included to ‘close’ the model (Lofgren 2002). 
In the between-periods component the model is updated to capture effect from the 
static model into the next period or alternatively to capture economic effects outside 
the model into the next period. The most important effect to be captured in the in-
between year updating process is the impact of current investment on future capital 
stock (Thurlow 2004). If mitigation leads to current investment in some sectors but 
not others, this would have implications for differences in capital stock in following 
periods. Other variables that are updated include total factor productivity, factor 
specific productivity, labour force growth, population growth, real wages, govern-
ment consumption, investment, and transfers from the government to household. 
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Most of these are exogenous parameters in the model. These parameters are up-
dated to provide better tracking of a GDP growth path.  
2.2 Data 
2.2.1 Social accounting matrix 
The main source of data used for the CGE modeling is a SAM, which is a compre-
hensive, economy-wide data framework. It is a square matrix in which each account 
is represented by a row and a column: each cell shows the payment from its column 
account to its row account. The CGE model follows the flows captured in the SAM. 
The SAM used for the modelling was compiled by the Western Cape Department of 
Agriculture (PROVIDE 2006) and is based on the base-year 2000. The same matrix 
was used by Pauw (2007), who describes the SAM in his paper.  
Table 1: PROVIDE National Accounting Matrix for 2000 (Rm) 
  Commod-
ities 
Activities Production  
factors 
House-
holds 
Enter-
prises 
Government Capital  Rest of 
world 
TOTAL 
    Capital Labour   Taxes Expend-
iture 
Invest 
ment 
Changes in 
inventories 
 
Commodities  1 088 770   580 802   167348 139 
648 
7 096 257 011 2 240 
675 
Activi-
ties 
 1 893 686           1 893 
686 
Factors Capital  377 770         15 910 393 680 
 Labour  442301         2 242 444 543 
House-
holds 
   94 883 440299  112 
441 
 29687   260 677 570 
Enter-
prises 
   262 
865 
  139 
834 
 51747    454 446 
Govt Taxes 117 232 -15155   87 848 33 248      223 173 
 Expendi-
ture 
    1 870 9 687 223 173    481 235 211 
Capital Savings     6 922 159 
156 
 -20526   1 192 146 744 
 Changes 
in invent-
ories 
        7096   7 096 
Rest of the world 229 757  35 932 4244 128 80  6955    277 096 
TOTAL  2 240 675 1 893 686 393 
680 
444543 677 570 454 
446 
223 173 235 211 146 
744 
7 096 277 096  
 
2.2.2 GDP Forecast up to 2050 
The dynamic CGE model requires a detailed forecast up to 2050 in order to establish 
the benchmark growth path of the model against which the alternative scenarios will 
be compared. A consistent forecast for the real GDP aggregates is required as well as 
for the level of capital stock in the economy and the size of the labour force. Table 2 
shows a summary of the growth forecast.  
The growth path for 2001 to 2007 is based on the actual values for the GDP aggre-
gates as published by Statistics South Africa and the SARB. The growth path for 
2008, 2009 and 2010 are based on the National Treasury forecast as published in 
the Budget Review document of 2007. The ASGI-SA growth targets are built into the 
forecast for the years 2010 to 2014. Thereafter continued growth is forecasted up to 
the mid 2020s whereafter growth returns to trend of 4.5%. 
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The growth for final consumption expenditure, government consumption expendi-
ture, investment, changes in inventories and GDP growth is initially imposed exoge-
nously on the model, while imports and exports are solved for endogenously. The 
growth path is determined accordingly. A range of parameters is then used to main-
tain the growth path set while variables such as consumption, investment and GDP 
are made endogenous to the modelling process. 
Table 2: Summary of the GDP growth forecast up to 2050 
GDP components  
(R million) 
2001-
2005 
2006-
2010 
2011-
2015 
2016-
2020 
2021-
2025 
2026-
2030 
2031-
2040 
2041-
2050 
Real final household consumption  
% change y-o-y 4.2 5.7 5.0 5.8 6.7 6.5 6.5 6.5 
% of GDP 63.6 67.3 65.5 63.5 63.0 65.5 66.1 66.1 
Real gross fixed capital formation  
% change y-o-y 6.3 13.4 8.6 7.3 2.6 2.4 3.1 3.1 
% of GDP 15.9 22.2 28.2 30.2 27.4 23.2 22.9 22.9 
Real government consumption  
% change y-o-y 5.1 4.9 5.2 6.0 7.0 6.6 6.5 6.5 
% of GDP 18.7 19.1 18.7 18.1 18.1 19.1 19.3 19.3 
Real change in inventories  
% of GDP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Statistical discrepancy: Real GDP  
% of GDP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Real exports: Total  
% change y-o-y 1.6 6.6 6.8 6.6 5.6 5.2 5.2 5.2 
% of GDP 26.7 27.6 29.4 30.0 29.3 28.9 28.9 28.9 
Real imports: Total  
% change y-o-y 7.0 11.3 8.6 7.5 6.2 5.0 5.0 5.0 
% of GDP 25.8 36.7 43.0 46.5 46.8 46.4 46.4 46.4 
Real GDP 
% change y-o-y 3.6 5.2 5.7 6.7 6.3 4.9 4.5 4.5 
 
2.3 Emissions 
The input-output structure within the SAM as used in the CGE model allows one to 
calculate the emission levels of the various industries according to its use of the 
different energy sources in their respective production processes. This allows the 
model to capture the change in emission levels due to structural shifts in production. 
The present study calculates the change in energy demand for coal, petroleum, and 
electricity in the economy and uses this as a proxy for emission levels. The changes 
from intermediate demand and final use are included. The limitation of this is that 
changes in the composition of demand for coal, petroleum and electricity will have 
an impact on the emission levels which this approach will not pick up. 
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2.4 Scenario modelling 
The shocks in the various scenarios are modelled as follows: 
• Structural shifts are modelled by relocating capital stock to the growing 
sector while keeping the total supply of energy unchanged.  
• Improved energy efficiency is modelled by reducing the intermediate in-
put use coefficient in the model.  
• Changes in investment required are modelled by adjusting the invest-
ment level in the model. It is assumed that household and firm savings 
increase to finance the higher investment required. 
• A sales tax is used to model the impact of a CO2 tax. Two alternative 
scenarios are modelled here: It is first assumed that government invests 
the additional revenue and, second, that government use the additional 
revenue for tax relief. The tax relief is given to firms and households pro-
portionally to their current tax contribution.  
2.4.1 Start-now, Scale-up and Use-the-market scenarios 
The mitigation scenarios Start-now (initial wedges), Scale-up (extended wedges), and 
Use-the-market (economic instruments with increased efficiencies) are modelled 
using the same approach as applied by Pauw (2007) in the static modelling process. 
The mitigation scenarios include structural shifts (for example switching from coal-
fired electricity plants to nuclear poser stations), changes in energy efficiency and 
changes in investment required. The extent of the structural shifts, changes in energy 
efficiency and investment required differs from scenario to scenario. The main im-
pacts of the three scenarios are set out in Table 3. 
Table 3: Structural shifts 
 Structural shifts in electricity generation Structural shifts in petroleum production 
GWC Electricity from coal remains the most 
important method for electricity gen-
eration. However its importance starts 
to decline from the early 2020s. Nu-
clear power becomes more important 
from the 2030s but is still small. At the 
end of the period, electricity from coal 
still constitutes 80% of total output and 
nuclear about 15%. 
Petroleum from oil is and remains the 
most important production method for 
petroleum. Its contribution to total 
petroleum supply increase marginally – 
in 2050 it accounts for 75% of total 
petroleum supply. The contribution of 
the other methods declines somewhat or 
remains constant.  
Start-
now 
Electricity from coal starts to rapidly 
decline from 2010 onwards. Its contri-
bution declines to 45% from 2030 
onward. Electricity from nuclear and 
gas becomes more important: each 
contributes around 25% to electricity 
generation from 2030 onwards. 
The contribution from petroleum from 
oil declines somewhat to 65% in 2050. 
The production of petroleum through 
coal-to-liquid is more important – its 
contribution increases to around 30% in 
2050. 
Scale-
up 
Electricity from coal declines from 
2010 onwards. Its contribution is al-
most 0% in 2050. The contribution of 
nuclear power increases to about 50% 
in 2050 with the electricity from gas 
making up the rest (just below 50%). 
The Scale-up picture is very similar to 
the Start-now picture. The importance 
of petroleum from oil is marginally 
lower, while the importance of petro-
leum from coal-to-liquid is marginally 
more important.  
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 Structural shifts in electricity generation Structural shifts in petroleum production 
Use-
the-
market 
The contribution of electricity from 
coal declines faster and reach almost 
0% in 2040. Nuclear is more impor-
tant, but only contributes 25% in 2050. 
Gas is the most important source for 
electricity generation (75%). 
Petroleum from oil becomes significantly 
more important. In 2050 it represents 
95% of petroleum production. 
Table 4: Energy efficiency 
 Energy efficiency 
in electricity use 
Energy efficiency 
in coal use 
Energy efficiency 
in petroleum use 
Energy efficiency 
in gas use 
Start-
now 
The energy effi-
ciency of most 
industries in the 
use of electricity 
improves except 
for wholesale and 
retail trade. The 
industry with the 
largest improve-
ment is ‘other 
manufacturing’ 
followed by non-
metal products. 
The energy effi-
ciency in the use 
of coal improves 
for all industries.  
The energy effi-
ciency in the use 
of petroleum 
improves for 
wholesal and retail 
trade – there is 
also a slight im-
provement in the 
energy efficiency 
of services. 
Not applicable 
Scale-
up 
The same as Start-
now 
The same as Start-
now 
The same as Start-
now 
Not applicable 
Use-
the-
market 
The energy effi-
ciency of most 
industries in the 
use of electricity 
improves except 
for wholesale and 
retail trade. The 
improvement is 
however much 
lower compared to 
Start-now and 
Scale-up.  
Initially the im-
provement in 
energy efficiency 
in the use of coal 
is lower than when 
compared to Start-
now and Scale-up. 
However since the 
mid 2040s there is 
a sharp increase in 
the efficiency of 
coal use. 
The same as Start-
now and Scale-up 
Most industries see 
a decline in the 
efficienct use of 
gas from the mid 
2040s onwards. 
 
Required investment 
Figure 1 shows the required investment by each of the scenarios. The required 
model is derived as input from the MARKAL model. The required investment in the 
Start-now scenario is lower than in the Growth without constraints (GWC) scenario 
as the improved energy efficiencies demand reduces demand and thus investment. 
In the Scale-up and Use-the-market scenarios the required investment is higher; it is 
the highest for the Scale-up scenario. 
CO2 taxes 
In the Use-the-market scenario CO2 taxes are imposed as a sales tax on the use of 
commodities producing high levels of emission including electricity, coal and petro-
leum. The purpose of this is to adjust economic behaviour by making the use of 
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electricity, coal and petroleum more expensive. The tax increase rates are derived 
from the MARKAL model. There is a significant increase in the tax on coal (especially 
for the generation of electricity), and smaller increases in the tax on crude oil and gas 
(as seen in). The revenue generated from the CO2 taxes is modelled using two alter-
native scenarios: (1) to increase investment or (2) for tax-relief. The approach used 
to model CO2 taxes is similar to the approach used by Devarajan et al (2009) where 
they model the impact of a carbon tax on coal, petroleum, and electricity. The results 
of Devarajan et al (2009) show that the carbon tax has a welfare loss, but much 
lower than the other taxes investigated (this includes a sales tax on energy use). 
Figure 1: Required investment (in R million) 
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Figure 2: CO2 taxes imposed in the Use-the-market scenario 
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2.4.2 Additional scenarios 
Two sets of additional scenarios are conducted. The first set of scenarios estimates 
the impact of an increase in the capacity of the electricity from coal industry versus 
the electricity from nuclear industry and the electricity from,renewables industry. The 
purpose of these scenarios is to investigate the economy-wide impact of the three 
methods in generating electricity and to answer questions such as which is most 
costly, which industries would be affected, which labour groups would be influenced, 
and what the welfare impacts and the macro economic effects would be. In these 
scenarios it is assumed that the capital stock of electricity generation using coal, 
nuclear and renewables increases by R10 billion in 2010, respectively. 
The last scenario conducted investigates the impact of a structural shift in the econ-
omy on energy demand and therefore emissions. A structural shift in the economy to 
a service based economy is imposed, while it is assumed that the contribution of the 
primary sector in the economy decline. It is assumed that the tertiary sector’s produc-
tive capacity grow by R2 billion a year, while the productive capacity of the primary 
sector decline by R2 billion a year. 
The impact of the additional scenarios is compared against the GWC scenario. 
2.4.3 Closures and assumptions 
The closures will be, as far as possible, kept in line with the closures used in the 
comparative-static modelling. The specific closures used will include the following: 
1. The savings rate of households and firms will adjust to finance the higher in-
vestment levels. 
2. The dynamic model makes provisions for specific levels of labour supply and 
unemployment for each type of labour. Semi-skilled and unskilled labour are 
unemployed, while skilled and high-skilled labour are very close to full em-
ployment. Employment levels will adjust for all types of labour until full em-
ployment is reached, whereafter wages will adjust. For skilled and high-skilled 
labour, wages will adjust sooner as these types of labour are much closer to 
full employment (a certain level of natural unemployment is assumed). 
3. The exchange rate is flexible with a fixed level of foreign savings (fixed at the 
base growth path level). 
3. Results 
3.1 Start-now, Scale-up and Use-the-market Scenarios 
GDP impact 
The Start-now scenario shows a decline in GDP (compared to GWC) from 2008 until 
2024 mainly due to the improved energy efficiency. The improved energy efficien-
cies lead to a decline in economic activity as the demand for electricity, coal and 
petroleum declines in intermediate use by industries. From 2024 onwards GDP 
(compared to GWC) increases, due to the positive impact on prices in the economy 
stemming from the improvement in energy efficiency. The prices of coal, petroleum, 
and electricity from nuclear and electricity from gas are lower. This translates into 
lower prices for most of the commodities in the economy. The commodities that do 
not see a decline in prices are electricity from coal, electricity from renewables, and 
commodities that are mostly sold to households (such as wholesale and retail trade, 
Modelling the impact of CO2 taxes using a dynamic CGE model 87 
Putting a price on carbon: Conference proceedings 
and services). The increase in the price of consumption goods is driven by higher 
demand. Consumption is higher in the Start-now scenario (compared to the GWC 
scenario) as investment is lower: households therefore need to save less to finance 
investment and consumption increase. This is a result of the closure rules used in the 
model: it is assumed that household savings adjust to finance additional investment 
and vice versa. As can be seen in Table 5 the decrease in GDP is mainly driven by 
higher consumption (compared to GWC), investment is lower (compared to GWC), 
while exports and imports decline. Exports decline as the price of exports decline. 
More goods are therefore sold domestically. Imports also decline as it is assumed that 
exports are the only source of foreign exchange to pay for the imports (assumed that 
foreign savings is fixed). Over the entire period average GDP is 0.06% lower when 
compared to GWC. 
The GDP impact of the Scale-up scenario is positive (compared to GWC). The en-
ergy efficiencies in the Scale-up scenario are very similar to those in the Start-now 
scenario and one would have expected the GDP impact to show a decline initially, as 
was the case in the Start-now scenario. However, investment in the Scale-up sce-
nario is significantly higher, so that the additional economic activity generated 
through the increase in investment outweighs the decline in economic activity from 
the improved energy efficiency. The improved energy efficiency and structural 
changes also result in lower prices for most commodities in the economy. The lower 
prices in this instance are further driven down by large declines in the price of capital 
(return on capital) due to higher investment. Some prices in the economy decline to 
a large extent (coal, petroleum from oil, petroleum from coal-to-liquid, petroleum 
from biofuels, and electricity from gas) but others, in turn, increase significantly 
(electricity from coal, electricity from renewables, and electricity from nuclear). Most 
investment and consumption industries also see an increase in prices. However, over 
the period the decline in prices outweighs the increase and there is an overall decline 
in producer prices. Initially consumption by households will fall as savings increase to 
finance the higher investment. However, consumption soon rises as the lower prices 
lead to an increase in demand. As can be seen in Table 5, the higher GDP is a result 
of an increase in consumption and investment. Over the entire period, average GDP 
is 1.26% higher when compared to GWC.  
The GDP impact in the Use-the-market scenarios is the same whether the additional 
revenue from the CO2 taxes gets reinvested or whether it is used for tax relief. The 
macroeconomic effect of the two scenarios is the same due to the assumptions of this 
model. When the additional revenue is reinvested it results in a decline in the re-
quired savings by households and firms, which is equivalent to tax relief extended in 
the second scenario. Investment levels in both cases remain the same, but the source 
of investment differs. In the reinvestment case governments invest the additional 
revenue, while in the tax-relief case the higher investment comes from firms and 
household who receive the tax relief. The main difference would be in the distribu-
tional and welfare impact as the people who save in the economy are not necessarily 
the same as the taxpayers. According to the SAM used, the high-income household 
group contributes 67% to total taxes paid by households, and 65% to total savings. 
The low-income group contributes 8.5% to total taxes paid by households and 8% to 
savings, while the middle-income groups contribute slightly more to savings com-
pared to taxes (27% and 24%) respectively. Tax relief is therefore expected to benefit 
higher income households more, while the impact of the reinvestment scenario 
depends on industry structure.  
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In the Use-the-market scenarios, GDP increases sharply from 2010 to 2018 due to a 
sharp increase in investment. Although the GDP impact is still higher compared to 
GWC it declines from 2018 to 2036 due to a bigger decline in consumption. There is 
a short period where the GDP impact is lower when compared to GWC, however the 
GDP impact again rises from 2044 onwards. Over the entire period, average GDP is 
0.73% higher compared to GWC, for both the Use-the-market scenarios. 
The required investment levels as imposed in the model are somewhat higher than in 
the GWC scenario. However, the additional revenue generated with the CO2 taxes 
results in even higher investment (either from the reinvestment or from tax relief to 
households and firms). This results in investment being significantly higher compared 
to GWC. Consumption will therefore decline as households need to save more to 
finance the increase in investment. Investment increases the capital stock in the 
model and will therefore increase production capacity in future periods. At the end of 
the period the taxes levied decline, causing the level of investment to decline. Exports 
increase initially as domestic prices rise (due to the increase in tax) relative to world 
export prices and more output is sold domestically. This results in a real depreciation 
of the exchange rate and a rise in imports. At the end of the period this is reversed 
due to domestic prices declining.  
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Figure 3: GDP impact (percentage deviation from GWC) 
 
Table 5: GDP components (percentage deviation from GWC) 
 2000-
2004 
2005-
2009 
2010-
2014 
2015-
2019 
2020-
2024 
2025-
2029 
2030-
2039 
2040-
2050 
Private consumption 
Start-now -0.03 0.96 0.44 0.38 2.13 2.41 2.55 2.27 
Scale-up 0.07 -0.09 -0.51 0.34 1.53 1.67 0.70 0.62 
Use-the-market – reinvest 0.07 0.07 -1.37 -1.43 -0.03 -0.68 -1.23 -0.97 
Use-the-market – tax relief 0.07 0.07 -1.37 -1.43 -0.03 -0.68 -1.23 -0.97 
Gross fixed capital formation 
Start-now 0.19 -3.37 -6.97 -2.85 -3.97 -4.40 -4.96 -5.05 
Scale-up 0.13 0.23 3.12 3.32 1.64 1.28 3.83 5.10 
Use-the-market – reinvest 0.13 -0.10 4.62 7.67 4.63 5.32 3.68 3.96 
Use-the-market – tax relief 0.13 -0.10 4.62 7.67 4.63 5.32 3.68 3.96 
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 2000-
2004 
2005-
2009 
2010-
2014 
2015-
2019 
2020-
2024 
2025-
2029 
2030-
2039 
2040-
2050 
Change in inventories 
Start-now 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Scale-up 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Use-the-market – reinvest 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Use-the-market – tax relief 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Government consumption 
Start-now 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Scale-up 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Use-the-market – reinvest 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Use-the-market – tax relief 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Exports 
Start-now 0.04 -0.74 -3.80 -2.50 -2.66 -2.58 -2.54 -2.08 
Scale-up 0.04 0.04 1.31 1.78 0.57 -0.05 -0.20 -0.43 
Use-the-market – reinvest 0.04 0.01 1.75 4.44 2.79 2.13 0.66 -0.54 
Use-the-market – tax relief 0.04 0.01 1.75 4.44 2.79 2.13 0.66 -0.54 
Imports 
Start-now 0.04 -0.53 -2.64 -1.73 -1.89 -1.93 -2.18 -2.00 
Scale-up 0.05 0.03 0.91 1.23 0.40 -0.04 -0.17 -0.41 
Use-the-market – reinvest 0.05 0.01 1.21 3.08 1.99 1.59 0.55 -0.52 
Use-the-market – tax relief 0.05 0.01 1.21 3.08 1.99 1.59 0.55 -0.52 
GDP 
Start-now 0.01 -0.23 -1.79 -0.77 -0.18 0.08 0.37 0.71 
Scale-up 0.05 0.01 0.62 1.42 1.54 1.54 1.74 1.89 
Use-the-market – reinvest 0.05 0.02 0.62 1.89 1.67 1.40 0.35 0.51 
Use-the-market – tax relief 0.05 0.02 0.62 1.89 1.67 1.40 0.35 0.51 
 
GDP industry impact 
Table 6 shows the industry impact for the Start-now scenario. Electricity from gas, 
petroleum from coal-to-liquid, and electricity from nuclear are the industries that 
benefit the most in the Start-now scenarios. The industry that benefits the least is 
electricity from renewables, mostly due to the structural shifts imposed in the model. 
The industry seeing the largest percentage change compared to the GWC scenario is 
electricity from gas. However, this is mainly because it is from a very low base: elec-
tricity from gas is a very small industry. 
Table 6: Start-now GDP industry impact (percentage deviation from GWC) 
 2000-
2009 
2010-
2019 
2020-
2029 
2030-
2039 
2040-
2050 
Best performing industries (excluding electricity and petroleum industries) 
Metal industries -0.64 -2.68 2.04 3.66 3.52 
Water 0.22 -0.82 0.79 0.98 0.86 
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 2000-
2009 
2010-
2019 
2020-
2029 
2030-
2039 
2040-
2050 
Worst performing industries (excluding electricity and petroleum industries) 
Machinery -1.51 -4.56 -4.34 -4.70 -4.05 
Other manufacturing -0.92 -4.07 -4.09 -4.36 -3.79 
Vehicles -0.54 -3.67 -3.77 -4.17 -3.92 
Construction -1.99 -3.88 -3.38 -3.79 -3.69 
Petroleum industries 
Petroleum from oil -0.10 -6.58 -12.75 -12.70 -10.76 
Petroleum from coal-to-liquids 0.01 41.80 242.75 340.73 341.20 
Petroleum from gas-to-liquids -0.65 -6.03 -16.48 -28.30 -37.24 
Petroleum from biofuels -0.16 -5.06 4.14 7.19 1.72 
Electricity industries 
Electricity from coal -0.25 -11.97 -29.05 -33.93 -31.87 
Electricity from nuclear 0.10 46.55 57.79 43.40 57.02 
Electricity from renewables 1.81 -89.54 -85.08 -69.23 -98.79 
Electricity from gas 0.18 589.07 2584.14 3416.93 3516.87 
 
The GDP impact on industries in the Scale-up scenario is shown in Table 7. The 
industries that benefit the most from this are again electricity from gas, petroleum 
from coal-to-liquid, and electricity from nuclear. Other industries that are likely to 
benefit here are investment-oriented ones such as metals and construction, due to 
the significant increase in investment. Industries that do not benefit include electricity 
from renewables, electricity from coal, and petroleum from gas-to-liquid. This is 
again a function of the structural shifts imposed in the model. 
Table 7: Scale-up GDP industry impact (percentage deviation from GWC) 
 2000-
2009 
2010-
2019 
2020-
2029 
2030-
2039 
2040-
2050 
Best performing industries (excluding electricity and petroleum industries) 
Metal industries 0.06 4.25 6.01 5.89 3.79 
Construction 0.17 2.90 1.64 3.88 5.53 
Machinery 0.05 2.27 -0.07 1.57 2.30 
Non metallic products 0.07 1.66 0.35 0.76 0.91 
Water 0.02 0.61 1.73 0.94 0.57 
Wholesale and retail trade 0.02 0.78 0.60 0.48 0.75 
Worst performing industries (excluding electricity and petroleum industries)  
Fertiliser 0.02 -0.29 -3.18 -6.07 -6.02 
Vehicles 0.02 1.18 -1.00 -1.63 -2.87 
Beverages 0.02 -0.03 -0.98 -2.16 -2.35 
Agriculture 0.02 -0.03 -0.53 -1.66 -1.80 
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 2000-
2009 
2010-
2019 
2020-
2029 
2030-
2039 
2040-
2050 
Petroleum industries 
Petroleum from oil 0.12 -4.26 -12.66 -13.54 -11.34 
Petroleum from coal-to-liquids 0.13 38.87 228.55 352.31 438.95 
Petroleum from gas-to-liquids -1.76 -10.81 -35.44 -56.23 -66.75 
Petroleum from bio-fuels -0.14 -4.90 -5.51 -6.40 -7.79 
Electricity industries 
Electricity from coal -0.19 -10.22 -27.90 -42.91 -75.51 
Electricity from nuclear 0.16 50.68 60.96 89.89 278.35 
Electricity from renewables 0.02 -92.04 -91.38 -65.35 -98.20 
Electricity from gas 0.22 617.85 2589.14 3986.44 8559.62 
 
The industry impact in the Use-the-market scenario is relatively the same as in the 
Scale-up scenario with the exception that investment industries such as metals, con-
struction, and machinery benefit more from the additional revenue from the rein-
vestment of CO2 tax revenue. Industries that benefit include electricity from nuclear, 
petroleum from coal-to-liquid, and petroleum from biofuels. When compared to the 
Scale-up scenario, the petroleum from coal-to-liquid industry benefits to a lesser 
extent. There is still a general move toward petroleum generated through coal-to-
liquid processes compared to oil, but due to the higher coal taxes the increase in 
petroleum from coal-to-liquid is smaller. Petroleum generation through biofuels, 
however, now increases with more than in the Scale-up scenario as some substitution 
to this method of petroleum production is less costly in the presence of CO2 taxes. 
Industries that do not benefit include electricity from coal, electricity from renewables 
and petroleum from oil. These industries’ GDP is lower compared to the Scale-up 
industry. The industry results for the Use-the-market Tax Relief scenario are similar. 
Table 8: Use-the-market GDP industry impact (percentage deviation  
from GWC) 
 2000-
2009 
2010-
2019 
2020-
2029 
2030-
2039 
2040-
2050 
Best performing industries (excluding electricity and petroleum industries) 
Metal industries -0.02 7.18 7.97 7.76 5.32 
Construction -0.04 5.95 5.10 5.55 6.77 
Machinery 0.04 4.83 3.33 2.63 2.61 
Other manufacturing -0.02 3.93 3.08 2.90 2.14 
Non metallic products -0.01 3.24 2.46 1.21 0.53 
Other services 0.03 -0.23 0.23 0.37 0.45 
Worst performing industries (excluding electricity and petroleum industries)  
Fertiliser -0.03 -1.56 -4.66 -9.57 -9.67 
Agriculture 0.03 -0.60 -0.68 -1.94 -2.53 
Beverages 0.03 -0.54 -0.75 -1.66 -2.02 
Vehicles 0.03 -0.60 -0.68 -1.94 -2.53 
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 2000-
2009 
2010-
2019 
2020-
2029 
2030-
2039 
2040-
2050 
Petroleum industries 
Petroleum from oil 0.07 0.41 -3.20 1.95 -1.10 
Petroleum from coal-to-liquids 0.30 35.37 136.30 -24.08 136.20 
Petroleum from gas-to-liquids -1.38 -20.73 -47.27 -60.30 -70.86 
Petroleum from bio-fuels -0.01 -5.89 -6.12 18.73 23.21 
Electricity industries 
Electricity from coal -0.31 -12.75 -17.01 -80.31 -93.94 
Electricity from nuclear 0.30 12.57 -27.93 146.59 149.72 
Electricity from renewables 1.82 -88.36 -79.47 -38.89 -97.75 
Electricity from gas 5.46 2047.64 5588.93 19019.63 27932.82 
 
Employment and wages 
The combined impact on employment and wages is shown in Table 9. In the Start-
now scenario, wage income for high-skilled and skilled categories increases over the 
entire period (compared to GWC), while factor income for the semi-skilled and 
unskilled groups decline. This result follows the industry results. Industries that bene-
fits in this scenario (such as petroleum from coal-to-liquid, petroleum from biofuels 
and electricity from nuclear) use high-skilled and skilled labour most intensively.  
In the Scale-up scenario wage income for all labour groups increases even for the 
semi- skilled and unskilled. The semi-skilled and unskilled benefit in this scenario 
from the increase in investment. Investment industries such as construction and 
machinery use semi-skilled and unskilled labour most intensively. The construction 
industry for example uses 56.4% semi-skilled and unskilled labour in production and 
contributes 10.4% to total employment of semi-skilled and unskilled labour in the 
economy. 
In the Use-the-market scenario the wage income for all labour categories increases 
initially. This is due to the additional demand from higher investment or tax relief. At 
the end of the period the wage income for high-skilled and skilled labour declines. 
These results also follow the industry results. Industries such as petroleum from gas-
to-liquid, electricity from coal, and electricity from renewables employ high-skilled 
and skilled labour intensively. 
Table 9: Employment and wage impact 
Average over period (deviation from GWC) 
 Start-now Scale-up Use-the-market 
High-skilled labour 3.6 24.1 8.4 
Skilled labour 8.8 29.4 8.8 
Semi-skilled and unskilled labour -11 17 13.7 
 
The returns to capital are higher in the Start-now scenario as investment is lower 
(14.7% on average over the period). In the Scale-up and Use-the-market scenarios 
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the returns to capital are lower as investment is higher (-6.1 and -13.1% on average 
over the period). In the Scale-up and Use-the-market scenarios the demand for 
capital increase more. Industries such as petroleum from coal-to-liquid, electricity 
from nuclear, and the metals industry are capital-intensive and use 74.3%, 81.6% 
and 60.1% capital in their production respectively.  
Household welfare 
The equivalent variation measure (as shown in Figure 4) measures the welfare im-
pact of the scenarios by measuring the change in utility for all household groups. The 
equivalent measure incorporates the welfare impact of changes in income and prices 
at a household level. In the Start-now scenario welfare for all households (over the 
entire period and compared to GWC) improves. The high-income household group 
sees the largest improvement in welfare as their income increased the most over the 
period. The high-income household group receives a large share of their income 
from high-skilled and skilled labour (70%). All households are better off due to the 
decline in prices from higher investment and improved efficiency. 
In the Scale-up scenario the highest income group sees a decline in welfare due to 
lower returns on its capital. This household group receives 18% of its income from 
capital. In the Scale-up scenario the low-income group is the best off. Low income 
households receive most of their income (53%) from unskilled labour and are also 
most intensively employed in investment industries such as construction which bene-
fit in the Scale-up scenario. 
In the Use-the-market scenarios all households are better off. The high-income 
household group is marginally better off. The wage income of the high-income 
groups is higher, but the returns they receive on capital are lower. Most of the welfare 
impact for the high-income groups is from lower prices. In the tax-relief scenario 
high–income households are marginally better off when compared to the reinvest-
ment scenario. This is because the high-income groups pays a larger portion of total 
taxes and therefore benefits more from the tax relief. In the reinvestment scenario 
low-income households are marginally better off, as they receive a large portion of 
their income from semi- and unskilled labour, which factor-income increase the most. 
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Figure 4: Equivalent variation (deviation from GWC) 
Energy demand and emissions 
Table 10 shows the changes in energy demand for coal, petroleum and electricity. In 
the Start-now scenario the demand for coal, petroleum and electricity decline. The 
demand for coal declines with less compared to the other scenarios, while the de-
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mand for petroleum and electricity decline with more. This is due to improved en-
ergy efficiency in the use of petroleum and electricity. In the Scale-up scenario the 
demand for investment is higher (when compared to GWC and Scale-up) which 
leads to an increase in the demand for petroleum and electricity. Structural changes 
in the economy (away from coal) lead to a relative large decline in coal demand. In 
the Use-the-market scenarios the demand for coal decreases significantly mainly due 
to the demise of the coal industry. The demand for petroleum also decreases. How-
ever, in the Use-the-market scenario the demand for electricity increases (especially 
at the end of the period) due to an increase in demand for electricity from higher 
investment and exports. 
The results are in line with results generated by Pauw (2007). Devarajan et al (2009) 
found that the impact of the taxes on GDP is negative and that the taxes have nega-
tive welfare impacts for most of the taxes investigated, especially when the tax reve-
nue is used for tax relief. The dynamic CGE modeling results shows that when the 
tax is combined with the mitigating scenarios the net impact on GDP is positive 
through increased investment. It is also assumed that the tax revenue is channelled to 
either increased investment, or tax relief. Although the increase in GDP puts pressure 
on energy demand it is countered with the improved energy efficiencies as well as 
the CO2 taxes assumed, so that the demand for coal, petroleum and electricity falls. It 
is expected that energy emissions will decline. 
Table 10: Energy demand 
 2000-
2004 
2005-
2009 
2010-
2014 
2015-
2019 
2020-
2024 
2025-
2029 
2030-
2039 
2040-
2050 
Coal 
Start-now 0.032 -0.474 -3.138 -6.746 -8.476 -10.433 -11.835 -12.240 
Scale-up 0.055 -0.041 0.039 -4.559 -7.417 -9.781 -13.028 -19.630 
Use-the-market – reinvest 0.054 -1.294 -6.572 -9.268 -10.777 -12.035 -42.922 -64.800 
Use-the-market – tax-relief 0.054 -1.299 -6.576 -9.268 -10.777 -12.036 -42.923 -64.802 
Petroleum 
Start-now 0.037 -0.150 -1.980 -0.760 -0.552 -0.829 -1.804 -2.976 
Scale-up 0.062 -0.037 -0.349 0.008 -1.591 -3.279 -3.970 -2.183 
Use-the-market – reinvest 0.062 0.005 0.649 2.067 1.129 0.013 -1.622 -2.587 
Use-the-market – tax-relief 0.062 0.002 0.645 2.066 1.129 0.013 -1.623 -2.590 
Electricity 
Start-now 0.011 -0.382 -4.343 -5.670 -5.161 -4.746 -5.974 -6.452 
Scale-up 0.038 -0.315 -2.348 -3.637 -3.489 -3.536 -5.399 -6.176 
Use-the-market – reinvest 0.039 -0.408 -1.341 2.720 9.051 13.599 16.536 12.142 
Use-the-market – tax-relief 0.039 -0.415 -1.348 2.720 9.051 13.599 16.534 12.137 
 
When the mitigation scenarios is combined with a CO2 tax the results indicate that 
the CO2 tax is effective in reducing output of CO2 producing industries as it changes 
the relative price of the commodities produced by these industries. However, the 
sales tax is distortionary as it introduces price wedges in the economy while consum-
ers may end up paying large portions of the tax. However, this is negated to some 
extent if the tax revenue from the carbon tax is allocated to tax relief.  
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3.2 Additional scenarios 
3.2.1 The impact of additional capacity in coal versus nuclear electricity 
generation 
The productive capacity of electricity generation by coal and nuclear is increased by 
R10 billion in 2010 in each scenario, respectively. The purpose of these scenarios is 
to see how the distributional impact of the two scenarios differs. The relative impact 
of the increase in capital stock is largely determined by the structure of the two re-
spective industries. The electricity from coal industry supplies 93% of electricity, while 
the electricity from nuclear industry supplies 5%. The value added in both industries 
is very similar; value added in the electricity from coal industry is slightly higher at 
55% compared to 54% in electricity from nuclear. The electricity from coal industry 
uses commodities from more industries in the generation of electricity, with large 
inputs from coal itself, construction, other manufacturing, electricity, and services. 
Large inputs into the electricity from nuclear industry are petroleum, construction, 
other manufacturing, and electricity. The electricity from nuclear industry is more 
capital-intensive than the electricity from coal industry (81% compared to 78%). 
High-skilled labour is used more intensively by the electricity from nuclear industry 
(14% compared to 10%). The electricity from coal industry uses unskilled labour 
more intensively (8.5% compared to 2.3%).  
The macroeconomic impact of the two scenarios is very similar. In 2010 GDP in-
creases by almost 0.25% as a result of the increase in capital stock. The additional 
capital stock increases the productive capacity of the economy and GDP remains 
higher than GWC for a time until it returns to GWC levels in the late 2030s. Over the 
entire period, average GDP is 0.02% higher compared to GWC. The increase in 
GDP is mainly driven by higher consumption, as the additional capital stock results 
in an increase in employment and wages and, therefore, disposable income. Lower 
prices from the increase in the supply of electricity also stimulate consumption. In the 
electricity from coal scenario the higher consumption is mainly due to lower electric-
ity prices, while in the nuclear scenario it is mainly due to higher wages. Exports also 
increase as the lower electricity prices lower domestic prices relative to world prices 
resulting in a real exchange rate depreciation. Imports also increase, as more foreign 
exchange is available from the higher exports to finance imports. Imports increase 
with marginally more in the nuclear scenario indicating that electricity from nuclear 
may be marginally more import-intensive than electricity from coal. 
Most industries benefit from the increase in the capacity of the electricity from coal 
industry, for the following reasons: 
• The electricity from coal industry has large backward linkages with other in-
dustries. As output here increases it will need more intermediate goods. The 
industries that supply intermediate goods such as coal, construction, other 
manufacturing, electricity, and services to the electricity from coal industry, 
benefit. 
• The electricity from coal industry supplies a large portion (93%) of the total 
electricity supply. The increase in supply of electricity from coal will therefore 
have a large price impact on the economy. Most industries that use electricity 
in its production process benefit from this, including metals, mining, pharma-
ceuticals, electricity from coal, wholesale and retail trade, and services. 
The electricity from nuclear industry does not benefit from the increase in the capac-
ity of the electricity from coal industry as there is substitution away from it to the 
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cheaper electricity from coal. The GDP impact on industries from the increase in the 
capacity of the nuclear industry is similar to that of an increase in the capacity of 
electricity from coal. The backward linkages between the electricity from nuclear 
industry and the electricity from coal industry are very similar except for coal used in 
the ‘electricity from coal’ industry. The demand for all energy sources increase as the 
economy expands. 
3.3 The impact of a structural shift in the economy from the primary to 
the tertiary sector 
This scenario assumes that there is a structural shift from the primary sector to the 
tertiary sector in the economy. From 2001 onwards it is assumed that the capital 
stock of the tertiary sector increases by R2 billion per year, while the capital stock of 
the primary sector decline by R2 billion per year. The aim of this scenario is to see 
whether this structural shift in the economy will lead to changes in energy demand 
and therefore emission levels.  
The GDP impact is initially positive as consumption and exports increase. However, 
from 2024 GDP is lower when compared to the GWC scenario. Over the entire 
period average GDP is 0.05% higher when compared to the GWC scenario. The 
increase in production capacity of the tertiary sector leads to an increase in supply, 
which in turn leads to an increase in employment and income. Prices will also go 
down as the returns to capital in the tertiary sector fall. The combined impact of 
higher income and lower prices leads to an increase in consumption. Since the terti-
ary sector sells more output to households compared to the primary sector, house-
hold consumption would therefore not be influenced as much by the rise in prices in 
the primary sector. The tertiary sector also employs high-skilled and skilled labour 
more intensively compared to the primary sector. The primary sector combined 
employs 24.9% and 8.6% high-skilled and skilled labour as a percentage of total 
factor use, compared to the tertiary sector that employs 59.1 and 31.9%, respec-
tively. The tertiary sector is also a larger employer of high-skilled and skilled labour 
and employs 80.2% and 87.3% of total high-skilled and skilled labour in the econ-
omy. Higher income in the tertiary sector is therefore expected to outweigh the de-
cline in income from the mining industry.  
The mining industry is an important earner of foreign exchange in the economy and 
the decline in mining exports is expected to influence the real exchange rate. Exports 
of the mining industry in 2000 contributed 33% to total exports in the economy 
compared to the tertiary sector that contributed 13%. Initially exports increase as the 
increase in exports in the tertiary sector outweighs the decline in exports from min-
ing. However, mining exports start to decline rapidly as the real exchange rate ap-
preciates and the price of mining commodities relative to international prices in-
crease. This also impacts negatively on tertiary sector exports and from 2024 total 
exports decline.  
Inter-industry linkages influence the impact of this scenario on the various industries. 
One would have expected agriculture to decline and wholesale and retail trade and 
services to increase more. The mining industries also show a larger decline than 
expected. The reasons for this are that (1) agriculture is used intensively in industries 
such as food and beverages that benefit from the increase in consumption; (2) 
wholesale and retail trade and services do not benefit as they are used by industries 
such as petroleum from coal-to-liquid, and petroleum from gas-to-liquid; and (3) the 
mining industries decline more than expected due to a large decline in exports espe-
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cially from 2024 onwards. Industries that benefit in this scenario are those that sell 
mostly to consumption, including food and beverages, industries that supply the 
inputs into these industries such as machinery, and industries that use services 
(wholesale and retail trade and other services) intensively in their own production 
processes. These industries benefit from the lower prices associated with the service 
industries. Industries that do not benefit are either used intensively in the production 
of mining commodities or suffer from the real exchange rate appreciation (from 2024 
onwards).  
Employment and wages increase initially as the tertiary sector is a larger employer 
than the primary sector. The tertiary sector also employs high-skilled and semi-skilled 
labour more intensively and these labour groups see a large increase in factor in-
come. The semi-skilled and unskilled labour group benefit more than expected since 
they are more intensively employed in the primary sector. However, other industries 
that benefit such as construction and the metals industry also employ semi-skilled 
and unskilled labour intensively. At the end of the period all labour categories see a 
decline in wage income as exports declines  
The demand for coal, petroleum, and electricity initially rises as the services sector 
(and the economy) expands. However, with the decline in mining the demand for all 
these commodities starts to decline. The demand for coal and electricity declines the 
most, as it is intensively used in the mining industries. 
4. Summary and conclusions 
The GDP impact in the Start-now scenario is lower when compared to the GWC 
scenario. This is because the increased energy efficiencies result in a contraction of 
economic activity as less electricity is used. This is accompanied by a loss of wage 
income due to lower employment and wages for semi-skilled and unskilled labour. 
However, most households are better off due to lower prices in the economy from 
the increased energy efficiencies. 
The GDP impact in the Scale-up scenario is higher when compared to the GWC 
scenario. The impact of the substantial increase in required investment in this sce-
nario outweighs the decline in economic activity associated with the increase in 
energy efficiency. Wage income for all household groups increases; return on capital 
is lower due to the increase in investment. This results in higher-income households 
not benefitting from this as they receive most of their income from capital. The low-
income household group benefits the most as they are intensively employed in in-
vestment-oriented industries. 
The GDP impact in the two Use-the-market scenarios are very similar, as the adjust-
ment mechanisms in the model results in the same macroeconomic impact. The 
GDP impact is higher compared to the GWC scenario due to the increase in invest-
ment. Investment is higher due to firstly, higher required investment and, secondly, 
higher investment associated with the CO2 taxes levied. The CO2 taxes levied are 
either reinvested or the tax relief extended generates higher savings by firms and 
households, which in turn generates higher investment. The higher investment again 
results in a decline in the return on capital. Wage income rises especially for the 
semi-skilled and unskilled labour groups as they are intensively employed in the 
investment-oriented industries. There are marginal differences in the distributional 
impact. In the tax-relief scenario the high-income households are marginally better 
off, while low-income households are marginally better off in the reinvestment sce-
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nario. All household groups are better off, with the high-income households best off 
when compared to the GWC scenario. 
There is a general decline in the demand for coal and petroleum in all the scenarios. 
The decline in demand for coal is the largest in the Use-the-market scenario. De-
mand for electricity increase in the Scale-up and Use-the-market scenarios due to the 
large increase in investment and exports associated with these scenarios. 
In conclusion: A CO2 tax may not be the most appropriate tool to achieve the desired 
results considering the economic development objectives of South Africa if it leads to 
higher prices for energy. However, as seen from the results, if the CO2 tax is com-
bined within the LTMS framework its negative impact is negated through higher 
investment and GDP growth. The mitigation scenarios have a positive impact on 
GDP when investment is large as is the case with the Scale-up scenarios. Although 
economic activity initially declines due to improved energy efficiency, it is followed 
by a period of economic expansion as lower prices increase output in most industries 
– this is especially the case when it is combined with higher investment. When CO2 
taxes are levied the economic impact is again positive if this is combined with either 
tax relief or reinvestment of the additional tax revenue. 
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THEME 3: LESSONS FROM THE CDM 
EXPERIENCE 
Innovative environment for enhancing 
carbon markets and prices 
Francis Yamba  
 
Abstract  
Africa’s share in the global market through the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) is dismally low – standing at 2.42% of total CDM projects in the pipeline as at 
end of February 2010. Various barriers have been identified, including: CDM exper-
tise, institutional/policy arrangements, awareness and information, and financing. 
This paper elaborates on Africa’s carbon potential, barriers limiting CDM implemen-
tation, and a barrier removal strategy. As part of the barrier removal strategy aimed 
at addressing some of the barriers, in particular financing, the paper proposes an 
innovative environment for enhancing carbon markets and prices. 
Keywords: carbon potential, barriers, barrier removal strategy and innovative financ-
ing environment, Africa  
 
1. Background 
There are two main types of market-based policy instruments aimed at curbing 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions: price-based and quantity-based ones (UNCTAD 
TDR 2009). These have generally been used in developed countries and are now 
being urged on emerging developing countries. Carbon tax is a price-based instru-
ment, because it imposes a direct charge on the use of fossil fuels based on their 
carbon content. In fact, the carbon tax is equivalent to an emissions tax. In contrast, 
in a system of tradable permits, the regulator determines the maximum permissible 
aggregate emission level (the cap), and issues corresponding allowances for emission 
dischargers. However, in view of several constraints which have limited the applica-
tion of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in most of sub-Saharan Africa, 
resulting in African markets being largely bypassed by emerging or rapidly expanding 
carbon markets, the application of policy instruments is not relevant. What is re-
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quired, however, is an innovative environment for enhancing carbon markets and 
prices.  
This paper therefore initially investigates Africa’s carbon market potential, and identi-
fies various barriers inhibiting its development, including carbon prices, and proposes 
a barrier removal strategy for the same purpose. To enhance better carbon prices in 
Africa and financing, the paper proposes an innovative mechanism which requires 
the establishment of an African Carbon Exchange comprising trading, Africa Carbon 
Fund, and knowledge hub platforms. 
2. Methodology 
Some of the results presented in this paper emanate from a study undertaken under 
the Climate Strategies project aimed at evaluating the record of the CDM to date and 
to consider ways it might be improved in the future international climate policy 
regime. The project was coordinated by Oxford Institute for Energy Studies and 
University of Zurich between mid 2008 and December 2008 (Michaelowa & Muller 
2009). The study included analysis from an industrialised country viewpoint on one 
hand, and from a developing country perspective (covering Africa, India and China) 
on the other. The concept originating an innovative environment for enhancing 
carbon markets and prices emerged from discussions between the Centre for Energy, 
Environment and Engineering Zambia (CEEEZ) and Lloyds Financials of Zambia.  
3. Africa’s carbon potential 
All Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), including African countries, are expected, among others things, to un-
dertake measures and programmes to mitigate climate change – taking account of 
their common but differentiated responsibilities and their specific national and devel-
opment priorities and circumstance. Thus far the main drivers for the carbon market 
in Africa and other developing countries are CDM and voluntary markets. There are 
several constraints that have limited the application of CDM in Africa and, as a con-
sequence, African markets have been largely bypassed by emerging or rapidly ex-
panding carbon markets. 
From the African perspective, CDM was meant to allow companies in developing 
countries to become fully engaged in climate change initiatives and benefit from new 
investments and transfer of cleaner technologies. At the outset, there were different 
interpretations of this, one of which was that the private sector from developed coun-
tries would actually come and invest in developing countries. However, this did not 
turn out to be case, since the local private sector has been expected to undertake the 
investments, while the developed countries only buy carbon credits. The status and 
performance of CDM in Africa as at February 2010 is illustrated in Table 1. Out of 4 
949 projects in the pipeline, Africa has only 120 projects representing only 
2.42%. Why such a slow uptake? One of the arguments advanced for this low 
participation in CDM market in Africa is the existence of a variety of barriers. 
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Table 10: Status and performance of CDM in Africa 
Source: www.uneprisoe.org 
Total in CDM Pipeline Number % kCERs 2012 % 
Latin America 838 16.93 382 704 13.41 
Asia & Pacific 3 866 78.12 2 299 867 80.61 
Africa 120 2.42 91 735 3.22 
Middle East & N Africa 72 1.45 51 726 1.81 
LDC 19 0.38 20 122 0.71 
LDC Asia & Pacific 34 0.68 6 900 0.24 
Total 4 949 100 2 853 054 100 
 
 
It is expected that total Certified Emission Reduction (CER) potential would reach 
740 million tonnes of CO2-eq per year, more than sub-Saharan Africa’s current 
annual GHG emissions with a value of (US)$4 billion per annum at $5 per CER. 
There is also great potential through the introduction of energy efficiency manage-
ment practices in view of the inefficient manner of energy use in most industries in 
Africa (IPCC 2007: Chapter 7).  
Besides the energy sector, there is an enormous potential in the forestry and agricul-
ture sector, which has only been assessed superficially, including: improved agricul-
ture practices (zero tillage conservation, improved agriculture management systems), 
restoration of cultivated organic soils, improved crop land management (improved 
grazing land management, restoration of degraded land, livestock management) and 
sustainable natural resource management (prevent deforestation, intensive manage-
ment fertilization, increased land- scape carbon stocks), and increase of bioenergy 
substitution.  
A recent study (Walker et al 2008) estimated the area of land available for afforesta-
tion in sub-Saharan Africa at 625 million hectares, and this could sequester over 30 
billion tCO2 in a period of 10 years. Methane reduction opportunities in the agricul-
tural and waste management sectors are also significant. 
4. Barriers inhibiting CDM 
Barriers inhibiting CDM in sub-Saharan Africa are well known (de Gouvello et al 
2008; Africa Carbon Forum 2008; IER 2002; Alves 2005; Pemberton 2001) and 
include CDM expertise, institutional/policy arrangements, awareness and informa-
tion, and financing. As regards expertise, there is generally a lack of sufficient CDM 
expertise to undertake technical feasibility studies and development of Project Idea 
Notes (PINs) and Project Design Document (PDDs), on the one hand. On the other 
hand, there is still lack of sufficient specialised support service providers among the 
consulting firms, research institutions, and academia in Africa to work with the pri-
vate sector to develop PINs and PDDs (IER 2002; Alves 2005). 
As part of institutional/policy arrangements, governments are expected to set up 
Designated National Authorities (DNAs) for approval of CDM projects and provide 
letters of approval and established sustainable development criteria required for 
approving CDM projects. Although DNA offices exist in most African countries, they 
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lack resources for infrastructure and capacity development to expand their mandates 
to include provision of CDM promotional services. However, besides their existence, 
there is as yet no integrated institutional environment at policy, agency, and corpo-
rate levels to mainstream CDM in their vision and development of implementation 
strategies, investment promotion, and business investment decision processes, re-
spectively.  
As for awareness and information, as shown by a recent study (Satnam 2007), the 
private sector has still not fully woken up to take advantage of CDM Investment 
opportunities due to various barriers. The study identified barriers including:  
(i) a lack of perception of companies about the technical and financial bene-
fits offered by the CDM;  
(ii) a lack of model companies to provide some experience for new develop-
ers; 
(iii) a lack of ability to develop PDDs;  
(iv) limited resources for specialised support services for economic and finan-
cial analysis of CDM projects; 
(v) a lack of awareness about the price of CERs on the international market 
and therefore uncertainty of the impact of these on project economics; 
(vi) a low level of knowledge regarding the legal issues to be considered un-
der the CDM;  
(vii) inability to negotiate for a emission reduction purchase agreement 
(ERPA) and high transaction costs. 
It is now a well-recognised fact that lack of financing is the biggest hindrance to CDM 
project implementation. This is the case since carbon finance alone will not solve the 
investment financing gap (de Gouvello et al 2008; Africa Carbon Forum 2008). For 
typical renewable energy projects, including hydro, wind, and biomass, the carbon 
contribution to financing ranges from 5% to 50% depending on the type of projects 
(Pfeifer et al 2008). Several project developers, investors and buyers have empha-
sised that generally unattractive investment frameworks for conventional energy 
projects are a major obstacle to CDM project development, including access to pro-
ject finance (Africa Carbon Forum 2008). At the local/regional level, financial institu-
tions perceive energy related projects as risk, and therefore are reluctant to invest in 
them.  
Further, it has been revealed (Pemberton, 2001, Alves, 2005) that there is a weak 
financial base for local companies to implement CDM projects, non-inclusion of 
CDM investment of traditional, national/regional financial institutions on their lending 
portfolio, and lack of institutional set up for performing CDM project cycle functions. 
The studies also revealed limited awareness as to the availability of international 
investment sources and of risks associated with CDM project implementation, as well 
as limited – and sometimes zero – awareness of transaction costs in CDM implemen-
tation and impacts of CERs on projects economics. 
5. Barrier removal strategy 
This section considers barrier removal strategies aimed at removing hindrance to 
CDM development and implementation in Africa and hence unlocking its great CDM 
potential. The suggestions are based on the studies mentioned in section 4. 
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1. CDM capacity: Provision of support and resources to develop local expertise in 
key related CDM services to help project developers prepare business plans, 
PINs and PDDs. Capacity building activities should involve learning by doing, 
targeting groups such as engineers, economists and financial analysts from in-
dustry, consulting firms, and research organisations and academia. African gov-
ernments need capacity to promote and encourage CDM and work with the pri-
vate sector to stimulate project development. African businesses need increased 
awareness of CDM, its benefits and role in accelerating investment and bringing 
in new technology. 
2. Awareness and information: Continued aggressive CDM awareness and infor-
mation programmes among companies, farmers and project developers on 
CDM objectives and its project cycle, and on the benefits of CDM in business, 
especially involving high-level meetings among CEOs. Provision of technical in-
formation and key data to the private sector and farmers on technology (renew-
able energy, energy efficiency etc), characteristics, investment and of the costs, 
through establishing websites and specialised focal points for widespread dis-
semination 
3. Financing: Awareness and sensitising programmes to local financial institutions 
to remove the perception that renewable energy, energy efficiency and other 
(afforestation and agriculture) projects carry high risks and transactions costs as-
sociated with CDM implementation; and also programmes on the need to for-
mulate an innovative financing arrangement. 
6. An innovative environment for enhancing carbon markets and prices 
To address the financing barrier requires an innovative environment to enhance 
carbon markets and prices mechanism under the proposed Africa Carbon Credit 
Exchange (ACCE). ACCE was developed based on discussions between the Centre 
for Energy, Environment and Engineering Zambia (CEEEZ) and Lloyds Financials of 
Zambia. ACCE will manage a market-place which is uniquely designed to facilitate 
the implementation of carbon reduction projects by unraveling the complexities of 
carbon markets and addressing the prevailing barriers to carbon market development 
in Africa. ACCE will further provide innovative services and solutions within existing 
African and international frameworks to unlock low-carbon Africa and will serve as a 
one-stop shop for emission reduction or sequestration projects to access the capacity, 
financing, and linkages required to enable low-carbon development. 
It is proposed that the ACCE introduces three platforms, namely: a knowledge hub, 
the Low-Carbon Africa Fund, and trading platforms. The knowledge hub will build 
capacity through sensitisation on CDM awareness and will build the technical capac-
ity to develop and implement carbon projects. Once the projects have been assessed 
and found viable from both business and CDM perspectives, they will be considered 
for project financing from the Fund. The Fund will draw financial resources from 
different sources to include pensions, savings and equity entities. The Low-Carbon 
Africa Fund Portfolio will unlock finance for carbon projects, including green tech-
nology development and/or transfer. The Fund will provide debt and/or equity to 
projects that facilitate sustainable development and reduce emissions versus the 
business as usual approach. The Fund will also buy African-based carbon credits 
(CERs and Verified Emission Reductions, VERs). The trading platform will provide 
the medium for transactions, and supporting structures in the form of brokers and 
local partners throughout Africa. The platform will further provide a need to build 
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greater supply for today’s market by exchanging services that address current con-
straints in Africa. A summary of the proposed innovative environment for enhancing 
carbon markets and prices mechanism under ACCE is shown in Figure 1. 
 
  
Figure 1: Summary of the proposed innovative environment for enhancing 
carbon markets and prices mechanism under ACCE 
7. Conclusions 
Africa has a great potential for CDM projects, and therefore stands to benefit if various 
issues (CDM reform, barrier removal strategy, and financing) are articulated and imple-
mented as far as possible. Implementation of the proposed Africa Carbon Credit Exchange 
ACCE will go a long way in addressing barriers currently inhibiting CDM implementation in 
Africa through increased project pipeline and better carbon prices. 
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Redefining the role of CDM in the quest for putting a price 
on carbon in South Africa 
John Fay, Farai Kapfudzaruwa and Lin Na 
 
Abstract 
Both South Africa and China are emergent economies heavily dependent on fossil-
fuel based energy sources, and the potential to leverage the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) is significant in both countries. However, experience to date with 
CDM indicates South Africa has significantly lagged behind China in the uptake of 
the CDM, accounting for only 0.9% of the worldwide registered annual Certified 
Emission Reductions (CERs) while China has dominated the market, generating over 
54% of the annual worldwide CERs. Thus, an opportunity exists to redefine the role 
of CDM in South Africa to better incentivise a lower carbon development trajectory. 
This paper provides a comparative analysis of the CDM experience in China and 
South Africa in order to identify the underlying drivers and obstacles to CDM in both 
countries. It is the authors’ objective to analyse the lessons learnt from market-
leading China and laggard South Africa to better understand the structures and 
policies necessary within host CDM countries to unlock the potential of CDM in a 
post 2012 regime.  
 
1. Introduction 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is a market-based approach under the 
Kyoto Protocol, designed to provide financial incentives for developing countries to 
voluntarily contribute to emission reduction efforts and promote sustainable devel-
opment (UNFCCC, 2009). China and South Africa both ratified the Kyoto Protocol 
in 2002, and are eligible to implement CDM projects and to trade the Certified Emis-
sion Reduction credits (CERs) through the international compliance carbon market. 
The fundamental structure of the CDM as a market-based approach causes it to 
favour low-cost opportunities that generate significant CER volumes, in host coun-
tries with political stability, investment security and large ‘smokestack’ industries 
(such as heavy engineering, energy production or manufacturing that is heavily 
dependent on fossil fuels).  
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Whilst the main emergent economies in developing countries (China, India, Mexico, 
Brazil and South Africa) inherently meet the favourable CDM country criterion out-
lined above, in reality the geographical distribution of the projects indicates a signifi-
cant disparity in CDM uptake between the countries. Of the 4 673 projects in the 
CDM pipeline as of October 1st 2009, the Asia and Pacific region has dominated the 
CDM while Africa has under-performed. China has taken the leadership role by 
supplying 2012 CERs, whereas South Africa, the leading CDM host country in Africa, 
has played a negligible role thus far (see Table 1).  
Table 1: CDM project and CER comparison  
Source: UNEP (2009)  
Location Worldwide China South Africa 
Issued projects  566  144 (25.4%) 4 (0.7%) 
Issued kCERs  333 069 153 234 (46%) 1 023 (0.3%) 
Registered projects  1 834 626 (34.1%) 16 (0.9%) 
Registered 2012 kCERs  1 685 229 912 041 
(54.1%) 
15 643 
(0.9%) 
Remaining CDM pipeline projects  2 839 1 205 (42.4%) 12 (0.4%) 
Remaining CDM pipeline 2012 kCERs  1 100 520 627 221 (57%) 1 065 (0.1%) 
GDP 2008 estimated1 ($ thousands) - 4 326 187 000 276 764 000 
Total 2012 CERs / GDP ($ thousands) - 0.39 0.06 
Estimated population2  - 1 338 613 000 49 052 000 
Total 2012 CERs /population  - 1.26 0.36 
Total emissions (thousand tons CO2)
3   6 017 690 443 580 
Total 2012 CERs / Est. total emissions  0.28 0.04 
Notes: 
1. World Bank 2008 GDP. 
2. CIA World Factbook 2009. 
3. Energy Information Agency 2006 Estimates 
 
 
As of 1 October 2009, 1 834 projects have been registered by the CDM Executive 
Board (EB) at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), with expected CERs representing 1 685 million tons of carbon dioxide 
equivalent (tCO2e) by the end of 2012. Among the registered projects, China has 
626 projects, representing 34.6% while South Africa has 16 projects representing less 
than 0.9% of the total. Even when normalising the significant size difference between 
China and South Africa, it is further apparent that South Africa has lagged behind 
(Table 1). China has significantly higher utilisation of CDM in terms of CER per 
thousand tons of CO2 emitted (0.28 to 0.04), CER per thousand dollars of GDP 
(0.39 to 0.06), and pipeline CER per person (1.26 to 0.36).  
This article explores the underlying drivers of the Chinese and South African experi-
ences in order to compare and contrast what has supported or hindered CDM uptake 
in both countries. The paper discusses how a country’s regulatory and policy frame-
work need to be aligned with the emission reduction targets and sustainable devel-
opment criteria for CDM to ensure that the mechanism enhances the social, eco-
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nomic and environmental demands of the country. It is the authors’ intent to analyse 
the experience gained from market leading China to better understand how to lever-
age the CDM market and to facilitate further development in South Africa. At the 
same time, the lessons learnt from the Chinese and South African CDM market can 
guide other developing countries to develop a healthy and mature path for the im-
plementation of CDM and other market-based mechanisms.  
2. Methodology 
This paper utilised methodological and investigator triangulation as the main re-
search approaches (Denzin 1970; Jick 1979; Kimchi 1991). This approach used 
conferences, interviews, reports, archival documents and field observations as the 
main data collection methods. The use of multiple data sources to examine CDM 
experiences in South Africa and China enhanced the validation process by ensuring 
that weaknesses inherent in one approach were counterbalanced via strengths in 
another (Denzin 1970; Jick 1979).  
The majority of statistical data was obtained from the UNFCCC website and the 
UNEP Risøe CDM project pipeline for 1October 2009 (UNEP 2009) which provides 
an analysis and database for all CDM projects that have been sent for validation. It 
also contains information pertaining to the Designated Operating Entities (DOEs), 
project types, number of CERs and several analyses relevant in investigating and 
comparing the current state and future trends of CDM in China and South Africa. 
The analysis from UNEP and UNFCCC website also played a significant role in 
providing background information in designing interview questions. Review of pub-
licly available background documents was also critical in providing contextual infor-
mation on CDM in South Africa and China. Key documents reviewed included 
UNFCCC and national CDM regulation; national renewable energy policies and 
regulation; EB-approved methodologies and project design documents (PDD); re-
ports and criteria provided by the South African and Chinese Designated National 
Authority (DNA). An extensive literature review on CDM was also conducted as a 
means of exploring and understanding the current discussions around CDM, both 
globally and specifically to South Africa and China (e.g. discussion on ‘additionality’, 
efficiency of the EB and regulatory aspects of CDM).  
To develop a first-hand understanding of the drivers and constraints to CDM uptake 
in both China and South Africa, structured interviews and unstructured discussions 
were conducted with relevant CDM stakeholders. A number of observers and stake-
holders in the research process also enhanced the reliability of the data by comparing 
data from different individuals for consistency. The interviews focused on under-
standing the main drivers and constraints of CDM in China and South Africa in the 
context of sustainable development, flow of investments, institutional and capacity 
issues, efficiency of the EB and other CDM management structures and the regula-
tory framework of the CDM. The interviews largely used open-ended questions to 
facilitate open discussions with the stakeholder on a wide range of issues related to 
the CDM (Bryman 1998; Neuman 2006). To identify key informants, a list of key 
CDM stakeholders in China and South Africa was compiled from CDM association 
lists, project documents, CDM analysis reports and conference proceedings. Fur-
thermore, asking each contacted interviewee for additional referrals for information 
rich key informants proved effective (Mason 1996; Welch et al 2002).  
For the China research component, 17 interviews with European companies operat-
ing in China were drawn upon. In addition, structured interviews were held with four 
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local project developers, two investors, two researchers and two officials representing 
the DNA (one from the Ministry of Environmental Protection, one from the CDM 
Project Management Centre). In South Africa, 53 key informants were identified and 
contacted for structured interviews. Interviews were conducted with one DNA official, 
eight project developers, two DOEs, four research consultants and three representa-
tives of a financial services firm. Unstructured discussions held with CDM stake-
holders during relevant conferences in China and South Africa were also drawn 
upon.1 These interactions were important to gather information on key issues affect-
ing CDM (such as new CDM methodologies, policies, and post-2012). Moreover, 
most of the respondents are influential in the climate change policy realm, so that 
their input was important in any policy discussions for the post-2012 CDM outlook. 
Lastly, previous research on CDM, as well as direct involvement in carbon finance 
through the implementation of CDM projects in China and Africa by the paper’s 
authors, provided additional insight into understanding the opportunities and chal-
lenges in the CDM process. The researchers have been involved in numerous work-
shops and field observation on CDM in Africa and Asia. These workshops and field 
observations are an invaluable source of information for policy because they provide 
interaction and input from individuals who work on CDM on daily basis. The authors 
have been actively involved with the implementation of the EU-China Facilitation 
project and the development of the Africa Carbon Credit Exchange.  
3. CDM: Current state, opportunities and challenges 
As highlighted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth 
Assessment Report, anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are ‘very likely’ 
the cause of climate change which poses enormous threats to economic stability, 
public health, national security, as well as to the environment (IPCC 2007). In order 
to promote climate justice, the Kyoto Protocol recognises that human activity driving 
GHG emissions has been concentrated in developed countries over the past 150 
years and therefore has adopted the principle of ‘common but differentiated respon-
sibilities’, placing a greater burden to address climate change on the developed 
countries (UNFCCC 2007; Comim 2008). As a result, all developed nations, aside 
from the United States, have ratified the Kyoto Protocol and committed to legally 
binding measures that set a ceiling or cap on allowable emissions released in the 
atmosphere over a given timeframe. Conversely, developing countries that have 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol do not have binding emission reduction targets for the first 
period from 2008 – 2012 (IETA 2009). As one of the mechanisms defined by the 
Kyoto Protocol, the CDM allows the Annex I countries (developed countries with 
emission caps) to implement the GHG emission reduction projects in the non-Annex 
I countries (developing countries without emission caps), providing a flexible alterna-
tive for Annex I countries to meet their binding obligations. This approach, as sup-
ported by market theory advocates, is perceived to create a cost for emissions while 
simultaneously creating a market incentive to emit less, either through efficiencies or 
offsets (Yeoh 2008: 190). 
                                                 
1  Conferences include UNEP Financial Initiative Conference held October 23-24, 2010 (John Fay, 
Farai Kapfudzaruwa); The Ecocentric Journey Conference September 15-17 2009 (John Fay, Farai 
Kapfudzaruwa); The EU China CDM Facilitation Project Final Dissemination Conference held No-
vember 19, 2009 (Lin Na); Convention of Parties 15 – attending from Dec 09–17, 2009 (John Fay).  
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For countries in Africa to fully exploit the economic and environmental benefits of 
emission trading, CDM also needs to provide an effective medium for transfer tech-
nology to these developing countries (Lütken 2009). Other important issues which 
have been raised include the risks associated with CDM projects hampering devel-
opment and how these risks can be quantified (Bohringer et al 2007). According to 
Oleschak and Springer (2007) CDM risks tend to be low for (large) countries with 
high potentials such as China, India and Brazil. The main reason for countries to be 
classified as low risks for CDM projects is the fact that the institutions related to the 
monitoring and implementation of flexible instruments are rated excellent. These 
countries score high on the following points: DNA in place, participation in capacity-
building, memoranda of understanding with potential investors, declaration of policy, 
and experience with projects (Oleschak & Springer 2007). The regulatory environ-
ment which encompasses enforcement of contracts, ease of starting business, and 
registration of property rights are also an important factor in determining the risks 
levels of CDM projects (Oleschak & Springer 2007). Youngman et al (2007) com-
plement Oleschak and Springer’s findings by critically examining past CDM and JI 
project portfolios for the extent to which the technology transfer promised to host 
countries really occurred. Youngman et al (2007) revealed that more than half of 
116 CDM and JI projects analysed do indeed involve the transfer of technology 
hardware from outside the host country, with a total value of €1.3 billion. However, 
for low- and non-emitting energy technologies (wind, hydro, biomass, energy-
efficient devices) the carbon value offered by CDM may not be enough to cover the 
high upfront investments. Therefore, stimulating specific technologies can be consid-
ered an additional policy goal and may require policy instruments in addition to a 
simple carbon price (Youngman et al 2007). The authors also suggest that options 
such as programmatic CDM projects need to be supported within the policy realm. 
These research findings present some important questions that will inform policy 
decisions, which will be probed in this paper. The comparison of CDM experiences 
in China and South Africa will provide an opportunity to understand whether addi-
tional policies are needed to ‘accelerate technology diffusion for long-term climate 
targets’ if technology transfer occurs, but not systematically enough to diffuse new 
technologies (Bohringer et al 2007). 
Despite the dual goals of emission reductions and achieving sustainable develop-
ment, the emerging CDM project portfolio is shaped almost exclusively by financial 
incentives for the emission reduction component of projects (apart from the small 
share of investors that wish to pay a premium for particularly Sustainable develop-
ment friendly CDM projects) (Ellis et al 2007). As a result many of the current CDM 
projects represent relatively low-cost emission mitigation opportunities that do not 
result in investment in new infrastructure. Therefore, the future climate change re-
gime should redesign the CDM to ensure that it exploits the link between sustainable 
development benefits and mitigation which could be a key to motivating developing 
countries to take on future mitigation commitments (Ellis et al, 2007). This implies 
lasting changes in energy infrastructure and demand. 
The operation of CDM requires significant institutional arrangement at different 
levels. At the international level, the EB oversees the CDM activities and policy mak-
ing, under the authority and guidance of the Conference of the Parties (COP). At the 
domestic level, the DNA reviews submitted CDM projects and approves or rejects 
them based on specific international and domestic procedures and regulations. The 
institutional capacity is important as research has shown host country CDM proce-
dures, specifically evaluation criteria and approvals, are a determinant to CDM 
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investment (Nham, 2007: 553). Since its inception in 2005, the CDM has grown 
rapidly, with 4 673 projects in the CDM pipeline, which will amount to over 
7 416 430 kCERs by 2020 (UNEP 2009). Even though the Asia and Pacific region 
currently accounts for approximately 80% of the CDM project pipeline and the 
volume of CERs (Figure 1), countries from Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa 
have slowly increased their uptake of CDM projects. Within Africa the uptake has 
remained small, but a group of CDM leaders have emerged, mostly within the 
wealthiest economies including South Africa, Egypt and Morocco. Each of these 
three countries has a handful of large scale CDM projects in the pipeline (UNEP 
2009).  
 
Figure 1: CDM Projects and KCERs by region 
Source: UNEP (2009) 
As a mechanism that gives monetary value to emission reductions, the market 
searches for the highest volumes at the lowest cost. As such, the CDM has been more 
effective in achieving one of its main goals of reducing mitigation costs while being 
less effective in contributing to sustainable development (Figueres & Streck, 2009; 
Holm Olsen 2007; McGown 2008; Sutter & Parreno 2007; Fenhaan 2008). CDM 
has been effective in quickly eliminating substantial portions of HFC-23 and N2O 
industrial gases which experienced early uptake in the market although they contrib-
ute little to sustainable development. The exclusion of deforestation leaves the largest 
emission source of many tropical countries untapped by CDM and misses an oppor-
tunity to enhance sustainable land use practices (Figueres & Streck 2009). Since the 
developing countries are highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, it is wor-
rying that the CDM has not moved developing countries towards low carbon devel-
opment paths based on more sustainable energy production and consumption pat-
terns and sustainable forest management (Figueres & Streck 2009; Figueres et al 
2005; Wara 2007; Wara & Victor 2008). The complex relationship between social 
and economic development and climate change, particularly in developing countries, 
may require CDM to be restructured into a genuinely integrated mechanism which 
reduces emissions at low costs while improving the livelihoods of vulnerable commu-
nities. However, the two objectives imply tradeoffs, since setting a high development 
objective for CDM projects can slow investment transfers and hamper the flexibility 
of the mechanism to lower implementation costs (Figueres & Streck 2009). However, 
increased levels of entrepreneurship combined with innovative financing that lever-
ages CDM can help to simultaneously promote sustainable development through 
reduced emissions (Gantsho & Karani 2007).  
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There are certain aspects of the CDM related to its efficiency, sustainability, institu-
tions and structure which need to be restructured to strengthen the effectiveness and 
transparency of the mechanism (Capoor & Ambrosi 2009). As the EB has worked to 
maintain CDM credibility through a strict verification process, delays have been 
problematic and contribute to a recent upsurge of project rejections. Also, the EB’s 
efforts do not sufficiently address the issues ‘of re-casting the additionality debate, 
which is core to the raison d’être of the CDM and also the main reason why projects 
get reviewed for registration’ (Capoor & Ambrosi 2009). There has also been mount-
ing criticism about the lack of transparency in the EB’s decision-making and lack of 
predictability (IETA, 2005). Addressing additionality concerns will not only reduce 
the short-term delays, but also help preserve and expand the credibility of the CDM, 
so that streamlining the process of registration and issuance is an important immedi-
ate objective of CDM reform (Capoor & Ambrosi, 2009). The governance structure 
of the CDM would have to be reviewed taking into account the need to supervise a 
rapidly growing market and to include private sector participants that are not repre-
sented in the COP ensuring the conditions for fair and predictable decisions (Fi-
gueres & Streck, 2009). 
4. CDM in China 
4.1 Overview 
Since commencement in 2006, the number of CDM projects in the global carbon 
market has experienced tremendous growth. The significant growth of the CDM 
market in China has made it the largest CDM host country and, consequently, the 
biggest CER supplier in the international carbon market. As at 1 October 2009, 
1 975 Chinese projects have been developed or are currently in the CDM develop-
ment pipeline, including 626 projects registered at the EB. The expected average 
annual CERs from the Chinese CDM projects is over 190 million tCO2e, representing 
nearly 57% of the worldwide total annual expected CERs (UNEP 2009). China 
continues to develop CDM projects at a rapid rate; by 10 November 2009 the num-
ber of DNA-approved CDM projects jumped to 2 232 (NDRC 2009), with nearly 250 
new projects approved in less than six weeks. To put this rapid growth into perspec-
tive, at the end of 2006 there were only 138 CDM projects in the pipeline (Eua 
2009).  
Project scope 
As illustrated in Figure 2, current CDM projects in China cover a wide range of 
industrial type. Renewable energy projects, including small hydro power, wind power 
and biomass, represent a dominant share of existing CDM projects, in terms of both 
project number and the quantity of expected annual CERs. Energy efficiency is the 
second largest area for CDM project development, coming from various industrial 
sectors including steel, iron and power industries. Furthermore, a majority of the 
developed and registered energy efficiency CDM projects are for their own power 
generation, using waste heat recovery or waste gas recovery for power generation. 
Several new project types have emerged recently, including the solar energy utilisa-
tion, perfluorocarbons, SF6 and transport, which are a result of new methodology 
development. 
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Figure 2: Registered and pipeline projects 
Source: UNEP Risø Centre 01-10-09 
Early on in the Chinese CDM experience, hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) and N2O pro-
jects were considered as ‘low-hanging fruits’, due to the large amount of CERs from 
a single project and the relatively low per unit investment. However, from the begin-
ning of 2009, there are no new HFC projects being developed, with the last HFC 
project registered in April 2009. This is partly because the HFC destruction potential 
in the Chinese market has largely been exhausted and through an exorbitant 65% 
taxation charge for HFC projects under the income-sharing CDM management 
policy (EUb 2009). The growth of N2O projects is also slow, with only two new 
projects developed in the pipeline in the first nine months of 2009.  
CDM management in China 
Currently, there are a large number of Chinese governmental authorities directly 
involved in the management of CDM projects including the National Leading Group 
on Climate Change (NLGCC), the National CDM Board (NCB), National Develop-
ment and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the CDM Project Management Centre 
(CDM-PMC), among which NDRC serves as the DNA for CDM implementation in 
China (CDM-PMC, 2009). The institutional structure for CDM management is a 
vertical management system. The NLGCC, consisting of 20 ministries, oversees the 
national CDM policies, regulation, standards and supervises the National CDM 
Board. The NCB is responsible for reviewing CDM projects, reporting to the NLGCC 
on the overall progress of CDM project activities, and making recommendations on 
amendments to the CDM operation regulations and procedures based on emerging 
issues (CDM-PMC 2009). China’s DNA is part of the NDRC, which is under the 
supervision of the NCB and responsible for receiving CDM project application 
documents, implementing the CDM administrative procedure and issuing the Letter 
of Approval (LoA) for the qualified CDM projects, and implementing specific CDM 
activities.  
In addition, the recently established CDM Fund Management Centre (CDMFMC) is a 
key institution within the Chinese CDM management structure. It is sponsored by the 
Ministry of Finance and manages the funds collected from the CER revenue fees 
charged by the government which will be used as grants to support climate change 
activities and provided as a seed fund for clean technology investment.  
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CDM regulation in China 
The regulatory framework for CDM implementation is outlined in the Chinese gov-
ernment’s Measures for the Operation and Management of Clean Development 
Mechanism Projects (CDM-PMC 2009). This serves as the main legal basis for the 
CDM implementation in China, including guidance on the eligibility of the projects, 
the application guidelines, the approval procedure of the DNA, the priority areas of 
sustainable development, and the CER revenue-sharing policies.  
Only Chinese enterprises are eligible to apply for CDM projects because only locally 
owned (at least 51% ownership) companies are allowed to own CDM projects in 
China. The Chinese government included this regulation to protect local enterprises’ 
ability to participate in the CDM activities. However, according to a recent survey of 
European enterprises operating in China’s CDM market (CDM-PMC 2009), this 
eligibility requirement is considered as a major barrier for foreign investment and 
technology innovation in China.  
The CDM project owner is required to submit to the DNA the following documents: 
the PDD, certification of enterprise status (enterprises licence), general description of 
projects, the Engineering Feasibility Approval from NDRC, and the Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) approval from the Environmental Protection Administration 
(CDM-PMC 2009). The project owner is also required to present the Emissions 
Reduction Purchase Agreement (ERPA) or purchase intent, and the consultant ser-
vice contract for review. The CER price agreed to in the ERPA is one of the elements 
to be reviewed and a minimum price, or pricing floor, is given as a ‘guideline’. One 
argument for the price floor is that the GHG emission reduction resources are con-
sidered state-owned in China and in the early stages of CDM the local project owners 
may not have the capacity to negotiate the appropriate purchase price. Also, it is also 
argued that clear guidance on CDM pricing in China can have a positive impact 
stabilising the international carbon market and give project owners clarity on poten-
tial CDM revenue streams (personal communications 2009). 
Although there is no clear framework to define which type of project will contribute 
the most to sustainable development in China, priority areas for CDM development 
include energy efficiency, renewable energy and methane recovery and utilisation, 
which is consistent with the country’s overall climate change and energy policies2.  
Prioritisation of the CDM development is implemented and enforced through the 
CER revenue-sharing policy. According to the Chinese government, GHG emission 
reduction resources are owned by the Chinese government and the CER revenues 
generated from the specific CDM projects shall be jointly owned by the project owner 
and it (NDRC 2005). This statement allows the government to charge certain per-
centages of the CER revenue from the different types of CDM projects. According to 
the different priorities, the government therefore collects fees at different levels from 
the CER revenues, based on the principles below: 
• 65% for projects involving HFC and PFC emission reductions; 
• 30% for projects involving N2O emission reductionl 
                                                 
2  One of the current research projects under the EU-China CDM Facilitation Project, The Impact 
Assessment of CDM Projects in China on Sustainable Development (August 2009), is trying to de-
velop a suitable methodology to evaluate the contribution to sustainable development from different 
type of CDM projects. 
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• 2% for projects in priority areas and forestation projects.  
Chinese sustainable development priorities and the CER revenue-sharing scheme 
appear to have an influence on the current CDM project development trend, in 
which both the number and the expected annual CERs of renewable energy projects 
and energy efficiency projects take the biggest share of the pipeline.  
4.2 CDM experience in China: Key drivers and obstacles3 
4.2.1.1 Key drivers 
The worldwide CDM pipeline shows China has been a successful player in the CDM 
market. While there are many factors which have affected CDM development in 
China, we have found the following points to be particularly salient drivers of CDM 
development in China: 
Firstly, the relatively well-established regulatory framework and procedure from the 
DNA has facilitated the CDM development. The efficiency of the Chinese DNA has 
also been improved in recent years, which allows for fast development of a large 
number of CDM projects.  
Secondly, capacity building at the early stage for different stakeholders is commonly 
viewed as a key driver that has enhanced the local project participants’ knowledge 
and skills, which has significantly facilitated development of the CDM. The engage-
ment and development of local CDM project developers and consultants is also a 
positive result of different capacity building programmes. There has been numerous 
capacity building projects and schemes in China targeting the DNA and the local 
authorities.. The EU-China CDM Facilitation Project, for example, is a large capacity 
building project funded by the European Commission and jointly implemented by 
Chinese and European partners. Other European member states have also funded 
similar projects, such as government of Denmark, the UK government, and the Ital-
ian government. The regional CDM centers have actively been involved with capac-
ity building projects and the Chinese government has attached great emphasis to 
CDM awareness raising and knowledge dissemination. Frequent CDM events organ-
ised by the Chinese government and other agencies in China have proven to be an 
effective platform for information exchange and knowledge sharing for the local 
CDM stakeholders. 
Based on the successful capacity building programmes, local expertise and human 
capacity have been tapped into and mobilised. There is sufficient human capacity 
and knowledge base in China to implement CDM projects. The opportunity of a 
growing market has continuously attracted high quality expertise to the field, creating 
a virtuous cycle that has propelled forward the CDM market.  
Thirdly, the overall socio-economic and policy context in China provides an excellent 
environment for CDM development. In the socio-economic aspects, China has ex-
perienced on average over 10% growth from 2005 to 2008; even with the global 
economic downturn starting from late 2008, GDP growth in 2009 in China is still 
expected to exceed 8% (Whelan 2009). The robust economic development in recent 
years has created huge potential for GHG emission reductions and therefore for 
CDM projects. The rapidly increasing power generation capacity and the large-scale 
                                                 
3  The analysis in this section draws significantly draws upon the experience of authors Lin Na and 
John Fay in implementing the EU-China CDM Facilitation project.  
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production of cement, steel and iron have provided opportunities for renewable 
energy and energy-efficiency CDM projects from the power sector and the energy-
intensive industries.  
Lastly, and possibly most salient, the perspective of overall Chinese governmental 
policy has been instrumental in enabling CDM. The development of renewable 
energy and energy conservation is a top priority in China’s overall national planning 
and strategies. In 2006, the Renewable Energy Law was formulated to promote the 
development of renewable energy. Further, 2007’s Medium- and Long-term Devel-
opment Plan for Renewable Energy has set up specific renewable targets by 2020. 
Besides the renewable energy policies, the domestic energy conservation and emis-
sion reduction programme has intensified, with various energy efficiency projects 
being launched. As a result, the domestic policy trends have been perfectly matched 
with a more mature status of CDM to create a booming market and project pipeline 
in China. This has resulted in significant uptake of CDM by large-scale state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and investment groups which are actively involved in project 
development, and has profound implications for the enhancement of the CDM (EU 
2009a). SOEs are involved in sectors such as power generation, energy-intensive 
manufacturing industries including cement, steel and iron. In the power generation 
sector, the big SOEs are highly involved in the development of CDM projects. The 
five largest power-generating SOEs, China Datang Corporation, China Huaneng 
Corporation, China Huadian Corporation, China Power Investment Corporation, 
and China Guodian Corporation, have developed a large number of CDM projects 
in the pipeline, taking a significant share of the wind and hydro CDM projects (UNEP 
2009).  
Key obstacles 
Although CDM development in China is generally viewed as a success, there are 
various issues which could be improved upon there and in other developing coun-
tries. Firstly, an appropriate guideline to direct CDM towards sustainable develop-
ment is currently missing in China. As a market-based mechanism, CDM orientation 
can be focused on the market players’ interests to the detriment of sustainable devel-
opment. The DNA has the responsibility to guide the CDM towards sustainable 
development of the host countries and should develop comprehensive criteria for 
sustainable development at the early stage of CDM development. Since the CDM is 
continuously evolving and is a learn-by-doing process, the CDM guidance should 
remain flexible in order to address the emerging issues. The Chinese CDM measures 
which serve as the legal basis for CDM implementation were officially formulated in 
2005 and now may require modifications to further enhance the sustainability criteria 
of CDM in China.  
Secondly, due to fast-growing CDM projects in China, the demand for DOE4 services 
is increasing but capacity is limited, creating a significant bottleneck in the CDM 
process. The validation and registration of an individual project is taking longer than 
in previously years, increasing risks and costs for all other project stakeholders. Ca-
pacity building for domestic DOEs in China started much later than for the DNA and 
project developers, resulting in validating and verification bottlenecks in the CDM 
                                                 
4  A DOE is a domestic or international legal entity accredited and designated by the EB, which 
validates the proposed CDM projects and subsequently requests the registration of the project at the 
EB, and verifies the emission reductions, certifies the CERs and requests the EB to issue the CERs. 
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process. Until March 2009, the DOEs were only international organisations with no 
domestic firm accredited by the EB. However, on 25 March 2009 at the EB 46 
meeting, two Chinese Applicant Entities (AEs), the China Environmental United 
Certification Center and China Quality Certification Centre were accredited as DOEs 
for both verification and verification/certification functions (UNFCCC 2007). Since 
the domestic DOEs are now accredited, project developers have begun using their 
services; this has been considered by some to be a faster option due to fewer projects 
in their working schedule and easier follow-up communication (interview with K 
Lieberg, 6 November 2009). 
Thirdly, apart from the domestic barriers, uncertainty raised from the international 
climate change negotiations has challenged the healthy operation of the market and 
is viewed as a significant obstacle to further CDM development in China. Any mar-
ket-based mechanism like CDM resulting from the policies and politics is generally 
viewed as highly risky for the market, and lack of clarity in the market serves to 
exacerbate the risks (interview with S Kwan, 6 November 2009). There needs to be 
greater certainty in the markets from a regulatory perspective in order to facilitate a 
healthy and stable market. This is seen as a general limitation of the CDM, applying 
to all the host countries and CDM stakeholders.  
4.3 CDM in South Africa  
4.3.1 Overview 
Project scope 
South Africa affirmed accession to the Kyoto Protocol on July 31 2002, entering the 
Protocol into force on 16 February 2005 (REEEP 2009). While other emergent 
economies have successfully harnessed the potential of CDM to varying extends, 
South Africa has consistently been a laggard since CDM inception. As at October 21, 
2009, only 131 CDM projects have been submitted to the South African DNA, con-
sisting of 102 Project Idea Notes (PINs) and 29 PDDs. Of the projects submitted to 
the DNA, only 33 projects have advanced to validation, representing 17 registered, 
four issuing CERs and another 12 at various stages in the CDM EB pipeline (DNA 
2009). In addition, the trend of project submission to the DNA has not seen a notice-
able increase in 2009, considering only 35 projects have been submitted to the DNA 
as at October 2009, compared to 41 in the whole of 2008.  
The project types of all CDM projects submitted to the DNA are illustrated in Figure 
3, indicating a high percentage of cogeneration, renewable energy, fuel switch, 
energy efficiency, waste management and methane recovery and flaring. However, 
when comparing that to the number of projects that have been moved through the 
process and corresponding CER potential, the nitrous oxide projects account for a 
majority of credits, while renewable energy, energy efficiency and waste manage-
ment have had little success in generating CERs; representing a significantly smaller 
percentage of total CERs than their percentage of total projects in DNA pipeline. 
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Figure 5: South African annual CERs by approved PDD and CDM pipeline 
by project type 
Source: DNA (2009) 
 
CDM management in South Africa 
The DNA, within the Department of Energy, has the legal mandate to oversee the 
CDM in South Africa under Section 25 of the National Environmental Management 
Act. Since its inception in 2004, the main task of the DNA has been to assess poten-
tial CDM projects, to determine whether they ‘assist South Africa in achieving its 
sustainable development goals and to issue formal host country approval where this 
is the case’ (DNA 2009). However, as a result of the weak institutional and policy 
framework and lack of capacity the DNA has been playing an important role in 
providing support to project developers and promoting CDM in South Africa to 
potential investors. Unfortunately, the private sector and investors in South Africa 
have been too conservative and not forthcoming to promote CDM (interview with L 
Chauke, 28 October 2009). To overcome these challenges the South Africa Clean 
Development Mechanism Industry Association (SACDMIA) was launched in 2007. to 
provide a platform for CDM industry stakeholders to promote their common inter-
ests, that is, ‘CDM investment promotion, capacity building, and research or facilita-
tion dialogue with the relevant institutions, civil society and government’; it strives to 
formulate a common perspective on how to stimulate growth within the energy 
sector, and streamlining the existing operational environment so that the CDM can 
act as a vehicle for reducing GHG emissions and driving foreign direct investment 
(van den Berg 2007). As the lead contributor in the African CDM project pipeline 
and among the few well-functioning DNAs in Africa, the South African DNA also 
participates in the DNA Africa Forum to discuss challenges within the CDM process 
with stakeholders such as DOEs. 
The DNA is also mandated to promote the establishment of CDM projects in South 
Africa ‘in cooperation with other government agencies with the same or similar 
responsibilities’ such as the Department of Environment (NEMA section 25 (3) 
(1)(e)). However, other relevant government agencies have not been active in pro-
moting CDM in South Africa (e.g. the Department of Trade and Industry and the 
National Treasury which are part of the DNA steering committee), a scenario which 
has slowed the uptake of CDM projects in the country. A senior Department of En-
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ergy official involved with the DNA noted that other government agencies needed to 
be more proactive in participation of CDM workshops and promoting CDM in the 
country (interview with L Chauke, 28 October 2009). This is seriously undermining 
South Africa’s performance in the CDM market as there is no coherent structure 
within government departments to attract investment and manage CDM in South 
Africa. The DNA requires support from other departments which can leverage in-
vestment for CDM more effectively than the Department of Energy.  
CDM regulation in South Africa 
The regulatory framework for CDM implementation is outlined in a government 
gazette (section 25(7-8) of the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA). 
This serves as the main legal basis for the CDM implementation in South Africa, 
including guidance on the eligibility of the projects, the application guideline, the 
approval procedure of the DNA and the sustainable development criterion. 
Project developers or owners enter the CDM project approval process through volun-
tary screening or mandatory submissions. The voluntary screening provides the DNA 
with an opportunity to carry out an initial screening of the project and provide feed-
back to the developer on the likely performance of the project against approval 
criteria. This is done via submission of a brief PIN and an application form to the 
DNA. The mandatory submissions require all projects to submit a detailed descrip-
tion of the project via a PDD and an application form to receive a letter of approval 
from the DNA. The PDD should already have been validated by the DOE at this 
stage. The PDD is posted on the DNA website for public consultation for a period of 
30 days. The DNA will then provide a recommendation based on the consultation 
and its evaluation process and then sends them to the DNA steering committee for 
consideration. Based on the comments from the committee, the DNA makes its final 
decision on the approval of the project. 
Unlike in China, the South African DNA has a set of defined sustainable develop-
ment criteria which guides the evaluation of the projects. These criteria are guided by 
the definition of sustainable development in NEMA Section 1 (xxix): ‘the integration 
of social, economic and environmental factors into planning, implementation and 
decision making so as to ensure that development serves present and future genera-
tions’.5 Despite having this definition and guidelines, a DNA senior official noted that 
it is difficult to ‘measure the social development impact within CDM’ (interview with 
L Chauke, 28 October 2009). Therefore, the DNA encourages the N2O projects in 
South Africa which have minimal positive impact to social and economic develop-
ment to invest in other social community projects (ibid). However, the DNA official 
explained that if the number of N2O projects increases, the DNA will consider impos-
ing a tax on these CDM projects as is the case in China.   
4.4 CDM experience in South Africa: Key drivers and obstacles 
Key drivers 
While CDM in South Africa has not generated a large number of projects to date, 
there are positive aspects within the structure which could serve as the foundation to 
                                                 
5  Further information regarding the NEMA sustainable development definition can be found at 
www.dme.gov.za/dna/dna_susdev.stm. 
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increase South African CDM uptake. The following points are encouraging elements 
the research has identified within the South African CDM experience. 
Firstly, while the absence of an efficient DNA is often regarded as a hindrance to 
increasing CDM in Africa, this does not seem to be the case in South Africa (NEPAD, 
2009). The South African DNA is well organised and highly regarded both domesti-
cally and internationally. Our research has indicated the South African DNA is doing 
an effective job administering the CDM limited pipeline to date. Stakeholders inter-
viewed consistently regarded the DNA highly, comments including: ‘responsive and 
helpful with a transparent and clear process’ (A van Roffet, interviewed 28 October 
2009); ‘really tried to push CDM and has done a fairly good job’ (M Parramon, 
interviewed 30 October 2009); and ‘one of the best functioning DNAs in the world – 
clear process and committed to timelines … will engage for a solution to work for all 
on any problems’ (H Sa, interviewed, 28 October 2009).  
Secondly, the South African economy is based on a high emission structure, provid-
ing ample possibilities for CDM projects. The high dependency on coal-based power, 
and a growing demand for electricity provides an ideal baseline scenario for energy 
efficiency and renewable energy projects, creating significant potential for CDM 
projects (du Toit, 2009: 49). While there has been slow uptake to date in these sec-
tors, increasing electricity tariffs and improved technologies are increasingly making 
renewable energy projects more cost-competitive, thus increasing the likelihood of 
implementation. In addition, there is great potential for the CDM to support impor-
tant sustainable development priorities of the South African government, e.g. the 
Integrated National Electrification Programme, and the White Paper for Renewable 
Energy target of 10 000 GWh by 2013 (REEEP 2009).  
Thirdly, there is a strong base of local project developers with the technical expertise 
to develop projects in South Africa. While most other countries in the Southern 
Africa region have few if any local groups with the expertise to successfully develop a 
CDM project, South Africa has many capable CDM stakeholders and a CDM indus-
try association.   
Key obstacles 
There is a great deal of hesitancy and uncertainty regarding the perceived risks of 
CDM in South Africa. Throughout the research, the following issues emerged as 
recurrent obstacles to greater CDM uptake in South Africa.  
First, potential South African projects owners in the public and private sector have a 
perceived lacked of the vision required to fully harness CDM opportunities. This is 
compounded by a lack of governmental capacity, public awareness and overall 
education regarding climate change and CDM (du Toit, 2009:54). The public sector 
has been hesitant to take on additional responsibilities of developing CDM and the 
private sector is unwilling to take on the risks associated with investing in CDM (per-
sonal communication 2009). The conservative nature of South African business 
combined with limited regulatory pressure to reduce emissions has resulted in an 
unwillingness to make sustentative investment into CDM (NEPAD 2009). While local 
expertise is available in South Africa to navigate the intricacies of the CDM process, 
organisations that would own the CERs have not possessed the ability to identify 
quality opportunities and corresponding benefits, resulting in little uptake of potential 
CDM projects. In addition, the carbon markets are complicated and continually 
evolving, thus requiring a champion at each stage of the project development cycle 
in order to implement. Due to the conservative business environment in South Af-
A comparative analysis of CDM in South Africa and China 121 
Putting a price on carbon: Conference proceedings 
rica, few project champions have emerged to date. As a result, the critical mass 
required to propel the CDM market forward has not been generated. 
Second, the overall complexities of the CDM market have been a disincentive to 
both public and private entities in South Africa. The uncertainty surrounding the 
CDM market, including fluctuating market prices and little post-2012 clarity, has 
created a situation whereby the upfront investment to access the CDM is a major 
deterrent to moving projects forward. The long approval process and concerns re-
garding if a project will be registered also contributes to hesitancy of potential project 
owners to engage in the process. There is also a need for increased flexibility of 
existing approved methodologies from the EB. If an existing methodology cannot be 
leveraged, the cost of developing a new methodology was cited during our stake-
holder interviews as a prohibitive factor to CDM, and while ‘BRIC countries have 
developed numerous CDM projects, this does not mean that the opportunity auto-
matically extends to South Africa’ (DME 2009: 13).  
In addition, the high cost of validation and lack of South African DOEs is a major 
bottleneck to CDM projects. All project developers contacted during our research 
indicated issues with DOEs as a major problem in South Africa due to cost and 
availability. Validation costs, varying by project type from an estimated €10 000 to as 
high as €58 000 for a programmatic CDM validation, represent a significant invest-
ment by project developers or owners (interviews, 2009). Additionally, as many 
DOEs are European organisations, costs are often denominated in euros, adding 
further uncertainty due to exchange rate risks. The timelines and subsequent overall 
expense of validation has increased in the past two years, in one project developer’s 
experience from approximately 3-6 months to 8-12, resulting in further expenses for 
the CDM projects (interveiw with R Spalding, 30 October 2009). This problem was 
further exacerbated in September, 2009 when DOE SGS United Kingdom Ltd, 
which has been active in South Africa, was suspended by the EB.6  
The third main obstacle identified is the underlying financing of CDM projects. Even 
though an implicit intent of the Kyoto Protocol is to increase FDI for emission reduc-
tion projects, CDM experience has shown that the onus ‘rests almost entirely on 
investors in developing countries being willing to put up the financing for the pro-
jects, that through the generation of CERs help developed country emitters avoid 
having to make such investments’ (Lütken 2009). Depending on project type, the 
income from the CERs is usually not sufficient to cover the overall project costs. As a 
result, there is a need to find debt or equity financing which can be difficult to secure 
in a reasonable timeframe. This can be extremely difficult as financial return is not 
guaranteed until the CERs are delivered unless sold ex-ante, often at a significant 
discount. As a result, CDM financing can easily become an afterthought which can 
only be leveraged after underlying project finance is organised, which is then further 
complicated as this can bring into question financial ‘additionallity’ of the CDM 
project. Compounding this problem has been the financial crisis; the perceived 
higher risk of African-based project finance has made funding even more scarce due 
to the current risk adverse investment climate (Interview with K Reuss, 30 October 
2009).  
The fourth major obstacle our research has identified is the lack of meaningful gov-
ernmental or regulatory support for renewable energy and a dependence on high-
                                                 
6  The UNFCCC list of DOEs indicates SGS as suspended: http://cdm.unfccc.int/DOE/list/index.html, 
viewed 10 November 2009.  
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emission coal based power. The South African White Paper on Renewable Energy 
(2003), has set a target to produce 10 000GWh from renewable energy sources 
(mainly from biomass, wind, solar and small-scale hydro) by 2013; the report also 
deemed this target to be economically viable through subsidies and carbon financing. 
To date, only two renewable energy CDM projects have been registered and no 
subsidies on the scale required to meet the target have been disbursed, leaving South 
Africa’s modest renewable energy target significantly off-track to meet its 2013 goal. 
This is a significant point of departure for South Africa in comparison to the global 
CDM experience, where renewable energy projects represent 59% of the overall 
CDM pipeline (UNEP 2009). 
However, in order to reverse this dearth of renewable energy project and support the 
2013 renewable energy target, the National Energy Regulator of South Africa 
(NERSA) released in March 2009 the Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff (REFIT) 
regulatory guide (NERSA, 2009). The REFIT guidance document appointed Eskom, 
the centralised, single energy buyer in South Africa, as the Renewable Energy Pur-
chasing Agency (REPA) and set 2009 tariffs by renewable energy technology (see 
Table 3).  
Table 3: REFIT 2009 
Source: Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff (REFIT)(2009) 
Technology REFIT (R/kWh) 
Wind 1.25 
Small hydro 0.94 
Landfill gas 0.90 
Concentrated solar 2.10 
 
While the REFIT has the potential to help incentivise CDM development, no power 
purchase agreements have been signed as of the end of October 2009 because 
Eskom does not have funds to pay the REFIT, as stated by Eskom’s Director of 
Sustainability (UNEP FI Roundtable, 23 October 2009). Funding for REFIT is to be 
requested through the 2010 tariff request. 
As South Africa’s primary energy producer and buyer, Eskom is the key player to 
lead both renewable energy and energy efficiency projects but has done little to 
galvanise the renewable or CDM industries. Eskom’s Director of Sustainability indi-
cated that initially there was great excitement in 2004 when CDM became available; 
however, reality around downstream funding and the difficult registration process 
tempered enthusiasm for CDM. This is confirmed by looking at Eskom’s direct CDM 
experience: the parastatal submitted three PINs to the South African DNA in 2006 
and one in 2007, comprising two renewable energy and two energy efficiency pro-
jects, of which none have submitted PDDs to the DNA due to lack of underlying 
funding for the projects (Interview with M Rambakos, interview, 28 October 2009).  
With low electricity prices from coal-based generation in South Africa, independent 
power producers (IPPs) need a stable planning horizon, strong off-taker agreements 
and a tariff and regulatory framework in place that provides an adequate return to 
make renewable projects feasible. Without these assurances on the project’s financial 
metrics, renewable energy projects cannot get off the ground, resulting in a missed 
opportunity for a robust renewable energy CDM pipeline in South Africa. To date, 
A comparative analysis of CDM in South Africa and China 123 
Putting a price on carbon: Conference proceedings 
Eskom has not provided off-taker agreements that make projects feasible, slowing the 
renewable and subsequently the CDM markets. Eskom’s lack of willingness to engage 
directly with CDM or provide a conducive environment for IPPs demonstrates a need 
for greater coordination between the policy and development framework and key 
entities such as Eskom 
5. Analysis and conclusions 
While the uncertainty surrounding the post-2012 climate change regime has adverse 
implications for all countries developing CDM projects, it also provides an opportu-
nity to address the obstacles to CDM worldwide and within CDM host countries. 
Ideally the international negotiations will streamline the cumbersome CDM process 
and deal with difficulties regarding DOEs, permissibility and establishment of appli-
cable methodologies and underlying financing. This is also an ideal time for South 
Africa to reflect on its overall CDM experience in order to better promote emission 
reductions and sustainable development. By ‘looking East’ to understand the drivers 
of China’s effective implementation of CDM, South Africa can explore its own CDM 
experience to better understand why it has not been fully leveraged. 
By comparing the CDM experience of China to South Africa’s, it becomes evident 
that, while there are many influencing factors, the main CDM element which has 
allowed China to thrive and South Africa to lag behind is the implementation of a 
robust policy framework and engagement by key governmental and private sector 
stakeholders. Such a robust policy framework will engage key government, private 
and public sector stakeholders and provide the underlying incentives required to 
unlock the potential of CDM. Collaboration and engagement among different stake-
holders also paves the way for robust leadership within government and the private 
sector with a clear understanding of the CDM potential. 
The Chinese government and industry decision-makers quickly recognised the op-
portunity of CDM and developed a policy structure to nurture the nascent industry. 
Similar to South Africa, China has an increasing demand for power and has priori-
tised the development of renewable energy and energy efficiency, creating incentives 
that have enabled these project types to move forward. As a result, renewable energy 
and energy efficiency projects represent nearly three quarters of the CDM project 
pipeline in China. In contrast, South Africa has suffered from a lack of leadership 
around the implementation of emission reductions an integrated part of development 
strategy. Policy to enable renewable energy in South Africa has been wholly ineffec-
tive and stifled by Eskom’s unwillingness to leverage CDM as a financial incentive. 
To better leverage CDM, policy and its implementation needs to prioritise low carbon 
development approaches and integrate it throughout all development initiatives. 
Finally, while it is unlikely South Africa will agree to stringent emission caps at inter-
national climate change negotiations, considering policies similar to China’s efforts to 
reduce emission intensities has the potential to promote CDM participation.  
The South African government also needs to ensure that policies can be realistically 
implemented in order to avoid cases whereby Eskom is unwilling to sign power 
purchase agreements for renewable energy due to a lack of funding for the incre-
mental expense mandated in the REFIT. This will only be possible through better 
communication and collaboration across all relevant governmental departments. 
Policy-makers need to be continually engaged to be made aware of the evolving 
CDM opportunities in order to continually align regulation to fully exploit the poten-
tial incentives of CDM.  
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Further, while alignment of overarching polices is important to drive CDM, a greater 
awareness and understanding of opportunities and benefits of CDM by key public 
and private sector decision makers at the ‘Board’ level is needed to better exploit 
opportunities that have so far been left unharnessed. As exemplified by the Chinese 
management structure of CDM, significant involvement by many decision-making 
entities in government and business is required. This is a relevant lesson for South 
Africa as increased awareness by decision-makers is important to maximise CDM 
utilisation. While the South African DNA has been running CDM promotion work-
shops since 2006, the DNA acknowledges low participation from the key decision-
makers that own the assets eligible for CDM projects, resulting in a communication 
gap that can only be bridged through combined efforts with ‘other government 
ministries, trade groups and industry associations’ (Interview with L Chauke, 28 
October 2009). Through creating greater awareness of the CDM process and aligning 
with governmental development priorities, potential project owners will have the 
incentive to move CDM projects forward, and be better informed about the market 
based incentives available to generate emission reductions by following sound ad-
vice, adhering to CDM rules and planning for extended timelines.  
To conclude, the Chinese and South African CDM experiences highlight the need for 
a systematic approach to create a vibrant environment for CDM to thrive in host 
countries. CDM project potential and technical capacity to work through the intrica-
cies of CDM is not sufficient to harness its full potential. The alignment and imple-
mentation of governmental development policy with emission reductions and sus-
tainable development, as defined by each country, is also required to make possible 
CDM participation and provide the underlying incentive for governmental and pri-
vate sector asset owners required to unlock the potential of CDM.  
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Abstract  
This paper explores how energy-intensive (EI) sectors and those that are also trade-
intensive (EITI) could be included in the use of economic instruments for mitigation 
in South Africa. Carbon tax or emissions trading are being considered as part of 
emerging climate policy. Economic instruments can make a major contribution 
towards South Africa’s goal of a deviation below business-as-usual of 34% by 2020. 
The paper identifies energy-intensive sectors, trade-intensive ones and compares the 
two. Reviewing international experience, it explores policy options for application in 
the SA context.  
The rate of a carbon tax could be linked to energy or carbon content, with lower 
rates subject to an agreement with government on mitigation. If emissions trading 
were chosen, initial allowances should be auctioned. If permits were allocated admin-
istratively to EI or EITI sectors, this should be transitional and allow for an appeals 
procedure. Recycling of revenue would be desirable under either a tax or auctioning 
scheme, promoting efficiency, further mitigation and diversification in EITI sectors. 
Policy favouring EI industry might need to be revised in favour of incentives for 
climate-friendly programmes. Access to a sectoral crediting mechanism on a no-lose 
basis deserves re-consideration. Targets for energy- or emissions-intensity could be 
set for EI and EITI sectors.  
Keywords: energy-intensive, trade-intensive, carbon price, emissions trading scheme, 
carbon tax, South Africa 
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1. Introduction  
In January 2010, the South African government notified the Secretariat of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that it ‘will take 
nationally appropriate mitigation action to enable a 34% deviation below the ‘Busi-
ness as usual’ emissions growth trajectory by 2020 and a 42% deviation below the 
‘Business as usual’ emissions growth trajectory by 2025’ (RSA 2010). In pledging this 
nationally appropriate mitigation action (NAMA), South Africa made clear that the 
offer was conditional on support for the NAMA in the form of finance, technology 
and capacity-building and on an ambitious, fair, effective and binding multi-lateral 
agreement – which is needed to deliver the support. It recalled the commitment 
made by President Zuma on the 6th of December 2009 (Presidency 2009), and 
effectively associated itself with the Copenhagen Accord (Leaders of 29 countries 
2009). In making this pledge, the letter recalled the study of mitigation potential 
under the Long-Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS) (SBT 2007). The notification 
concluded that with ‘financial, technology and capacity building support from the 
international community, this level of effort will enable South Africa’s green house 
gas emissions to peak between 2020 and 2025, plateau for approximately a decade 
and decline in absolute terms thereafter’ (RSA 2010).  
Effectively, the strategic direction set by Cabinet based on consideration of the LTMS 
in mid-2008 has been internationalised. The LTMS analysed a series of mitigation 
options, and also considered a range of economic instruments to incentivise these 
mitigation options. One of the most effective mitigation options was putting a price 
on carbon, which could see reductions relative to baseline of 12 287 Mt CO2-eq 
between 2003 and 2050. With South Africa pledging achieve a deviation below 
‘Business as usual’ (BAU), the question had shifted from whether to reduce emis-
sions growth to how to achieve the deviation below BAU.  
In this paper, the particular focus is on how a particular group of industries could be 
part of such a solution. The focus is on energy-intensive (EI) industries, and particu-
larly those that are also trade-intensive (EITI), and what policy options exist to 
achieve emission reductions in these sectors, in the context of an overall climate 
policy for South Africa.  
South Africa should learn from international experience with carbon taxes and cap 
and trade mechanisms, which globally have been key instruments to mitigate climate 
change. In applying such lessons to the South African context, the specific context 
must be taking into account – particularly the context of poverty. The aim would be 
to achieve mitigation at the same time as achieving national goals of eradicating 
poverty and achieving more sustainable development. The question is how energy- 
and trade-intensive industries could be part of the solution, rather than part of the 
problem.  
Given our historical development around a minerals-energy complex (Fine & 
Rustomjee 1996), much of our economy – and its politics – is structured around EI 
sectors (Winkler & Marquard 2009b). Three quarters of primary energy supply 
comes from coal and more than 90% of electricity from coal-fired power stations 
(Winkler 2009a). The use of electricity is comparatively inefficient. The combination 
of EI industry, low energy efficiency, carbon-intensive electricity and the large-scale 
direct use of coal implies that South African industry would be significantly more 
affected by a carbon tax than industries in comparable countries. Yet the policy of 
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the ruling party envisages placing a price on carbon (ANC 2007). EI industries would 
be expected to shoulder a significant part of the burden.  
Exposure to trade raises a different concern, namely that of competition in interna-
tional markets with other firms which may face lesser constraints or costs. Those 
industries that are EITI would be expected to feel the impacts of a carbon price more 
than others. If not addressed in a structured way as part of climate policy, EITI sec-
tors can be expected to lobby for complete exemption from mitigation. A structured 
approach would be preferable to ad hoc exemptions. The goals of a structured ap-
proach would fall into two broad categories: 1) to deal with the concerns of industries 
that will face higher risks than others following the implementation of a carbon price, 
in a way that does not undermine mitigation efforts; and 2) to provide support to 
more EITI sectors to be part of a solution. The second goal would be achieved both 
through greater energy efficiency and through diversification.  
Proposed policy options should achieve the goal of preventing either the stranding of 
assets in these sectors, whereby investments made under a significantly different set 
of incentives become worthless as the result of the introduction of a diametrically-
opposed set of incentives, or the associated social and economic impacts of strand-
ing, particularly job losses. At the same time, policies should incentivise as much 
energy efficiency in these industries as possible. Special measures or lower tax rates 
should not provide perverse incentivise to extend the life of plants in these sectors.  
Alternatively, strategies are needed to reduce emissions in these sectors, including, in 
extreme cases, the closure of plants accompanied by appropriate plans for a ‘just 
transition’ for those working in those industries to lower-carbon livelihoods. There 
are cases where the sectoral regulatory environment impedes the incentive impact of 
the tax on consumers. For instance, in the liquid fuels sector, synfuels producers 
would incur far higher carbon taxes (or costs for emissions permits) than crude refin-
eries, but due to the current regulatory system, would be unable to pass this addi-
tional cost to consumers. It is doubtful whether this incentive, if it were passed on, 
would achieve anything except the shutdown of the only synfuels plant in the coun-
try. If this is a desirable policy outcome, it could be better achieved through a specific 
policy measure. The imposition of a tax might be effective in gaining concessions for 
lowering the carbon intensity of the plant. A related but different issue is posed by 
electricity tariff structures – due to the lack of transparency in electricity pricing in 
South Africa, additional measures would be required to pass through the marginal 
cost of the tax to individual consumers. 
This paper proceeds is organised as follows: First, the context in which economic 
instruments are being considered is briefly recalled. In section 3, we identify sectors 
which are EI, those that are TI and those that are EITI. The following analysis focuses 
on EI and EITI sectors, not those that are only TI or simply large energy users. The 
next section considers international experience with carbon taxes, emissions trading 
and policy instruments for addressing the specific issues of EITI industries. Section 5 
then draws on both the previous sections to suggest a range of possible approaches 
to EI and EITI sectors, in the context of the development of South African climate 
policy.  
2. Context: an energy-intensive history 
This paper considers the question: How could economic instruments be applied in 
South Africa to EI TI industries. This question is posed in the context of emerging 
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national policy on climate change mitigation – and in the context of the specific 
challenges faced by South Africa. The context is that of a political economy which 
historically has been dominated by the minerals-energy complex (Fine & Rustomjee 
1996).  
The history of the minerals-energy complex has resulted in carbon-intensive electric-
ity generation, comparatively inefficient use of energy and support for EI industries. 
Electricity generation has relied on coal for many decades, with over 90% generated 
from coal-based power plants. Using the methodology of Hohne et al to evaluate 
emissions intensity of electricity, developed countries average 0.4 kg per kWh, devel-
oping countries fare worse with 0.7 kg per kWh, and South Africa has an emissions 
intensity of 0.869 for its electricity (Höhne et al 2008). 
Due to long-term low energy prices, partly because of ultra-cheap industrial coal 
prices and partly because of massive overcapacity in the electricity sector from the 
mid-1980s, South African EI sectors are also very inefficient by comparison to most 
other countries (Marquard 2006). The costs of using coal have not been internalised 
(Spalding-Fecher & Matibe 2003; Van Horen 1996). Incentives have not promoted 
more efficient use, and so industries are not efficient by international comparison. 
For instance, South Africa’s iron and steel industry is amongst the top 20 such indus-
tries in the world by output, but is also the most inefficient. A comparison of five EI 
sectors across a representative sample of countries globally reveals that South Africa 
is least efficient or close to least efficient in over half of them, and its aggregate score 
is the third worst out of about 50 countries (Den Elzen et al 2007) 
EI sectors have long been supported by policy. A recent policy initiative in this regard 
was the ‘Developmental electricity pricing programme’ (DEPP) of the Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI), which sought ‘to attract industrial investment projects to 
the Republic, which would in the absence of DEPP not invest in the Republic, 
through providing them with electricity tariffs that will … enable an IRR [internal rate 
of return] that will ensure that the applicant can invest in South Africa’ (DTI 2005). 
While expressed as ‘beneficiation of downstream industries’, this policy essentially 
promoted key EITI sectors at direct odds with climate mitigation objectives. The 
programme was effectively suspended after the electricity crisis of 2008, but was just 
the last in a long series of state initiatives since the 1970s to develop EI industries in 
the economy, to take advantage of low coal and electricity prices, the country’s 
minerals industry, and to boost foreign exchange earnings. After the overbuilding of 
generation plant by Eskom in the 1970s and 1980s, the policy was accelerated to use 
the available excess capacity (Marquard 2006). 
Put together, the combination of policy support for EITI industry, carbon-intensive 
electricity and inefficient use of energy have resulted in high energy-intensity. This 
has been acknowledged in government planning, such as the first Integrated energy 
plan (DME 2003). This stated that by ‘international standards, South Africa has a 
high energy intensity.’ This is because low energy costs and an abundance of mineral 
deposits have led to an emphasis on primary extraction and processing, which is 
inherently energy intensive’. It is in this context that we look to identify EI, TI and 
EITI sectors.  
3.  Identifying energy-intensive and trade-intensive sectors  
The first step in a structured approach to EI and EITI sectors under a carbon price 
must be to identify the industries concerned. This paper identifies EI sectors, then TI 
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ones separately, before combining the findings to identify EITI industries. It is the 
latter two categories which are the focus for policy recommendations, particularly 
considering how economic instruments might be applied to EI and EITI sectors. The 
scope of this paper does not include sectors that are TI only; future work on border 
adjustment might include these. In the context is domestic climate policy and eco-
nomic instruments, the relatively greater costs in EI sectors and competitiveness 
concerns of EITI are most relevant.  
3.1 Energy-intensive sectors of the economy 
In this paper, energy-intensity is measured as energy demand (in terajoules) per unit 
of GDP (in millions of 2000 constant rands), following the approach taken in estab-
lishing baselines for energy efficiency (Hughes et al 2002). The data needed to derive 
a measure of energy intensity are energy consumption per sector and GDP (total 
output) per sector. Energy intensity is then calculated as energy consumption per 
sector, divided by economic output per sector. Table A.1 in the Appendix and Figure 
1 below show the trends in energy consumption per sector between 2001 and 2006.1  
To determine the energy intensity of these industrial sub-sectors of the economy, the 
Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) energy balances data were employed 
along with Statistics South Africa (SSA) gross domestic product (GDP) figures. This 
task involved determining the overlap between industrial classifications in the Energy 
Balances and those in the SSA figures. The energy balances are generated according 
to the methodology employed by the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the 
International Industrial Classification as (partly) used by SSA (Weidema 2010). The 
SSA GDP figures are produced based on the Standard Industrial Classification of all 
Economic Activities (SIC) which is based upon the third revision of the International 
Standard Industrial Classification of all Economic Activities (ISIC) (UN Statistics 
Division 2002). 
Two caveats should be noted before proceeding – energy intensity is used as a first 
approximation for emissions intensity, and the analysis focuses on energy users in 
the industrial sector only. On the first point, energy intensity is highly correlated with 
emissions intensity due to the emissions-intensive nature of the South African energy 
sector. However, there are industrial sectors such as iron and steel and cement which 
produce additional non-energy emissions (industrial process emissions which pro-
duce GHG as a result of non-combustion processes), which would increase the 
emissions intensity of these sectors. This initial analysis has not taken these impacts 
into account; thus, interventions in the energy system (fuel switching, or energy 
efficiency measures) will reduce the emissions intensity of some sectors more than 
others, and might be an area for future work. 
The second point is simply that the analysis is on EI industrial sub-sectors, which are 
those that use a large amount of energy per unit of output. Industry in South Africa 
has shifted from being mining-intensive to EI manufacturing processes (Hughes et al 
2002). In addition, South Africa derives substantial wealth from energy-related activi-
ties (Consult 101 et al 2001: xvi). This characteristic of the economy is described by 
Fine and Rustomjee (1996) as the minerals-energy complex. Given that in South 
Africa the industrial sector is the largest user of energy in final energy consumption 
(Winkler et al 2006) we continue reporting on industry in this section, which is a sub-
                                                 
1  Figure A.1 in the Appendix highlights the trends of the other seven main industrial energy consum-
ing sectors. 
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set of the entire economy. Table A2 in the Appendix shows the large energy-
consuming industrial sub-sectors. 
The question of interest is the impact of pricing carbon on those that use energy 
intensively. For ease of comparison of the highest energy consuming industrial sub-
sectors, only a subset comprising the top-six energy consuming sector are reflected 
here in text. Figure 1 shows the trend in energy consumption for these six highest-
consuming industrial sectors. The energy consumption trends for all other sectors are 
shown graphically in Figure A1 in the Appendix. Energy consumption data on all 
sectors is in Table A 2.  
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Figure 1: Industrial sectors with highest energy consumption,  
2001 to 2006 
Source: Own calculations based on DME (2001-2006) 
It should be noted that the reported energy consumption in the chemicals and petro-
chemicals sector may be due to several factors, not all of which are clear from the 
available data. Much of the decline from 2001 to 2006 may be explained by, firstly, 
the shutting down of a small electricity plant in the sector, so that efficiency losses 
would be accounted for elsewhere, secondly, the switch to natural gas in a smaller 
plant, and thirdly – and least transparently – a change in accounting for some of the 
energy use in the industry from final energy use to transformation. In terms of eco-
nomic output in each of these industrial sectors in Figure 2 (and a fuller set in Table 
A.2 in the supplementary data in the Appendices) indicate that unsurprisingly the 
mining and quarrying sector as well as chemical and petrochemical products and 
iron and steel (inclusive of non-ferrous metals in SSA GDP figures) contribute signifi-
cantly to GDP of the industrial sectors assessed. The construction and food and 
tobacco industries follow close behind. The construction industry showed a notable 
increase in GDP during the 2001 to 2006 time period where as the mining and 
quarrying sector appeared to decline in output between 2003 and 2006.  
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Figure 2: Trends in GDP across industrial sub-sectors,  
2001 to 20062 
Source: Own calculations based on SSA (2001–2006) 
Having shown energy consumption and GDP, energy intensity is simply calculated 
by division. Table 1 shows energy intensity by industry as energy use per unit of 
economic output. (the trends in GDP across the other main industrial sub-sectors are 
shown in Figure A.2 in the Appendix),  
Table 1: Energy intensity (energy per economic unit of output) 
(Terajoules)/GDP (Millions of constant 2000 Rands) 
Source: Own calculations based on on DME (2001-2006); SSA (2001–2006) 
Industrial sub-sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Rank 
 Iron and steel and non-ferrous metals 10.8 9.7 10.2 10.5 9.8 9.3 1 
 Non-metallic minerals 8.7 8.0 10.8 12.1 12.9 7.6 2 
 Chemical and petrochemical 5.9 4.7 4.5 3.8 3.4 3.4 3 
 Mining and quarrying 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.8 3.0 2.9 4 
 Construction 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 5 
 Paper pulp and print and wood 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 6 
 Machinery 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 7 
 Textile and leather 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 8 
 Food and tobacco 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 9 
 Transport equipment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10 
 
It is immediately clear that the most EI sectors are iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, 
non-metallic minerals, chemical and petrochemical products,3 and mining and quar-
                                                 
2  The trends in GDP across the other main industrial sub-sectors are shown in Figure A.2 in the 
Appendix. 
3  Energy use in the chemicals and petrochemicals sector seems, from interpretation of the DME’s 
energy balances (DME (2001-2006), to include coal use for chemicals manufacture, as well as for 
private electricity generation, but excludes coal use as feedstock for synfuels manufacture, including 
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rying. Figure 3 shows the clear separation between these four sectors and other 
industrial sub-sectors. In the figure, iron and steel is combined with non-ferrous 
metals – the basic metals. Sectors are ranked by average energy-intensity (most to 
least) between 2001 and 2006. Note that within mining, the gold mining sector is a 
particularly EI sector, as the deeper gold is needed to be mined the more energy is 
required to make this possible. 
Figure 3: Average energy intensity between 2001 and 2006 of each indus-
trial sector 
Source: Own calculations based on DME (2001-2006); SSA (2001–2006) 
Having identified EI sectors, the next step in the analysis was to assess which sectors 
are TI – and by what measure. 
3.2 Identification of trade-intensive sectors of the South African econ-
omy 
To identify TI sectors the proportion of total output composed of exports and imports 
were assessed. The approach followed here is as taken in previous work on which 
this section draws extensively (Jooste et al 2009), which employed the United Na-
tions Commodity Trade Statistics database (UNComtrade – see http://comtrade.un. 
org/) at the two digit level of commodity disaggregation (according to the Harmo-
nised System or HS classification) as well as the Quantec Standardised Industry 
Database (www.quantec.co.za/data/easydata-rsa-standardised-industry) which identi-
fies 46 industries at varying levels of two to three digits South Africa Standardised 
Industry Classification (SSA 1993). Using these data sources and their sectoral defini-
tions, export intensities were assessed. Trade intensity could conceptually also apply 
to imports (e.g. components), but the concern of competitiveness was taken to apply 
                                                                                                                                     
the use of such coal for generation of process heat (completely integrated into the synfuels process), 
which is accounted for elsewhere in the energy balances. 
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primarily to exports.4 The analysis therefore measured exports as a proportion of the 
total output of sectors of the South African economy, with output measured in mone-
tary terms. The analysis showed that that there are six sectors which have export 
intensity above 44%, namely  
 gold and uranium ore mining; 
 other mining; 
 coal mining; 
 machinery and equipment; 
 basic non-ferrous metals; and 
 basic iron and steel.  
The next sector had an export intensity of 28%, significantly lower than the top six 
(Jooste et al 2009).  
3.3 Energy-intensive and trade-intensive sectors of the South African 
economy 
The preceding sections have assessed EI sectors and trade-intensity respectively, 
laying the basis to determine those sectors which are EITI. The analysis of EI sectors 
is based on energy analysis, while that for TI sectors comes from a different tradition, 
both with their complexity. For this initial analysis, the combination is done in a 
simple but transparent manner. The methodology is a comparison of lists, as shown 
in Table 2.  
Table 2: Energy intensive, trade-intensive and EITI sectors  
Energy-intensive sectors  Trade-intensive sectors  Energy-intensive and 
trade-intensive sectors  
Iron and steel  Basic iron and steel Iron and steel 
Non-ferrous metals Basic non-ferrous metals Non-ferrous metals 
Non-metallic minerals   
Chemical and petrochemical 
products 
  
Gold and uranium ore 
mining 
Gold and uranium 
mining  
Coal mining Coal mining 
Mining and quarrying 
Other mining Other mining  
 Machinery and equipment  
 
                                                 
4 Taking into account both exports and imports, the top six TI sectors were similar, with four sectors in 
also in the top six: gold and uranium ore mining; other mining basic non-ferrous metals; basic iron 
and steel. The distinct two in each case were, for export-intensity: coal mining and machinery and 
equipment; for both export and import: leather and leather products, and basic chemicals.  
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Table 2 shows that the basic metals – iron and steel, as well as non-ferrous metals – 
are EITI. Mining is also EITI, although listed differently. Within mining, the trade 
analysis provides a more detailed break-down, considering gold and uranium min-
ing, coal mining and other mining. Machinery and equipment is TI only, and would 
not be included given the focus of this paper. Chemical and petrochemical products 
may merit consideration in carbon pricing, but in terms of energy- rather than trade-
intensity. Non-metallic minerals are similarly in the first column of Table 2, but not 
the second. Both chemicals and non-metallic minerals are therefore considered in the 
remainder of this paper as E) sectors, together with the EITI sectors as above. In 
consideration of further work, we make suggestions for refinement of the identifica-
tion of EITI sectors.  
Having identified EI and EITI sectors, our paper turns to consideration of lessons 
from international experience.  
4. International experience on carbon pricing and possible approaches 
to EITIs  
Two major approaches to pricing carbon are the imposition of a carbon tax and 
emissions trading. Other papers in this collection of conference papers compare these 
two economic instruments more generally (Goldblatt 2010; Robb et al 2010). The 
purpose of reviewing these two approaches here is to draw lessons for approaches to 
EI and EITI sectors. A brief review of the concepts underlying the instruments informs 
our discussion.  
Carbon taxes use the price mechanism, imposing an additional cost that is aimed at 
reflecting the external costs of carbon emissions in the price paid. The price is set in 
the tax levels, which need to be determined. Emissions trading schemes (ETSs) start 
with quantity rather than price. The cap regulates the quantity that may be emitted, 
which creates scarcity. Emitters must acquire permits, but are allowed to trade with 
other entities which may have different mitigation costs. Firms compete to purchase 
permits they require, either by auctioning or on secondary markets. Permits will be 
tradable and a market price will be formed. 
The distinction between instruments, for this purpose, is not a hard one. There are 
measures applicable both taxes and trading – such as recycling of revenue. Variants 
of emissions trading (also called cap-and-trade) and carbon taxes are examined.  
4.1 The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme  
The EU-ETS is currently the only fully-functioning GHG cap-and-trade scheme, 
although a number of others are in the design phase, whereas carbon taxes have 
been applied in a number of countries since the early 1990s. The EU-ETS includes 
large emitters in the power and heat generation sector as well as other EI industrial 
sectors – combustion plants, oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel plants and 
factories making cement, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, pulp and paper are included in 
the scheme (EC 2005). An initial lesson is that EI sectors can be included.  
One approach to EI and EITI sectors under emissions trading might have been to 
allocate free allowances. The initial allocation of permits is given to those emitting, 
which some consider a reward for bad behaviour. The experience of the EU-ETS, 
however, was to move from free allocation in the first phase to auctioning of initial 
allowances, increasing over time.  
Structuring approaches to pricing carbon in energy- and trade-intensive sectors 137 
Putting a price on carbon: Conference proceedings 
Analysis of the EU-ETS has found that TI sectors, specifically export-intensive sectors 
such as cement and aluminium, are risk of damage to their competitiveness as a 
result of the EU-ETS, should prices rise or their allocations decrease (Grubb & 
Neuhoff 2006). There is no explicit provision for for EITIs in the EU-ETS, with the 
EU having in 2009 identified a lengthy list of sectors deemed to be potentially ‘at risk 
of carbon leakage’ and is to decide on policy approaches in 2010 (Grubb & Counsell 
2010). A relevant approach is that of limiting the pass-through of the carbon price to 
consumers. In the EU-ETS, this was constrained to a degree in countries with less 
liberalised electricity sectors through regulation or the threat of regulation. However, 
this is likely to undermine the potential of an ETS to internalise emissions pricing 
(Grubb & Neuhoff 2006). 
4.2 Australian emissions trading schemes 
Australia’s policy on mitigation is being built around a medium-term target for na-
tional emissions and a domestic emission trading scheme, called the Carbon pollu-
tion reduction scheme (CPRS) (Australia 2008). The CPRS is a key means to achiev-
ing the emission goals – which sets the ‘cap’, covering about 75% of GHG emissions. 
In November 2009, the Australian Senate voted to reject the legislation, but indica-
tions were that it might be reconsidered after Copenhagen. In January 2010 and 
following the Copenhagen Accord, the Australian government made a submission to 
the UNFCCC, a range of -5% up to -15% or -25% (conditions being a deal with 
participation by major developing countries and, for the highest level, the global 
effort being consistent with stabilisation at 450 ppmv) (Australia 2010). Of particular 
interest is that EITI sectors would receive an administrative allocation of permits, as a 
transitional assistance measure. The Green Paper that informed discussions leading 
to the CPRS considered the impact on EITI industries, in particular the most emis-
sions-intensive electricity generators. The proposed administrative allocations is 
linked to the EITI industry’s output (Australia 2008). 
Under an Electricity sector adjustment scheme, the Australian government will pro-
vide during the first five years of the CPRS about A$ 3.9 billion worth of such per-
mits, based on an initial price of $ 25 per ton of carbon. Furthermore, responding to 
concerns of non-EITI sectors, the proposed scheme would include an Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal. Effectively, if there are concerns that EITIs earn windfall profits, 
these could be challenged. To enable this, details of administrative permits issued 
would be published by the regulator.  
The CPRS also has specific provisions for emissions-intensity (not EI) in the electricity 
sector. Not all power plants would be eligible to trade, only those above the grid-
average emissions intensity from 2004 to 2007 (0.86 t CO2-eq / MWh in Australia; 
the comparable figure for Eskom is 0.96 t CO2-eq/MWh).  
New South Wales in Australia piloted a GHG reduction scheme (GGAS), prior to the 
development of the national Carbon pollution reduction scheme (CPRS). GGAS was 
a regional baseline and credit scheme that started in 2003, building on an existing 
emissions benchmarking programme linked to retailer licensing conditions (Tyler et al 
2008a). One element considered in this state-level ETS was voluntary participation 
of some large electricity customers. In the context of a baseline and credit approach, 
the incentives drive participation, rather than a firm cap. Following the trend in the 
EU-ETS, the Australian scheme proposes to move to 100% auctioning over time.  
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4.3 Differential rates under a carbon tax  
The Scandinavian countries pioneered carbon taxes. Various approaches were tried 
(Winkler & Marquard 2009a), and the details on levels set and experiences gained 
have been reviewed elsewhere (Tyler et al 2008b). What is of interest to the present 
discussion are examples of differential application of carbon taxes – either lower rates 
of taxation for specific sectors, or complete exemptions.  
The Finnish tax was based on carbon content, later combined with energy content in 
a 60:40 ratio. However, international transport fuels (so-called bunker fuels resulting 
in marine and aviation emissions) were exempted. Sweden similarly set its tax levels 
in relation to the average carbon content of the fuel. In the Swedish case, biofuels 
and peat were exempted, but also fuels for electricity generation. Sweden and 
Finland provide examples of setting a different tax level for EI sectors, with some 
sub-sectors entirely exempted. The basis of such reducing tax levels could be energy 
or carbon content.  
The German environmental tax reform was not considered effective in achieving 
mitigation initially, since it excluded coal (Anderson 2008). Germany has had energy 
taxes since the 1950s, including natural gas but not include coal until 2007. Coal was 
heavily subsidised through a so-called Kohlepfennig, with different rates for industry 
and households. Between 1999 and 2003, Germany undertook environmental tax 
reform, increasing taxes on transport fuels and phasing in an electricity tax. The 
revenues were earmarked for recycling into pension contributions. Energy products 
other than transport, by contrast, received tax relief – paying 40% of the standard 
energy tax rate, once the tax burden exceeded a threshold level. The manufacturing 
sector is eligible for a refund of 95%, if the energy tax burden is greater than tax relief 
(Speck 2008). By the end of this evolution, Germany provides an example of balanc-
ing the tax burden with tax relief.  
The UK includes in its climate policy a Climate change levy (CCL) – a tax on electric-
ity, gas, coal, liquefied petroleum gas used for energy. The CCL is levied on power 
generation, industrial iron, steel, mineral chemicals and transport. A reduced levy 
applied to EI users, provided a climate change agreement was signed 
4.4 Adjusted tax rates under emissions trading 
Up until this section, we have considered examples specific to a tax or trading. The 
EU experience considered differential tax rates, in a context where both instruments 
apply. The experience of the EU in integrating existing carbon taxes by member 
states in a broader emissions trading scheme may provide lessons. Anderson (2008) 
notes the complicated schemes have been designed to balance, cap, or reduce the 
tax, as countries with a tax fall under the EU cap. Member states apply to the Euro-
pean Commission for approval, essentially for lower tax rates. While the burden on 
EI industries ‘remains negative … due to many exemptions, the actual burden is 
rather modest’ (Anderson 2008: 79).  
Under the EU-ETS, EI companies receive compensation for the additional energy 
costs, through a reduction in social security contributions. Even these exemptions are 
adjusted, given that EI sectors in countries with high shares of hydro- or nuclear 
power in their mix are less sensitive to carbon-based energy taxes. As the compensa-
tion is considered to be ‘state aid’, there are limits on the concessions that can be 
granted. The European Commission guidelines codify agreements relating to selec-
tive tax reductions. An energy taxation directive limits the duration of exemptions to 
five or ten years. The exemptions have reduced the burden on EI sectors, which 
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range between one and four percent of gross operating surplus across different coun-
tries and industries (Anderson 2008).  
4.5 Use of carbon tax revenues for energy efficiency incentives  
Denmark has combined the levying of a carbon tax with subsidies for energy effi-
ciency. A study comparing the effectiveness of this combined approach suggests that 
this led to the best results in terms of mitigation achieved, while noting that its energy 
sector is more carbon-intensive than others in Scandinavia (Anderson 2004). Euro-
pean experiences suggest a ‘relatively broad consensus about the properties of reve-
nue-neutral environmental tax reform’ (Anderson 2008:64).  
Revenue recycling can be applied not only with a tax, but also the revenues from 
auctioning of allowances, or other instruments. The UK climate change levy was 
offset by a reduction of 1% in the employer’s rate in national insurance, and to fund 
energy efficiency incentives. The UK Department of Climate Change considers the 
levy to be revenue-neutral.  
A fiscally neutral approach is both more attractive for tax policy, and the incentives 
packaged together with the carbon tax can address socio-economic priorities.  
4.6 Domestic sectoral approaches  
Among sectoral approaches, one should distinguish between international and do-
mestic approaches. Setting sectoral targets internationally (IEA 2009; Japan 2008) 
was seen by many developing countries as equivalent to commitments. On the other 
hand, developed countries were expected to adopt economy-wide commitments. 
The relevance to this paper, however, is that sectoral approaches apply particularly 
to EITI sectors.  
In a new context, with major developing countries having pledged deviation below 
BAU (as South Africa) or reduction in carbon intensity (China, India and others), 
domestic implementation will have to be considered sector by sector. EITI sectors 
may benefit from access to sectoral crediting mechanism. The competitiveness con-
cerns of EITI sectors could be addressed by seeking to ensure that all participants in 
the sector are internationally subject to the same benchmark.  
Benchmarks could be defined as specific emissions intensities; for example the ce-
ment sector could aim to reach x kg CO2-eq per ton of cement. In practice, a range 
of different benchmark figures would be needed, given different processes and prod-
ucts. Technically, these could be resolved, but as a matter of negotiation, reaching 
consensus on benchmarking during negotiations is often difficult. Another approach 
would be to require the best available technology (or in the 10th or 25th percentile in 
terms of emissions per output) to be installed. Again, this would require long lists of 
technologies.  
4.7 Summary  
Before turning to policy options for South Africa, it is worth summarising the lessons 
learned from international experience. Generally, more provisions under carbon 
taxes and emissions trading have considered EI sectors, with fewer examples of 
policy for EITIs. In countries where carbon taxes have been implemented, differential 
tax rates have been applied, based in Scandinavian countries on energy or carbon 
content. The German system evolved to a complex balance of tax relief with tax 
burden, while the UK reduction in the climate levy was subject to firms signing an 
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agreement with government. In the EU context, tax rates have been adjusted as 
countries fall under the cap of the ETS – including exemptions for EI companies.  
For emissions trading, the trend in both the EU-ETS and the proposed Australian 
scheme is to shift from grandfathering (free allocation of initial allowances) to 100% 
auctioning. The most explicit provision for EITIs that this paper has found is the 
administrative allocations to EI, TI and emissions-intensive power plants. To counter 
concerns of windfall profits from non-EITI sectors, an appeals tribunal is an interest-
ing option.  
Revenue from taxes or auctioning allowances provides a means to encourage mitiga-
tion in EI and EITI sectors – or to achieve broader socio-economic goals. Fiscally 
neutral design seems to be an attractive element from climate and development 
perspectives.  
Finally, this paper reflected on the possibilities for sectoral approaches, domestically 
and also allowing incentive-driven participation in baseline-crediting systems. The 
technical issues of agreeing benchmarks, particularly at the international level, would 
need to be addressed.  
5. Range of possible approaches to carbon pricing for South Africa  
Drawing on early work on economic instruments to put a price on carbon and les-
sons from international experience of dealing with TI and EI sectors, this section 
explores a range of policy options for SA. While focusing on economic instruments, 
EI and EITI sectors, the proposal should be considered as part of South Africa’s 
development of climate policy more broadly. Some of these options apply irrespec-
tive of which instrument is chosen (emissions trading, carbon tax or indirect meas-
ures), while others are integral to a specific option. If successful, the measures should 
achieve the intended outcome of the carbon price – provide incentives to producers 
to reduce carbon intensity, provide incentives to consumers to decrease the carbon 
intensity of their consumption, and result in a shift to a low-carbon economy. The 
aims of these options would be to maintain other policy goals (international competi-
tiveness, economic growth), while helping South Africa achieve its 34% deviation 
below BAU by 2020 and more beyond.  
Another consideration would be the timing of measures elsewhere – either the impo-
sition of equivalent carbon price mechanisms elsewhere, or the unilateral imposition 
of border adjustments in export destinations for goods produced by South African EI 
and EITI sectors. This will depend on the outcome of the current international nego-
tiations, but implementation of any of the special measures proposed below would 
depend on the prevailing international environment. Implementation of equivalent 
carbon pricing policies among major trading partners should obviate the requirement 
for special measures. 
5.1 Apply any lower carbon tax rates on objective basis  
If a carbon tax were implemented, experience elsewhere indicates that industries will 
lobby for lower tax rates. This consideration returns to the initial problem, which is 
that – absent a structured approach – government will face special pleading. The 
outcome of such a process is not often in the interests of environmental integrity, as 
ad hoc arrangements cut against the initial intention of reducing emissions. Drawing 
on the experience gained from other countries, a structured approach for EI and EITI 
sectors could base the rates set for a carbon tax on energy or carbon content. The 
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iron and steel sector, for example, would have a rate set in relation to kg CO2 per ton 
of steel produced. To enable a common metric, a national benchmark would have to 
be defined. Alternative to specific emissions intensity would be assessing emissions 
intensity in kg CO2 per rand of economic output, analogous to Table 1 for energy-
intensity in industry. Either measure would provide an objective measure, rather than 
a complete exemption. Lower rates or tax relief should also, following the UK exam-
ple, be subject to an agreement of the entity with government indicating how it will 
contribute to mitigation.  
5.2 Allocate initial allowances by auctioning  
Economic theory suggests that initial allocation of allowances is the most efficient, 
but most emissions trading schemes started by free allocations in relation to past 
emissions, called ‘grand-fathering’. Grandfathering is inherently very administratively 
burdensome, requiring a high level of data on the part of the regulator (Tyler et al 
2008a). It also lacks flexibility in allowing change in industry structure. Furthermore, 
the approach is at odds with the principle of equity, in rewarding historical polluters 
the most with new assets. Finally, it is doubtful that grandfathering would prevent EI 
and EITI industries lobbying for their special case. Increasingly, the trend in the EU, 
the proposed Australian CPRS and legislation for a US scheme, is towards auctioning 
of permits to emit GHG emissions. In our context, EITI sectors such as mining and 
the EI production processes by SASOL, for example, should be covered through full 
auctioning.  
Maximum coverage in an ETS is desirable to achieve the most mitigation, and to 
maximise economic efficiency in mitigation. In South Africa, with an energy system 
dominated by Eskom, Sasol and a few large EI industrial sectors, and with the ab-
sence of an electricity market, there might not be sufficient liquidity in any domestic 
emissions-trading scheme without participation of EI and EITI sectors. A clear policy 
option thus would be to have 100% coverage and full auctioning of initial allow-
ances.  
5.3 Administratively allocate permits to EITIs for a transitional period  
There are compelling reasons to move to auctioning as rapidly as possible. Some 
free allocations may be necessary as a transitional measure to make a scheme ac-
ceptable to EITI industries. If grandfathering were applied at all, it should be as a 
transitional measure to auctioning, rather than an option in its own right. This would 
follow the proposal of the Australian CPRS in its approach to EITI sectors.  
5.4 Combine carbon tax or auctioning revenue with incentives for energy 
efficiency or other goods 
Revenues from auctioning of allowances or from the levying of a carbon tax could be 
used to provide incentives for energy efficiency. These are important in South Africa 
at a time when the choice has become to face unpredictable black-outs and brown-
outs, or to structure a power conservation programme. Legislation requiring manda-
tory energy efficiency standards to be met is now needed, which would provide the 
regulatory basis. The impacts of such a law for poor households and for EI and EITI 
industries could be softened through targeted incentives. As an example, non-ferrous 
metals would still pay a tax or buy permits, but receive support in improving the 
efficiency of their production – and thus reducing their energy-intensity. Energy 
efficiency more broadly has the benefit of contributing to employment.  
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Diversification away from EI sectors could be promoted via subsidies for investment 
in green industries by specific EITIs as a quid pro quo for the early retirement of 
inefficient plant. An example would be support for the synfuel industry to shift to 
electric vehicle – although this would pose the question which specific companies 
should be supported. Incentives should be part of a general industrial policy aimed at 
diversification away from EI sectors.  
The revenues generated from a tax or auctioning are not motivated by revenue-
generation and could be made revenue-neutral by combining the measure with an 
incentive package. It is likely that different views will be expressed on the use of 
carbon revenues. International experience suggests that one should expect govern-
ment (and treasuries in particular) to motivate for the revenue to be retained in the 
general fiscus or to be used for additional mitigation. Business will want to see reve-
nue spent on the worst affected sectors. Small customers and poor households – if 
they are effectively represented through civil society, consumer organisations and 
unions – will want to reduce the impact on households, particularly the poor. A 
balance between these different interests will need to be negotiated.  
5.5 Sectoral approaches  
As outlined in section 4.6, South Africa has expressed interest in sectoral approaches 
primarily at the domestic level. With the announcement of a 34% deviation below 
BAU by 2020, the question of how this would be achieved would require planning 
for implementation in each domestic sector. The development of national policy is 
being structured in this way. The particular issues of EI and EITI industries, as out-
lined above, should be taken into account.  
A further consideration for EITI sectors, given their exposure to exports, emerges 
from trade modelling of impacts of response measures on South Africa (Jooste et al 
2009). This analysis indicated that mechanisms such as sectoral baseline and credit-
ing mechanism could be attractive for South Africa and EITI sectors in particular. At 
the national level, losses can be turned into gains, with lost exports outweigh advan-
tages of increased EITI industry exports, reinforcing the findings of an earlier study 
(Consult 101; EC & IDC 2001). The recent study made a similar finding at sectoral 
level, in particular for iron and steel, as well as ‘other’ mining (not gold mining). In a 
situation without access to trading, these sectors showed losses when Annex I imple-
mented mitigation measures. But with something approximating sectoral crediting 
(labelled ‘no-lose emissions trading’ in the study), these losses turned to gains (Jooste 
et al 2009). Sectoral crediting mechanisms can potentially provide gains for EITI 
sectors – rather than losses – through access to a carbon market on a ‘no-lose’ basis.  
5.6 Set specific energy-intensity targets  
The above options have drawn on international experience in various ways; the 
following two consider policy options specific to our own context. One option would 
be for government to set energy-intensity targets for industries, as has been suggested 
elsewhere (Tyler et al 2008a). South Africa has not expressed its national pledge as 
an intensity target (unlike China and India), but as a deviation below the BAU trajec-
tory (RSA 2010). Part of the national goal could be translated into sector-specific 
intensity targets, which could be negotiated on the basis of international benchmarks. 
Specific emissions-intensity targets could build on companies goals already estab-
lished. Sasol has adopted an emissions-intensity target, aiming to reduce its GHG 
intensity by 10% below 2004 levels by 2015. While actual trends in GHG intensity 
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reduction suggest that the numerical value of the target could be doubled to 20%, 
the point for current purposes is that this policy option has the advantage of directly 
using approaches taken by companies, including by EITI industries. If leadership 
were shown by Sasol, it might be possible that one of our EI sectors, chemicals and 
petrochemicals, as a whole might take on ambitious intensity targets. The 2009 
Carbon Disclosure Project found that of the JSE top 100 companies, ‘20 have GHG 
emissions targets, while 11 are in the process of defining such targets’ (CDP 2009). 
The initial phase of ‘peak, plateau and decline’ needs to slow emissions growth and 
intensity targets could make a contribution. However, if there is continued growth in 
other sectors (e.g. energy supply), then more has to be done elsewhere. 
5.7 Review policy promoting energy-intensive industry 
If South Africa is to achieve a deviation below BAU, a shift of incentives will be 
needed from EI to climate friendly investments and technologies. Incentives such as 
the DEPP (see section 2) were designed to utilise the excess capacity in the South 
African electricity system in the 1990s and early 2000s, and benefited amongst 
others smelters in the iron and steel and non-ferrous metals sectors – identified in this 
paper as both EITI sectors. In 2010, facing an electricity supply crisis, continuing such 
policies would exacerbate the current crisis. If these incentives were phased out, the 
reduced burden on the fiscus would in principle free up resources that could be used 
for investment in climate-friendly sectors. The basis for such a shift has been laid by 
an in-principle decision by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) to integrate 
climate change into its industrial policy. Climate-aligned industrial policy might, for 
example, promote a solar industry development programme (Edkins et al 2009; 
Winkler 2009c). 
6. Limitations of this study and further work 
This paper focuses on how EI and EITI sectors might be included in carbon pricing, 
as part of broader climate policy. It does not seek to answer all questions, and its 
focus is derived from the identification of EI, TI and EITI sectors in section 3. An 
important area for further work is refinement of that identification. The approach in 
this paper was based on distinct methodologies for EI and TI sectors, and identifying 
the combined list EITI by comparing lists. Significant effort was made to check that 
sectoral definitions are consistent – that apples are being compared with apples. A 
dedicated study on sectoral definitions in energy balances and modeling, compared 
to those used in trade databases, would not only validate or amend our findings, but 
should also consider levels of disaggregation. A further study might investigate statis-
tical methods (e.g. analysis of distribution, clustering methods) of comparing not only 
top five or six, but how full sets of groupings overlap. In particular, the large set of 
smaller industries under the category ‘non-specified industry’ add up, as a group, to 
the second largest energy user within industry in South Africa. A detailed analysis of 
sectoral definitions was not the purpose of our paper, which focused on policy op-
tions.  
Having identified EI, TI and EITI sectors, we chose to focus on EI due to the com-
paratively greater cost they might face, and EITI due to competitiveness concerns. 
Further work is needed on TI sectors (even if they are not EI), in relation to border 
adjustments. The US and EU are considering such unilateral measures, in which a 
border tax or other measure is imposed on imports of emissions-intensive goods 
from countries that do not have a constraint on carbon. In the academic literature, 
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the idea that South Africa could consider its own border adjustments has been pro-
posed: ‘In order to contain the competitiveness impact of an energy sector ETS for 
energy intensive export orientated industry, mechanisms such as tariffs on imports or 
tax rebates at the point of export could be considered’ (Tyler et al 2008a). However, 
the notion of conducting climate policy by trade war seems a highly risky one 
(Winkler 2009b). If climate policy post-Copenhagen did degenerate into countries 
focusing on domestic law and dealing with others by border adjustments, then this 
option may need to be considered. It is not, however, a desirable scenario nor one 
currently pursued by South Africa, and thus a possible topic for future work.  
Further work is needed on the impacts on the poor of putting a price on carbon. In 
this paper, the focus was on industry. However, the poor are even more vulnerable 
to impacts of higher energy prices. Revenue recycled from tax or auctioning allow-
ances should be spent on ensuring that there is no such impact. Learning from the 
Scandinavian experience, one could combine climate objectives with other socio-
economic objectives, in that context reducing income tax. In the South African con-
text, particular preference should e given to the poor, and in avoiding any negative 
impacts on poor households through higher energy prices due to pricing carbon. 
Various options that have been considered in previous analysis (Pauw 2007; Winkler 
2007, 2010) include a food subsidy, a general VAT subsidy, an income tax subsidy 
and a general increase in welfare transfers. This is an area in which we intend to do 
further work.  
Having considered some of the areas in which the analysis presented here could be 
taken further, we conclude with the main findings of this paper.  
7. Conclusion  
This paper has explored how the sectors that have been central to the minerals-
energy complex that has dominated our economy in the past, could be part of the 
solution to the problem of climate change. It has focused on the question how eco-
nomic instruments might be applied to sectors that are EI and those that are EITI. 
Economic instruments – notably carbon tax or emissions trading – are key elements 
of emerging climate policy. What policy options exist to achieve emission reductions 
in EI and EITI sectors using economic instruments?  
A first step in a structured approach must be to identify the sectors. We identified EI 
sectors based on methodologies and definitions used for energy balances and model-
ling, TI sectors based on trade analysis and SIC codes, and compared the results. 
Basic metals, including iron and steel and non-ferrous metals, are EITI sectors. Min-
ing of gold, uranium, coal and other mining are also in this group. Sectors consid-
ered in the policy analysis for their energy-intensity only are chemical and petro-
chemical, and non-metallic minerals. In the context is domestic climate policy and 
economic instruments, the relatively greater costs in EI sectors and competitiveness 
concerns of EITI are most relevant.  
The paper then considered key lessons from experience in other countries (already 
summarised section 4.7). We focus in this conclusion on the application of those 
lessons in the South African context.  
The long-term mitigation scenarios found that a carbon tax was the ‘wedge’ yielding 
the most emission reductions among the options examined. Drawing on the Scandi-
navian experience, the rate of a carbon tax could be linked to energy or carbon 
content. If EITI sectors were given a lower rate, this should be subject to an agree-
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ment with government on how it will mitigate, drawing on the UK example. If the 
economic instrument chosen were emissions trading, international experience sug-
gests moving to auctioning of initial allowance – rather than grandfathering – as 
rapidly as possible. That would cover both EI and EITI sectors. The proposed Austra-
lian scheme considered a transitional measure of administratively allocating permits. 
If this were done, the notion of an appeals process to prevent windfall profits from 
being achieved at the expense of mitigation would seem desirable.  
The recycling of revenue from either a carbon tax or auctioning of allowances can 
serve several purposes. It could promote more mitigation through increased effi-
ciency, which would be desirable in EI and EITI sectors. It could also support diversi-
fication, for example from synfuels to electric vehicles.  
Three options considered relate to sectors. Existing policy that favours EI industry 
should be replaced with incentives for climate-friendly approaches, developing a 
solar industry programme rather than supporting smelters. A recent study suggests 
that access to sectoral crediting mechanisms can turn EITI sectors that stand to lose 
without ‘no lose’ emissions trading into winners. Domestically, some companies in EI 
and EITI sectors have set targets for energy- or emissions-intensity. This could be 
built on as a contribution to the national effort to achieve a deviation below BAU of 
34% by 2020.  
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Appendices: Supplementary material and data  
Table A1: Energy demand (in TJ) per industrial sub-sector (%) between 
2001 and 2006 
Source: Own calculations based on DME (2001-2006) 
Energy consumption (first row for each sub-sector) in TJ, and percentage of total 
industry energy consumption (second row) in % 
Industrial sub-sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Average 
 Iron and steel 277 078  280 727  292 005  313 771  305 487  293 426  293 749  
  (27.1) (27.4) (28.2) (26.7) (27.6) (27.4) (27.4) 
 Non-specified (industry)* 193 139  239 165  232 777  350 907  280 190  282 522  263 117  
  (18.9) (23.4) (22.5) (29.9) (25.3) (26.3) (24.4) 
 Mining and quarrying 183 744  183 795  180 699  190 274  204 592  201 982  190 848  
  (18.0) (18.0) (17.5) (16.2) (18.5) (18.8) (17.8) 
 Chemical and petrochemical 235 000  184 584  178 524  154 006  141 809  147 625  173 591  
  (23.0) (18.0) (17.2) (13.1) (12.8) (13.8) (16.3) 
 Non-ferrous metals 56 974  58 043  58 530  64 630  67 104  67 106  62 065  
  (5.6) (5.7) (5.7) (5.5) (6.1) (6.3) (5.8) 
 Non-metallic minerals 43 406  43 944  59 019  67 349  74 818  44 867  55 567  
  (4.2) (4.3) (5.7) (5.7) (6.7) (4.2) (5.2) 
 Construction 15 044  15 816  16 939  15 982  16 535  15 665  15 997  
  (1.5) (1.5) (1.6) (1.4) (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) 
 Paper pulp and print 8 835  8 837  7 777  7 697  8 635  9 441  8 537  
  (0.9) (0.9) (0.8) (0.7) (0.8) (0.9) (0.8) 
 Food and tobacco 3 724  3 785  3 688  3 516  3 783  4 135  3 772  
  (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4) 
 Textile and leather 1 774  1 901  1 880  1 890  1 868  1 868  1 864  
  (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) 
 Machinery 1 010  1 019  2 337  2 071  2 278  2 479  1 865  
  (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) 
 Wood and wood products 1 011  1 115  974  1 044  1 068  1 069  1 047  
  (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) 
 Transport equipment 682  717  343  304  332  329  451  
  (0.1) (0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
Total 
1021419 
(100) 
1023448 
(100) 
1035492 
(100) 
1173440 
(100) 
1108500 
(100) 
1072513 
(100) 
100 
Note: Individual sub-sub-sectors are not large energy users, but when put together smaller industries 
account for just under a quarter of industrial energy demand 
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Table A2: Annual GDP per industrial sub-sector 
Source: SSA (2001–2006) 
Industrial sub-sector GDP  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Average 
Units: GDP in constant 2000 prices, R 
millions (first row for each sector); 
Shares of industrial GDP: % (2nd row)       
 
 Non-metallic minerals 4 989  5 470  5 446  5 576  5 806  5 933 5 537  
  (1.8) (1.9) (1.9) (1.8) (1.8) (1.8) (1.8) 
 Iron and steel and non-ferrous metals 30 875  34 777  34 456  36 086  37 832  38 667 35 449  
  (11.0) (12.0) (11.8) (11.9) (11.8) (11.6) (11.7) 
 Chemical and petrochemical 40 140  39 550  39 478  40 675  41 553  43 362 40 793  
  (14.3) (13.6) (13.5) (13.4) (13.0) (13.0) (13.5)  
 Mining and quarrying 63 325  63 927  66 502  67 363  68 818  68 591 66 421  
  (22.6) (22.0) (22.8) (22.1) (21.5) (20.5) (21.9) 
 Construction 22 154  23 441  25 053  27 830  31 268  35 494 27 540  
  (7.9) (8.1) (8.6) (9.1) (9.8) (10.6) (9.0)  
Wood and paper, publishing and 
printing 16 605  16 614  16 381  17 447  18 725  20 824 
17 766  
  (5.9) (5.7) (5.6) (5.7) (5.9) (6.2) (5.8)  
 Machinery 5 133  5 079  5 084  5 104  5 636  6 246 5 380  
  (1.8) (1.7) (1.7) (1.7) (1.8) (1.9) (1.8) 
 Textile and leather 7 503  8 108  7 919  8 599  8 279  8 262 8 112  
  (2.7) (2.8) (2.7) (2.8) (2.6) (2.5) (2.7)  
 Food and tobacco 25 582  26 094  24 990  25 847  27 575  28 952 26 507  
  (9.1) (9.0) (8.6) (8.5) (8.6) (8.7) (8.7) 
 Transport equipment 16 134  15 925  15 271  16 337  17 469  18 406 16 590  
  (5.8) (5.5) (5.2) (5.4) (5.5) (5.5) (5.5)  
Total of GDP across these industries 
279 
920  
290 
377  
291 
417  
304 
398  
319 
517  
334 
229 
100  
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Figure A1: Trends in the other main energy consuming industrial sectors 
between 2001 and 2006 
Source: Own calculations based on DME (2001-2006); SSA (2001–2006) 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
%
Wo o d and pape r,
publis hing and printing
 Trans po rt equipment
 Textile  and lea ther
 No n-me ta llic  mine ra ls
 Machinery
 
Figure A2: Trends in GDP across the other main industrial sectors be-
tween 2001 and 2006 
Source: Own calculations based on SSA (2001–2006) 
 
  
 
 
 
   
151 
Mitigation in India: Emission trading as 
a possible policy option 
Prabhat Upadhyaya 
Abstract  
It is important for countries to undertake actions at home in addition to engaging in 
the international negotiations. The Emission Trading Scheme can be one of the 
policy tools to promote mitigation actions, but has not yet been implemented in any 
developing country. The paper gives an overview of the climate change debate, 
carbon markets and proposed government action to tackle climate change in India. 
The paper studies the proposed Perform, Achieve and Trade (PAT) scheme in India, 
under one of its eight national missions to tackle climate change, besides identifying 
the key design aspects of emission trading based on international experience. The 
challenges that the PAT will face in the future, if it were to be a flagship programme 
to tackle carbon emissions as well, are highlighted. The key strengths that the country 
has to implement such a mechanism and factors that it needs to take into considera-
tion while it is finalising the implementation plan for an in-country enhanced energy 
efficiency trading scheme are investigated. Based on the initial study, emission trad-
ing research topics that need to be analysed in greater detail have been specified. 
Keywords: India; Perform, Achieve and Trade (PAT); emission trading design; emis-
sion trading experience; implementation challenges; mitigation. 
 
1. Introduction 
Climate change is today recognised as one of the biggest problems facing life on 
earth. There is enough scientific evidence to prove that the problem is anthropogenic 
in nature (IPCC 2007). The critical questions therefore are who will take the neces-
sary measures (commitments by developed countries and actions by developing 
countries), how much emission reductions are to be undertake and by when. The 
2009 Conference of Parties (COP) in Copenhagen tried to reach an agreement on 
these questions but the complexity of arriving at solutions can be gauged from the 
fact that no consensus was reached on a plan of action. The outcome of the negotia-
tions, if it can be so-called, is what is known as the Copenhagen Accord. As many as 
five countries opposed it, so it could only be taken notice of by the COP, with Cuba 
opposing it formally (ToI 2010). The Accord, as such, is not a legally binding agree-
ment for it is not a COP decision. However, being a part of the process that resulted 
in the Copenhagen Accord, India is politically bound to the text. Ultimately, the 
Accord certainly is not enough to ensure a strong response to the problem of climate 
change. 
Mitigation in India: Emission trading as a possible policy option 152 
Putting a price on carbon: Conference proceedings 
1.1 Recent developments 
Taking cognisance of an atmosphere marred by lack of trust (Shrivastava & 
Upadhyaya 2009; Dubhash 2009) and the little time available at hand to reach an 
agreement to tackle climate change, it becomes important for countries, in their own 
limited capacities, to prepare domestically so that the implementation of a global 
agreement in future does not meet unpreparedness. This calls for study of the policy 
tools that are currently available to facilitate undertaking actions at home in addition 
to engaging in international negotiations. With its entry into force, the Kyoto Protocol 
created the foundation for what we now know as carbon markets1 (Ellis & Tirpak 
2006). Emission Trading Schemes (ETSs) and Joint Implementation (JI) in Annex I 
countries and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in non-Annex I countries 
have been the prime mechanisms laying the foundation of the carbon markets. It has 
also been suggested that new mechanisms will play a greater role in the post-2012 
carbon market (IETA 2009). 
It is in this light that emission trading (ET) as a policy tool to mitigate climate change 
should be closely examined. The benefits of the successful implementation of such a 
scheme include that it can enable the generation of fair economic returns which can 
then be used in a positive fashion towards income redistribution to tackle problems 
of importance to the country (Tänzler & Steuwer 2009). The design aspects are 
unique to each ETS. International experience exists in putting the principle of ET to 
use in developed countries such as those of the European Union (EU). However, no 
such scheme has been implemented in developing countries as at 2009. In the recent 
past there have been announcements from some developing countries that signal the 
potential establishment of domestic trading schemes including in Mexico, China and 
India. Mexico is in talks with its major emitting companies to set up a cap and trade 
scheme to take action domestically (Carbonpositive 2009). China plans to include a 
pilot ET system in its five year plan from 2011 to 2015 (Businessgreen 2009; Reuters 
2009). India has indicated undertaking a trading scheme in terms of energy saving 
certificates based on enhanced energy efficiency for intensive energy users (The 
Hindu 2009; Pew Centre 2008a), but this is different from ET as the commodity 
being traded will be energy-saving certificates, or white certificates. Against this 
background the paper examines the specific question of the relevance of ETS as a 
possible climate change mitigation policy option for India. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of India in the context 
of climate change, its emission profile, negotiating position, mitigation policies and 
the carbon market. It then outlines the planned enhanced energy efficiency scheme 
in India along with a briefing on the proposed Perform Achieve and Trade (PAT) 
scheme (which aims to promote energy efficiency and not tackle emissions as an 
objective but in the process will reduce emissions). Section 3 considers experience 
gained from existing ETSs in developed countries. The key building blocks and their 
design elements discussed. Section 4 analyses the feasibility of implementing ET in 
India. It highlights key challenges to be addressed if the PAT is to also be the flagship 
scheme to undertake emission reductions, besides identifying specific areas of study 
if a new ETS is to be created. 
                                                 
1  Carbon markets refer to the market scheme where units issued against reduction of GHG 
emissions are traded for a price. The market here includes both mandatory as well as 
voluntary schemes. 
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2. India: Background and factors relevant to implementing ET 
In terms of historical emissions (1850-2006) India, the world’s fourth largest econ-
omy (Pew Center, 2008b), is the ninth-largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter, ac-
counting for 2.38% of CO2 emissions from energy sector (WRI CAIT 2009; Pew 
Center 2008b). India’s total CO2 emissions in 2006 excluding land use, land use 
change and forestry (LULUCF) account for less than 5% of global emissions, making 
it fifth in terms of emissions worldwide (WRI CAIT 2009). Moreover, as economic 
development is undertaken, India’s emissions are also growing, although per capita 
emissions of 1.7 tCO2 (WRI CAIT 2009) are low, even relative to other major devel-
oping economies (the world average is around 5.8 tCO2 per capita).  
India is home to largest number of poor people in the world, with nearly 35% living 
on less than a dollar a day. Up to 400 million people (and well over 50% of the rural 
population) lack access to electricity (FIIA 2009). While climate change is likely to 
exacerbate India’s development challenges, especially for rural and small scale liveli-
hoods, economic development remains the government’s overwhelming priority. The 
economy is growing rapidly, with GDP rising about 8% a year over the past five 
years. As the economy has grown, emissions intensity (GHGs per unit of GDP) has 
declined significantly. India’s GHG intensity is currently 20% lower than the world 
average (and 15% and 40% lower than that of the United States and China respec-
tively).  
2.1 Emission profile and future estimates 
The largest part of India’s emissions arises from the energy sector. In 1994 energy 
accounted for about 61% of total CO2e emissions – of which almost half came from 
electricity supply, 20% from industrial fuel combustion and around 11% from trans-
port. Road transport accounted for nearly 90% of transport emissions, the remainder 
coming from rail, aviation and shipping (MoEF 2004). The World Resources Institute 
(WRI) estimates suggest that the overall contribution of the energy sector is rising 
(around 66% by 2005). Of the other sectors, agriculture accounted for 28% of total 
emissions in 1994 (MoEF 2004) (around 22% in 2005 as per WRI CAIT data sets), 
industrial process emissions contributed around 6-8%, waste disposal accounted for 
2% (rising to nearly 7% in 2005), and land use and land use change accounted for 
1% (net carbon storage in 2000). 
The emission intensity of India’s economy in 2006, estimated at 0.34 kgCO2 per US$ 
GDP (at ‘purchasing power parity’, 2000 prices), was roughly equal to the emission 
intensity for EU-27 (0.33 kgCO2) and below the world average (0.49 kgCO2) (IEA 
2008). 
According to a study based on five modelling exercises, per capita emissions projec-
tions in 2031 range from 2.77 to 5 tCO2 (MOEF 2009a), while that of total emissions 
range from 4 billion to 7 billion tCO2.  
2.2 India and climate change negotiations 
India is actively engaged in climate negotiations through the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). To date, India steadfastly refuses 
to countenance taking on mandatory emission reductions, arguing that developed 
countries bear full responsibility to pay for mitigation and adaptation in developing 
countries, as the dominant historical polluters (MoEF 2009b). At the same time, 
however, India is highly supportive of collaboration with developed countries to 
advance and deploy technologies which can both enhance energy access opportuni-
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ties for India as well as achieve mitigation outcomes. India has maintained its opposi-
tion to sectoral-based approaches as it feels them to be a means to place commit-
ments on developing countries and not in accord with the principles of the Conven-
tion (MoEF 2009b). A formal stand on ET has not yet been articulated and there are 
different opinions on using it as possible mitigation tool for the country.  
2.3 Policies addressing climate change mitigation in India 
India has a number of policies that, while not driven by climate concerns, contribute 
to climate mitigation by reducing or avoiding GHG emissions. It has also been esti-
mated that in the absence of a number of energy policies that are currently being 
implemented, CO2 emissions from the country would be nearly 20% higher com-
pared to business as usual scenarios in both 2021 and 2031 (TERI 2008). In July 
2007, Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh publicly committed to ensuring that 
‘India’s per capita emissions never exceed the per capita emissions of the industrial-
ized countries’ (GOI 2008). India’s strategy for tackling climate change while pursu-
ing development has been set out in its National Action Plan on Climate Change 
(NAPCC), released in 2008. The NAPCC comprises eight national missions. Some of 
these are already being finalised. The solar mission, the Jawaharlal Nehru National 
Solar Mission Towards Building SOLAR INDIA, has already been released (MNES 
2009). The mission is ambitious in its approach and aims to have 2000MW of off-
grid solar applications by 2022 and 20 000MW of utility grid power by 2022. The 
National Mission on Enhanced Energy Efficiency gives an indication of using trading 
schemes as a tool to reach its goals (EMT-India 2009) – this is discussed in section 
3.5.  
2.4 The carbon market in India 
It is also important to take stock of how the carbon market has fared in India till date. 
Taking note of key lessons will help in preparing the ground for ET in India. Under 
the Kyoto Protocol India can participate in the international carbon market as a 
supplier of carbon credits originated from CDM projects. The carbon market in India 
primarily comprises CDM projects registered with CDM-EB, besides a few scattered 
voluntary carbon reduction projects. 
India was one of the early movers into the CDM market. CDM has been fairly suc-
cessful in promoting investment in sustainable projects here, and at present India is 
the second largest supplier of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) in the world after 
China, with 20.22% of the 380 million CERs issued till date (UNFCCC 2010a). India 
also has the second largest number of projects (488) registered with CDM-EB, out of 
a total 2 057 projects registered worldwide (UNFCCC 2010b). Distribution of these 
projects by type is given in Figure 1. Programmatic CDM has also started to pick up 
now. At present, six projects from India feature at the validation stage in the pro-
grammatic CDM pipeline (CD4CDM 2010) indicating that the country can move 
beyond a purely project-based approach. Some of the key factors that ensured suc-
cess of CDM in India were preparedness of the government to implement CDM; an 
increase in awareness related to climate change; financial benefit to the industries; 
and interest generated in academia. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of projects in India 
Source: UNFCCC (2009) 
 
The carbon market in India still continues to face problems. It is important to take 
note of key factors that the carbon markets continue to grapple with: 
• an inability to generate large-scale projects especially in renewable and 
energy efficiency; 
• low instances of technology transfer from Annex I countries (Seres & 
Haites 2008); 
• the inability of CDM to tackle the problems faced by small and medium 
enterprises, which are important in India; 
• the highly bureaucratic CDM process leading to delays in getting final ap-
proval; and 
• a lack of clarity on price expectations. 
It will be interesting to see whether the carbon markets will continue to have a role in 
promoting energy efficiency and, if they do, how will it interact with the PAT scheme. 
2.5 Enhanced energy efficiency and role of PAT 
The National Mission on Enhanced Energy Efficiency is the key focus for future 
government action on energy efficiency. The mission is in its final stage of prepara-
tion and has come up with innovative proposals to promote energy efficiency by 
making use of the markets.2 It is intended that the mission will be implemented from 
1 April 2010 (Energymanagertraining 2010). The plan outlines four key initiatives: 
                                                 
2  Government officials clearly specify, however, that this scheme is not about emissions but about 
energy saving certificates and their trading; it will be therefore important in the near future to see 
how and if such a scheme would link with existing ETS 
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• Introducing an energy saving certificate trading scheme to maximise the eco-
nomic efficiency by which large energy-intensive energy users will meet fu-
ture mandatory efficiency requirements; also referred to as PAT (see Box 1). 
• Providing partial risk guarantees to financial institutions for commercial lend-
ing to energy service companies (ESCOs). 
• Fostering market transformation in appliances, using the carbon market (pro-
grammatic CDM) as a financing vehicle. An initial target area is compact fluo-
rescent light bulbs.  
• Introducing fiscal signals, namely peak electricity price for industrial and 
commercial users, as a way of stimulating demand management initiatives. 
The PAT scheme (Box 1) makes reference to market-based mechanisms and pro-
motes energy efficiency by making use of energy saving certificates. The nine desig-
nated consumer industries will be given goals and consumers will try to reduce their 
energy intensity. On achieving efficiency beyond the target, consumers will be given 
tradable energy permits.  
An important point is that the PAT scheme is based on emission intensity and will 
trade energy saving certificates, which implies that technically it will not be an ETS. 
Rather it will be based on energy saving and will be in line with what are termed 
white certificates. Its implementation will, however, provide valuable lessons that can 
prove helpful in designing an ETS in future, notably a chance to get perspective on 
‘rebound effect’ or the extent of increase in consumption of energy services due to 
reduction in its price on account of undertaking energy efficiency measures (Green-
ing et al 2000; Oikonomou & Patel). It will also help gauge the preparedness of the 
Box 1: Perform Achieve and Trade (EMT-India, 2009) 
The PAT scheme is a market-based mechanism to enhance energy efficiency in 
‘designated consumers’ (large energy-intensive industries and facilities). The 
scheme includes the following project steps:  
• Goal setting: Set a specific energy consumption (SEC) target for each 
plant, depending on the level of energy intensity (specific energy consumed 
= energy use / output) of that plant. The target will specify by which per-
centage a plant has to improve its energy intensity from the base line value 
in a period of three years.  
• Reduction phase: Within a three-year period (2009-2012) the designated 
consumers try to reduce their energy intensity according to their target.  
• Trading phase: Those consumers who exceed their target SEC will be 
credited tradable energy permits. These permits can be sold to designated 
consumers who failed to meet their target. Designated consumers who fail to 
achieve their target have to compensate for this failure by buying permits. If 
they fail to do either of these, they may have to pay penalties.  
The energy consumption reported by designated consumers is based on an 
audit by any of the BEE accredited agencies. The BEE may verify correctness of 
reported values. 
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administrative structure in the country if downstream approach is to be undertaken. 
3. Creating an ETS 
ET was first used in North America in the early 1990s for reducing emissions of SOx 
and NOx. EU-ETS is now the largest mandatory ETS currently in operation. Even 
though experience with respect to ETS is fairly limited, a lot has been learned and 
improved upon in the recent past. Some lessons are discussed in detail below. For 
the convenience of compartmentalising various points related to ETS, Harrison et al 
(2008) identify three broad categories in which public policy issues related to ETS 
can be categorised. Based on Harrison et al (2009) these are: 
• creating the scheme (defining the design); 
• addressing competitive and leakage concerns (protecting the interests of 
participating entities); and  
• linking different schemes (ensuring uniformity across the board). 
Perhaps the most important (and basic) finding learnt from trading is that it can be 
both cost-effective and environmentally effective, particularly if it is of the cap-and-
trade variety (Harrison et al 2008). However, the single most important factor that 
can decide the fate of an ETS is how its design and constituent elements are defined 
(Tyler et al 2009). Whether ET will be included as a globally acceptable flexible 
instrument or not is dependent on outcome of these negotiations. This paper will 
therefore limit the discussion to the realm of national political dynamics and will 
focus on design elements alone.  
In designing an ETS, policy-makers must take into consideration not only the quanti-
tative but also the political, economic and regulatory aspects of its implementation 
into consideration. It is important to remember that the biggest ETS at the moment, 
EU-ETS, grew out of failure that was more political in nature. The two failures that 
paved ground for the EU-ETS were firstly, the failure of the EC to have an EU-wide 
carbon energy tax in the nineties, secondly, the EC was not successful in blocking the 
inclusion of trading as a flexible instrument in the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 (Convery 
2009; Christiansen & Wettestad 2003). After opposing ET, several unexpected de-
velopments made the EC embrace it within six month as a cornerstone of its climate 
change strategy. Such factors can also influence how a particular ETS interacts with 
other such schemes in future (Flachsland et al 2009). The USA has seen bills being 
tabled for approval by the House of Representatives and the Senate. These various 
bills are discussed briefly. At the moment all eyes are set on US domestic climate 
legislation that includes a Cap-and-Trade system. The future of the same is hugely 
dependent on political and economic developments in the USA. 
3.1 Point of regulation 
Systems can be ‘upstream’, wherein the trading of emissions takes place at the level 
of fuel providers such as mining industries, or ‘downstream’, where regulation occurs 
at the point of direct emissions such as manufacturing industries. The upstream 
approach will target fewer point sources thus bringing simplicity and ease of admini-
stration and monitoring, whereas a downstream approach can cover a higher num-
ber of emission sources, thus bringing liquidity and flexibility. It is advisable that the 
decision of coverage be based on local conditions and the capacity of the implement-
ing entity. 
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Currently the EU-ETS follows the downstream approach covering close to half of EU 
CO2 emissions by encompassing nearly 12 000 installations. It does not currently 
cover households, agriculture, or transport. Aviation has, however, been included in 
the second phase of EU-ETS (Euractiv 2009). The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initia-
tive (RGGI) only covers power plants at the moment (Litz 2009a) and is spread 
across 10 states in the US. The United Kingdom Emission Trading Scheme (UK-ETS) 
comprises direct and indirect emission sources. The American Clean Energy and 
Security Act (ACESA; also known as the Waxman-Markey Bill) in the US has pro-
posed to cover entities having emission above 25 Kt CO2e. US trading proposals 
have proposed to follow a hybrid approach including both downstream and up-
stream emitters. The New South Wales GHG Reduction Scheme and the Australian 
Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme include both direct and indirect scope 2 emis-
sions. 
The downstream approach has been dealt with quite satisfactorily in EU-ETS. Hav-
ing bigger and fewer industries made it easier to monitor and administer the scheme. 
India will need to be cautious in deciding the approach to be followed and industries 
to be included, as the country has a huge number of SMEs. 
3.2 GHG emission and sources  
The implementation of an ETS is not possible without GHG emissions data which is 
robust and consistent across years. Emissions data is necessary for a number of 
reasons, such as defining the starting point (baseline), deciding upon the number of 
allowances to be introduced into the system, defining the liability of defaulters, and 
deciding on the scope, target type as well as the sectors to be covered at different 
stages (Litz 2009b). Data of a single year may not be representative and so it is 
always preferred to have data available consistently from different years. The avail-
ability of data alone, however, cannot ensure the implementation of a system as 
dynamic as an ETS. 
All six GHGs currently covered by the Kyoto Protocol can be targeted by an ETS. In 
the first phase of the EU-ETS the scheme covered CO2 and provided opt-in for 
additional gases to its member states, whereas it has been proposed to include gases 
other than CO2 in the second phase. The RGGI covers direct CO2 emissions from 
power plants which run on fossil fuels. The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) and 
UK-ETS both covered all six Kyoto GHG. Both of these schemes are voluntary in 
nature. The ACESA proposes to cover all six gases.  
The availability of data decides whether all the six gases can be covered or not. India 
has covered CO2, CH4 and N2O emissions in its National Communications and so 
the data availability will be better for these gases. Effort though will be needed to 
measure remaining three gases as well so that in due course of time emissions of all 
the six gases can be accounted. 
3.3 Allocation or auction 
Whether the allowances are to be auctioned or are to be given for free is a conten-
tious issue. In the past, especially during the first phase, the allocation has typically 
been done by using a grandfathering approach or giving allowances for free on the 
basis of historical emissions. Arguments for free allocation of allowances can include 
past output per unit of emissions or compensation against adverse impact of ET on 
companies. Of late, auctioning is gaining support as it addresses the concern of 
‘windfall profits’ to some entities (Harrison et al 2008). Most member states though, 
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have an interest to support their national industry through allowance over allocation. 
This can be detrimental to the environmental effectiveness of the system (Clo 2009). 
An entity can also decide on when to undertake auction. As the market, especially in 
its formative years, is far from being perfect, it is preferable to have frequent auctions 
initially leading towards a single auction (Mandell 2005), thus reducing transaction 
costs and tackling the possibility of collusive behaviour amongst the bidders.  
Auctioning was limited to a maximum of 5% for Phase I and 10% for Phase II in EU-
ETS, but the actual level of auctioning for both phases has remained far below these 
levels (Harrison et al 2008). It has been proposed to have 100% auction by 2020. In 
RGGI, allowance allocations are left to each state, but all states agree to set aside 5% 
of their emissions budget to fund environmental benefits (Mace et al 2008). The EU-
ETS is continuously improving distribution of allowances in the system. Environ-
mental effectiveness and economic feasibility are to be considered while deciding 
how the allowances are dealt with.  
In United States of America (USA), ACESA, being one of the main pieces of climate 
legislation currently under consideration by Congress and which passed in the House 
of Representatives in June 2009, has specific allowances to aid both industry and 
consumers who could be affected by the introduction of the Bill. Significantly, be-
tween 2012 and 2025, 76% of the allowances are to be allocated towards consumer 
assistance schemes. This value then increases to 83% from 2025 to 2050 (Larsen & 
Heilmayr 2009). 
A mix of grandfathering and auctioning approach is preferable in initial stages. The 
managing entity can also hold back certain amount of allowances so as to control the 
price volatility particularly close to end of a phase. 
3.4 Timeframes 
A long-term market signal increases certainty, which is of importance to business. A 
long lead time can help the business to take important investment decisions that are 
synchronised with compliance needs. Also it reduces transaction costs and increases 
confidence. Timeframes decided after taking a stakeholder’s viewpoint into consid-
eration will enjoy the benefit of participant approval. Having lead time will provide 
space for rectifying any problem faced in the systems and increasing their efficacy. 
The same was seen in the phase I of EU-ETS wherein almost all the member states 
over allocated the allowances resulting in a steep price dip in the ETS. As a result 
they were more conservative when allocating the allowances for Phase 2. 
The first phase of EU-ETS from 2005-07 was a learning phase. Phase 2 (2008-12) 
coincides with the Kyoto Protocol’s commitment period. The EU is committed for 
Phase 3 from 2013-20 and has maintained a target of minimum 20% emission 
reduction below 1990 level by 2020 that can be increased to 30% if other developed 
countries take up ambitious targets after COP15 as well (UNFCCC 2010c). RGGI 
aims to stabilise emissions by 2014 and to reduce 13% below 1990 level by 2019 
(Litz 2009a). The America’s Climate Security Act (ACSA; Also known as the Lieber-
man-Warner Bill) in USA gives a signal to have 72% reduction below 2005 level by 
2050 using only caps (WRI 2009). 
There is still a lot of uncertainty around RGGI and the time-frame involved. EU-ETS, 
on the other hand, with experience behind it, generates much more confidence 
regarding its future. Long-term planning and market signals ensure that the entities 
participating in the scheme can manage their investment behaviour. On the flip-side, 
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the entities can delay the investment to make a rush to buy credits at the last minute 
and thus increasing the volatility in the overall market (Tyler et al 2009). 
3.5 Offsets 
Offsets and their usage is a policy issue which is of direct interest for developing 
countries as well. It is the prerogative of the governing entity to decide the extent of 
offsets to be allowed in the system, at what time and at what prices. As of now, CDM 
and JI brings in international offsets for usage in various ETS. The CDM is one of the 
first kinds of mechanisms to be implemented in developing countries and has an 
inbuilt mechanism wherein the CDM Executive Board (CDM-EB) meets and decides 
to take steps to improve CDM on a regular basis. A trading scheme can decide 
whether to include uptake of such credits or not. The points to be considered while 
deciding upon the role that offsets (Mace et al 2008) can play are relative stringency, 
differences in project eligibility, and the difference in any quantitative limit on usage 
of credits while linking the ETS. 
The offsets are not to be confused with allowances that are set aside. Offset are 
created outside the system under discussion and can be used for meeting the targets, 
whereas allowances are a permit for an entity to emit. The credits from sink projects 
are not eligible in EU-ETS whereas in USA they were acceptable under the Boxer-
Lieberman-Warner Bill. Offsets from domestic Afforestation and Reforestation (A&R) 
projects that meet the definitions for these activities established under the CDM are 
recognized by the New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme. The pro-
posals in USA vary in the type of offsets allowed and restriction on their usage (Sterk 
& Kruger 2009). Boxer-Lieberman-Warner allows 15% of compliance credits to be 
routed from domestic offsets schemes and 15% from international offsets. The 
ACESA makes way for two billion tons of offsets annually. It starts discounting inter-
national offsets after the first five years of the programme. All the major proposals in 
USA allow for potential usage of international offsets. Waxman-Markey allows for 
one billion tonnes of international offsets that can be increased to 1.5 billion tonnes 
under certain circumstances. Kerry Boxer has the provision to increase international 
offsets from 0.5 billion tonnes to up to 1.25 billion tonnes under certain circumstance 
(WRI 2009).  
A number of other issues need to be taken into consideration while designing an 
ETS. However, the points discussed above are the basic building blocks of any ET 
and so warrant a thorough analysis while applying them to local conditions.  
3.6 Key learnings 
Any ETS rests on mutually agreed reduction targets (Ott & Sachs 2000). Based on 
the above discussion, some of the key points to be considered while designing any 
new ETS are as follows: 
• The point of regulation needs be decided, based on the spread of industry and 
sectors that are major emitters of GHGs. If there are a large number of small en-
ergy consumers then it is not advisable to follow downstream approach. Similarly 
if the sector comprises a couple of very large fossil fuel providers then the ETS 
can get monopolised. 
• Based on availability of data, the gases to be covered need to be identified. It is 
preferable that the data for a number of years is available. 
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• In the initial stage of ET, a grandfathering approach is advisable. It can give free 
permits to large polluters, therefore it should give way to auction-based allocation 
so as to promote fair distribution, environmental integrity and circumvent wind-
fall profits. The process of auction can be further streamlined to avoid collusion. 
• It is preferable to have a long time-frame so that the market participants can take 
long-term decisions regarding their investments and take a longer planning hori-
zon as reference. 
• Demand of offsets can stimulate markets in developing countries. However, care 
must be taken, as the small markets can become price takers and they might lose 
control of pricing by linking to a big ETS. It will be interesting to see whether reg-
istries can help to nullify this threat by playing role of an intermediary system be-
tween a number of buyers and sellers. 
• It is desirable that a scheme has different phases so that the learning can be 
incorporated into the system at different points. 
When dealing with the design aspects, factors that make implementation of ET 
smooth should be focused upon. 
4. Implementing ET in India – Analysis 
Based on the discussion in section 2 on the NAPCC, it can be inferred that there is a 
strong political will in the country to tackle climate change. A successful carbon 
market developed by implementation of CDM projects also indicates that industry is 
willing to rise to the challenge of reducing GHG emissions. The pressure exerted by 
civil society and media coverage given to the issue of climate change in COP 15 
indicates a rising awareness on climate change issues in the country. The local envi-
ronment is supportive of actions being taken by government to tackle climate change 
and scrutiny will ensure that they are ambitious enough, as has been witnessed in the 
case of the National Solar Mission. It can therefore be said that the country is well 
placed to look at the possibility of implementing an ETS. 
There is a considerable interest both nationally and internationally in the proposed 
energy saving certificate scheme based on plant specific energy intensity. The BEE 
has given it priority by including it in the mission document, reflecting that the policy 
environment is in favour of such a scheme. India is also home to some of the most 
efficient plants in the world, especially in the cement sector. These sectors can lead 
the efforts to promote energy efficiency in the country, as well as globally. However 
given that Indian industry also comprises a large portion of small and medium enter-
prises, it will not be possible to incorporate these players at the moment. The admin-
istrative and regulatory structure needed to tap these players will need some imple-
mentation experience. Taking these factors into consideration the currently proposed 
PAT scheme focuses on a small number of target-specific industries. A combination 
of downstream and upstream regulation may be followed to include a varied scale of 
industry present in the country. 
With reference to implementing an ET in the country, the proposed PAT scheme by 
BEE will serve to give good learning experience to the nation. Alhough essentially 
based on the concept of white certificates, it will bring out key lessons for ET as a 
possible policy tool. The policy-makers may decide to make this scheme itself the 
flagship emission reduction scheme with appropriate modifications or undertake a 
parallel new scheme in the future that will specifically aim at reducing emissions. 
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However, the answers to this policy question will be influenced by developments 
made at the international negotiations as well as by the experience gained from PAT. 
If, however, we assume that PAT will be the flagship scheme and a vehicle to pro-
mote both energy efficiency and emission reduction at the same time, then the fol-
lowing challenges need to be taken care of: 
• It is imperative that the inventory of emissions in the country is comprehensive. 
As of now India communicates its emissions via National Communication. The 
Second National Communication is in the process of formulation. Data collection 
and its reporting will be needed at a much more frequent rate. 
• Legal frameworks on means to collect data, specifying enforceable entities and 
the penalties for not meeting the targets, should be clearly laid out. Incorporating 
a voluntary phase can help to streamline the operation in future. 
• A long-term signal is imperative so that the investment decisions get a favourable 
policy environment. 
• There needs to be clarity on the targets given to the players. 
• Sectors such as agriculture, forestry, building and transport that involve a huge 
number of point sources should not be included in the initial phase of any such 
scheme. Even in later stages these may to be included only after assessing the 
preparedness of the administrative machinery to handle these sectors that include 
a large number of emission sources. 
• A common registry is to be formulated that is accessible by all the parties con-
cerned. This will help in avoiding information asymmetry. 
• The approach towards allocating emission allowances is to be defined; however, 
an effort to move towards auctioning in the long run is advisable. 
• Trading rules should be legally embedded and the defaulters be made to pay 
penalties that can be used to further work upon the guiding objective of the 
scheme. For the same reason a robust regulatory mechanism needs to be put 
into place. 
Based on an initial study it can be inferred that the ETS could be one of the policy 
instruments that the government could implement in the future. The proposed PAT 
will give the necessary experience; however, if ETS is to be created in the near future 
in the country for undertaking emission reductions then further study is needed on 
following specific issues: 
• A detailed analysis of existing ETS and their design elements is needed to inter-
nalise the salient features. 
• The point of regulation, whether upstream or downstream, to factor in varying 
industry types in country, particularly the SME sector. 
• It is too early to comment on the possibility of linking PAT with existing schemes. 
In the near future this will demand closer scrutiny so as to increase the market 
demand.  
• Price concerns will need to be taken care of, in addition to meeting the stringent 
standards needed in some of the schemes. The possibilities of including a safety 
valve to stop the sale of credits if a certain minimum price is reached, and to auc-
tion more credits to bring down the price, also need exploration. 
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Regulating energy demand and 
consumption in South Africa: 
Is carbon pricing sufficient?  
Tebogo Makube 
Abstract 
Globally, attention is being given to fossil fuels and their impact on climate change, 
environment, health and related issues. The economic policy issue is that carbon 
emissions represent a negative environmental externality, and in many cases the 
value of emissions is not easily monetised. Achieving sustained levels of economic 
growth, whilst protecting the environment and fostering sustainable development 
involves a complex trade-off. South Africa is not spared from this trepidation, be-
cause of high environmental emission levels brought about by its heavy reliance on 
fossil fuels for economic growth and development. 
Economic instruments are touted as cost-effective in dealing with climate change 
challenges. However, this study contends that economic instruments are important 
but not sufficient in comprehensively dealing with the impacts of climate change. In 
order to reduce emissions and transit towards low carbon economy, South Africa 
needs a myriad policy interventions to alter the economic structure which in the first 
place gives rise to environmental emissions. There is a need to reduce overall energy 
intensity whilst extracting more productivity and consumer welfare per unit of energy 
consumed. This will involve policy choices and complex trade-offs to balance the 
interconnection between economic growth, climate change and sustainable devel-
opment. 
Keywords: cap and trade, carbon tax, monopoly, Pigouvian tax, competition, regulation 
  
 
1. Introduction 
Climate change and carbon pricing have been dominating energy and environmental 
policy debates in recent years. Globally, countries are aware of the risks and oppor-
tunities associated with greenhouse gas emissions and mitigation. Many have taken 
steps to reduce heavy reliance on fossil fuels, and adopt climate change policies. The 
debate on these policies is centred on strategies needed to migrate to a low carbon 
economy. This relates to the pricing of carbon emissions to the development of clean 
energy technologies.  
In analysing the efficacy of climate change policies and carbon emission strategies it 
is important to understand historical energy supply and demand patterns. It should 
be noted that energy supply and demand are influenced by government policies on 
matters such as the economic structure and growth patterns, socio-economic and, 
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infrastructure priorities, transport policies and spatial development patterns, amongst 
other things. Government regulation of the energy supply industry and the environ-
ment also affects the overall performance of the industry from a supply and demand 
perspective. 
This study examines the implications of implementing climate change policies and 
carbon emission strategies in South Africa. An attempt is made to answer complex 
political economy questions relating to climate change and mitigation instruments. In 
the carbon pricing policy debates, questions of political economy are embedded and 
involve tradeoffs. In dealing with climate change policy issues, public choice deci-
sions will have to be taken on: (i) strategies to reduce energy intensity whilst growing 
the economy; (ii) carbon pricing instruments (taxes, caps and incentives); and (iii) the 
policy mix required to migrate to a low carbon economy. Any policy choice on these 
matters will have economic, technological and behavioural implications. Nonethe-
less, countries are incorporating the risks and opportunities associated with the physi-
cal effects of climate change in their economic policy scenarios. A contention is made 
that in South Africa, for carbon pricing to have an intended effect, other policy as-
pects of the South African economy such as spatial development plans, industrial, 
housing and transport policies will have to be reviewed as well. These latter policies 
are an externality to energy demand.  
2. Methodology and purpose of the study 
This study investigates how carbon emission mitigation policies will economically 
affect energy demand and consumption in South Africa. It draws on economic the-
ory and on empirical studies with implementation of climate change policies and 
strategies. The study uses economic literature and data to illustrate the impact of 
abovementioned policies and to argue that, if not properly designed, carbon regula-
tion may be regressive. An assertion is made here that energy is a key input which 
turns factors of production into goods and services; it is also a key input into the 
standard of living for households (Nordhaus, 1980). The structure of the energy 
industry as well as the performance is analysed in order to understand the dynamics 
of regulatory procedures to must accompany the evolution of climate policies in 
South Africa.  
These factors are reviewed and inform the analysis of this study, which thoroughly 
reviews carbon tax as an economic instrument. It drills deeper on tax design issues, 
especially the revenue source, the tax base and rate, including distributional issues 
regarding the tax incidence. It also reviews in detail international trade concerns 
regarding the efficacy of carbon tax and its limitations, and uses the analysis gener-
ated from literature and data to recommend an exposition of novel paths for South 
Africa’s transition to a low carbon economy.  
3. Energy supply and demand in South Africa 
South Africa has an abundance of coal which is the main source of energy and 
accounts for 73% of total primary energy supply (TPES) (DME 2006). As Figure 1 
shows, oil accounts for 17% of the supply, and about 63 per cent (319 000 barrels 
per day) of the crude oil used in South Africa in 2006 was imported, the remainder 
generated from coal through a petrochemical programme (EIA 2007).  
Energy supply is critical for transport, agriculture, mining and industry. South Africa’s 
rising energy demand in recent years has been influenced, amongst other things, by 
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firm economic growth rates spanning five years until 2009, the emergence of a black 
middle class, increasing motor vehicle usage, infrastructure and property booms 
(National Treasury 2008). In essence, South Africa’s economic structure and land-
use patterns largely determine energy needs. It is, therefore, important to consider is 
the overall role of energy in the economy. In order to get an understanding of the 
importance of this role, a comparison of the relationship between TPES and gross 
domestic product (GDP) is made here. South Africa’s energy usage to produce one 
unit of GDP is compared with other selected developed and developing countries, as 
energy use relative to GDP is an important indicator for understanding the relation-
ship of energy consumption to economic growth in any country (Suehiro 2007). 
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Figure 1: Total primary energy supply in South Africa 
Source: DME (2006) 
Analysis of the relationship between TPES and GDP per capita from 1971 to 2007 in 
(China, Germany, India, Malaysia, Spain, South Korea and South Africa) is pre-
sented in Figure 2. TPES is expressed in tonnes of oil equivalent per capita and GDP 
per capita. There are striking differences in energy supply and economic growth in 
these countries. In South Korea, TPES per capita in 2007 was nine times higher than 
in 1971, and it more than doubled in Spain over the same period (OECD 2009). In 
the 1970s, South Korea had low TPES/per capita levels relative to South Africa but it 
has bypassed the latter by making its economy competitive and export-oriented, thus 
increasing its economic growth levels. In the 1970s, Malaysia also had low TPES per 
capita levels relative to South Africa but is quickly catching up. Germany has used its 
comparative advantage in technological development to increase its energy efficiency 
whilst at the same time increasing its economic growth. China and India have rapidly 
increased their GDP per capita levels over the years but TPES per capita remains 
relatively low (OECD 2009). In South Africa, the annual per capita energy consump-
tion is 2.51 tons of oil equivalents (toe) compared to a world average of 1.67 (Coo-
per 2007; OECD 2009). The next section measures energy intensity in South Africa 
in relation to other countries. 
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Figure 2: TPES per capita in tons of oil equivalent versus GDP per capita  
(1971-2007) 
Source: Cooper (2007); OECD (2009); own calculations 
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Figure 3: Energy intensity versus economic growth rates (1991-2006)  
Source: Cooper (2007); OECD (2009); own calculations 
A comparison of energy intensity per thousand of dollars of GDP and economic 
growth rates in China, Germany, India, Malaysia, Spain, South Korea and South 
Africa from 1991 to 2006 is reflected in Figure 3. This is an assessment of the 
changes in the ratio of energy use to GDP. The comparison shows that the South 
African economy is highly energy-intensive relative to the others. What is striking is 
that over the years these other countries have been able to grow their economies 
using less energy. China is rapidly growing its economy but also intensifying its en-
ergy use. High energy-intensity levels in South Africa are a result of mining, primary 
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minerals beneficiation companies, a synthetic fuels industry and electricity generation 
which is dominated by coal-fired power stations (DME 2006). Cheap energy policies 
may once have been sensible to stimulate industrial development in South Africa but 
now there is a legacy of energy inefficiency which imposes economic, social and 
environmental harm. The situation in a way confirms the assertion made by Fine and 
Rustomjee (2006) that South Africa’s economy is trapped in the minerals-energy 
complex (MEC). According to them the MEC conundrum has been used as a form of 
economic accumulation in South Africa. 
There is no doubt that economic growth is inextricably linked to energy. Economists 
argue that GDP and other economic indictors are important measures of the per-
formance economy over time. However, these indicators are not sufficient measures 
of societal wellbeing or welfare, because environmental emissions impose transaction 
costs to society which often are not monetised (Tietenberg 2001). Besides high 
energy intensity, South Africa has high carbon emissions which are not fully costed. 
Unwanted by-products or negative externalities such as environmental pollution are 
in many countries not measured. Firms fail to take into account full economic and 
social costs of their environmental emissions which tend to be greater than socially 
efficient levels (Perman et al 2003).  
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 2009) esti-
mates that in 2005 South Africa’s carbon emissions per capita were 2.35 mtoe and 
energy intensity was 2.8 mtoe. South Africa’s carbon emissions per capita of GDP 
are considerably higher than in most developed countries (e.g. Germany, Spain and 
South Korea) and other developing countries (e.g. India and Malaysia) (see Figure 
4). Part of the reason for this is that ‘the petrochemical programmes is at least sixty 
per cent more greenhouse gas intensive than conventional oil refining’ (Copans 
2008: 1).  
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Figure 4: Carbon emissions and economic growth (1980-2006) 
Source: Nakata and Matsumoto (2008); OECD (2009); own calculations 
Although South Africa is still classified as a developing, or ‘non-Annex I’, country in 
terms of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto 
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Protocol), its carbon emissions per capita of GDP are considerably higher than other 
countries. This puts the country increasingly under pressure to take proactive action 
to mitigate environmental emissions. Another issue to consider is that South Africa’s 
heavy dependence on fossil fuels has both internal and external economic costs 
because part of the energy supply is imported. This necessitates serious political, 
economic and regulatory considerations. In responding to conundrum and broadly 
dealing with climate change challenges, the South African government approved the 
Long-Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS) process in 2007. The purpose of LTMS was 
to ‘outline different scenarios of mitigation action, to inform long-term national policy 
and to provide a solid basis for South Africa’s position in multi-lateral climate nego-
tiations on a post-2012 climate regime’ (DEAT: 2007:1). Realising the objectives of 
LTMS require critical thinking on a variety of policies and instruments. The next 
section discusses policy instruments which South Africa must consider in dealing with 
climate change and environmental regulation challenges. 
4. Economic instruments for mitigating against carbon emissions  
Arthur Cecil Pigou (1877-1953) argued that environmental degradation and resource 
depletion generate a social cost that should be dealt with by the government through 
taxes and not by markets. Pigou saw taxes and regulations as the best way to pro-
mote economic efficiency in the presence of spillover costs (Pigou 1960). Environ-
mental taxes also classified as Pigouvian taxes became an orthodox approach to 
internalise negative externalities into the price system (Herber & Raga 1995). The 
fervour for environmental taxes also gained momentum with the double dividend 
hypothesis, meaning that revenues from carbon taxes can be used to cut other taxes. 
The first dividend will be realised when an improvement in environmental quality is 
secured and the second dividend will be realised when there are gains in economic 
efficiency which can lead to employment opportunities, all other things being equal. 
In essence, double dividend asserts that a carbon tax reform does not only contribute 
to sustainable environment but also increases non-environmental welfare (Morden 
2009).  
The rationality for environmental taxes or Pigouvian taxes was challenged by Ronald 
Coase (Lee & Sanger, 2008). The Coase theorem postulates that there is no need for 
government intervention because if parties in the transaction, that is, the polluter and 
the victim, are properly organised they can agree on the settlement cost for environ-
mental damage (Lee & Sanger 2008). Coase argued that for as long as property 
rights are defined and allocated, there is no need for a command-and-control system 
of regulation. His point is that the market fails to fix the environmental problems 
because no one or both parties has the property rights. 
The Coase theorem assumes that Pigovian taxes are inefficient. He postulates that ‘in 
the absence of taxes and regulations, (suppliers and bystanders) will find the most 
efficient of all possible solutions and agree to a system of reimbursements or bribes 
that will make them both better off. The most efficient outcome could be either a 
cutback in production or some scheme for eliminating or reducing (the harmful 
effects)’ (Landsburg 2002: 456). However, the Coase theorem is limited in dealing 
with people without property rights but are affected by environmental externalities. In 
such a situation, government has a role to correct the market failure. It should be 
noted that pricing carbon either through taxes, tradable permits or regulation means 
that society will bear the social costs of resource utilisation. A consideration should be 
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made that any form of regulatory model maximises social benefits. The next section 
discusses policy issues and instruments to be considered in applying carbon prices. 
4.1  Pricing carbon: choice of policy instruments 
According to Lee and Sanger (2008) energy sources upon which carbon prices are 
imposed are both inputs into the production of goods and services and a final prod-
uct purchased by consumers. This presupposes that there must be a distinction be-
tween the direct and indirect effects of carbon taxes. This distinction is important for 
analysing the economic effects of a carbon tax and its effectiveness as a vehicle of 
environmental policy. 
This consideration is part of several policy issues that are at the core of climate 
change mitigation strategies. One key policy issue is whether a country prefers to 
have a system with direct control over price (a tax) or with indirect control over price 
(cap and trade). A carbon tax as an economic instrument puts a price tag on emis-
sions; cap-and-trade sets a quantity target. A policy issue is to consider the effect of 
carbon prices on coal-reliant countries such as South Africa and this relates to indus-
tries’ competitiveness, and distributional consequences. Grainger and Kolstad (2009) 
assert that the distributional effect on consumers arises because a carbon tax can be 
applied to consumers as well as industry, but a cap and trade system can only be 
applied to industry. They also argue that cap and trade has typically been applied at 
the point of emissions, targeting large emitters due to administrative complexities 
whilst a pure carbon tax offers certainty of price. Cap and trade is a form of ration-
ing; economic literature teaches that in a rationed market, predictable behaviours, 
such as rent-seeking, generally emerge. Any choice of an economic instrument has to 
pass a test of credibility and reliability, objectivity, transparency and simplicity. Car-
bon tax has an advantage over other economic instruments because it is designed on 
the basis of a existing tax collection system and administrative simplicity.  
4.2  Carbon tax: design and targeting issues 
Herber and Raga (1995) contend that since fossil fuels do not emit carbon in their 
natural state, a carbon tax on the stocks of such fuels would be meaningless. They 
propose that a tax should take the form of an excise tax levied upon carbon emis-
sions which result from the use of such fuels to produce energy for production and 
consumption purposes. However, they acknowledge that it is administratively difficult 
to levy an excise duty at the actual time of environmental emissions. Part of good tax 
design is to ensure that the tax system is transparent, meaning that the underlying 
purpose and principles behind the design of a carbon tax should be clearly identified: 
it should be clear what is being taxed, who is liable, and how their liability is calcu-
lated. Alternative methods of imposing a carbon tax as recommended by Herber and 
Raga include: ‘a) a primary carbon tax on fossil fuels when they are mined or im-
ported into a nation, or (b) a final carbon tax when fossil fuels are sold to industry 
and households for production and consumption purposes.’ Public finance literature 
teaches that when a tax is imposed on a final product, its incidence is the same 
whether the tax is levied on the consumer or on the seller. The same literature 
teaches that in designing any tax system, the source of revenue, base and rate should 
be specified and transparent. Herber and Raga further propose that for environ-
mental tax, ‘the base should be defined in specific rather than ad valorem terms since 
it is the physical amount of fuel used to produce energy that is linked to carbon 
emissions, not the pre-tax price of the fuel’.  
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In determining carbon tax rates, Lee and Sanger (2008) propose that differential 
marginal tax rates should be imposed upon the various fossil fuels based on the 
various amounts of carbon per unit of energy production they emi. They are of the 
view that carbon taxes should be imposed solely upon fossil fuels and not upon 
alternative sources of energy which do not emit carbon. In designing a carbon tax, it 
should be noted that coal emits 25.1, oil 20.3, and natural gas 14.5 grams of carbon 
per 1000 British Thermal Units (BTUs) of energy production (EIA 2007). This shows 
that coal has the largest carbon emissions per unit of heat energy of any of the fossil 
fuels; as such the carbon tax rate should be highest on coal, next-highest on oil, and 
lowest on natural gas in accordance with the above mentioned carbon intensity ratios 
(Herber & Raga 1995). Where similar substitute or alternative energy sources are 
taxed differently, substantial behavioural changes can be expected when the tax rate 
is significant, on coal for instance. Similarly, a pure carbon tax, which taxes coal 
more heavily than any other source of energy, will be disproportionately burdensome 
on South Africa. 
The implementation of a carbon tax is expected to generate macroeconomic effects 
(employment, output and changes in the price level), distributional effects (changes 
in the distribution of income and of the tax burden), and environmental effects (the 
primary goal being a reduction in carbon emissions, and the secondary objective, 
and a reduction in overall energy consumption reduction in greenhouse gas emis-
sions) (Lee & Sanger, 2008). In the case of energy-intensive companies, fossil-based 
energy sources are important production factors and the carbon tax will alter the 
relative price of these inputs. Depending on the economic and technological viability 
of non-fossil fuels, there is the potential for input substitution in the production proc-
ess as well as shifting of the tax through the price mechanism (Farzin & Kort 2000). 
To illustrate the economic transmission mechanism of carbon prices, Figure 5 shows 
that the equilibrium point is set at point E, where demand and supply functions 
intersect. The challenge is that at point E, the industry also imposes a huge negative 
environmental externality on society as shown by the marginal social cost (MSC) 
function lying above the industry supply or marginal private cost (MPC1) function. In 
this regard, the size of the negative environmental externality is the distance EF in 
unit terms, or the triangle EFG. This indicates the level of environmental emissions.  
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Figure 5: Economic impact of environmental regulation 
Source: Adapted from Sloman (2000) 
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By introducing new environmental regulations to curb emissions, Figure 5 shows that 
the private cost of production will rise by EG, shifting the industry supply function 
from S1 to S2. Whilst this will eliminate the economic cost of emissions, at the initial 
equilibrium point E there will be excess demand for services equal to Q2–Q1. This 
will raise prices and lower quantity, until the new equilibrium at point G is reached. 
The net effect of a cut back in output to Q2 will be job losses as production declines, 
coupled to a rise in the price to P2. The economic impact will also depend on the 
price elasticity of demand and marginal rate of substitution between factors of pro-
duction. This scenario becomes worse if the market is dominated by monopolies. 
The next section discusses market structure and the efficacy of carbon taxes. 
4.3  Market structure, economic regulation and carbon taxes 
The shifting of tax burdens through prices is more prevalent in a market structure that 
is non-competitive and in such a case the market structure will have to be regulated. 
The energy industry, however, is more closely regulated than many other industries 
because of the unique characteristics surrounding energy supply and delivery. Elec-
tricity, natural gas distribution and transmission are considered to be natural mo-
nopolies. Natural monopolies include infrastructure industries that are capital-
intensive and offer vital services. It is not economically worthwhile to create competi-
tion in such a market structure; this is due, in part to the inefficiency of having dupli-
cate facilities (Herber & Raga 1995). Since there is a significant economic barrier to 
entry because of sunk costs incurred whilst constructing the infrastructure, a firm in a 
natural monopoly position could price its products and services significantly above 
costs.  
For reasons mentioned above, carbon regulation may be regressive for poor house-
holds if not properly designed and regulated. The degree of ‘regressivity’ will vary 
depending upon the budgetary proportions of energy consumption among house-
holds. However, the impact of taxation on different households will require an in-
depth analysis of the economic incidence of taxes and the distributional aspect of 
government spending. According to Herber and Raga (1995), for an optimal reduc-
tion in environmental emissions, carbon taxes should reflect the price elasticity of 
demand for each fossil fuel, the cross-price elasticity of demand between different 
fossil fuels, and the cross-price elasticity of demand between fossil fuels and non-
fossil fuels. Herber and Raga’s postulation is that a pure carbon tax levied only upon 
fossil fuels would encourage the substitution of non-carbon-emitting energy sources 
by making them relatively cheaper than fossil fuels.  
Firms that exercise market power determine their own prices. Market power domi-
nance is prevalent in the energy sector which is dominated by monopolies and oli-
gopolies. In such a market structure, independent economic regulators are needed to 
limit market dominance, cap prices and protect consumer welfare. Economics litera-
ture teaches that in a competitive environment profits will generally be maximised 
where marginal revenue equals marginal cost: MR = MC. However, monopolies are 
price-setters with downward sloping demand curves. Figure 6 shows that monopolies 
use their market power to set prices above the marginal costs: P>MC. This leads to a 
dead weight loss to the consumer (the shaded area formed by the MC curve and the 
lines from Pm and Qm). This is a loss from the total economic surplus (Sloman 2000).  
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Figure 6: Monopolistic price determination structure 
Competitiveness concerns are the main barrier to adopting more ambitious domestic 
carbon policies. Economic theory teaches that in a market structure dominated by 
monopolies and oligopolies, economic agents liable for paying a tax do not always 
end up bearing the burden of that tax because of the possibility of shifting the tax to 
others. To avoid this tax incidence from occurring, there must be proper regulatory 
frameworks and institutions to make sure that the cost of environmental emissions 
does not end up being paid by a final consumer. The industrial structure, conduct 
and behaviour must be robustly monitored as well. 
All other things being equal, a carbon tax will yield an optimal outcome in a competi-
tive market where the social marginal benefit of the tax is equal to the social marginal 
damage (Esoula 2007). However, under imperfect competition, like monopoly and 
oligopoly, there is no guarantee carbon taxes will yield optimal returns, for reasons 
mentioned above. In the absence of competition, economic regulation is often ap-
plied as a substitute for competition. It will be important to consider the range of 
possible regulatory options available. In recent years, price cap regulation has be-
come established as the preferred approach to economic regulation in many coun-
tries (including other regulated industries in South Africa). Like the main alternative 
approach – rate of return regulation – price cap regulation is intended to prevent 
monopolists from exploiting market power. In addition, it also aims to provide regu-
lated firms with incentives to improve cost efficiency, to make efficient investment 
decisions and, where appropriate, to generate increased demand. 
Under price cap regulation, the maximum price that the firm can charge each year is 
typically expressed by a formula such as: 
Pt = (1 + CPI – X) Pt-1 
where Pt is the maximum price that the firm can charge in year t, CPI is the change 
in the consumer price index, and X is a factor (sometimes, rather misleadingly, called 
an ‘efficiency factor’) that leads to a real increase or decrease in prices over time. The 
X factor may be the same for each year in a price control period, or different values 
of X can be set for specific years. Price cap regulation can be used as an instrument 
to create incentives for firms to invest in alternative or clean energy technologies. 
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The next section discusses the application of carbon taxes at an international level 
and implications for South Africa. 
4.4  Carbon tax and international trade 
Carbon emissions vary considerably across nations in both absolute and per capita 
terms, but overall the industrial nations and some developing nations (China, India 
and South Africa, amongst others) are the primary polluters (OECD 2009). Through 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) or Kyoto 
Protocol adopted in 1997, participating nations agreed to set binding greenhouse gas 
emission targets for 37 industrialised nations and the European community. On 
average, countries party to the Kyoto Protocol committed to reduce GHG emissions 
by five percent below 1990 levels over the first commitment period, which lasts from 
2008 to 2012 (OECD 2009). The Kyoto agreement includes several mechanisms 
designed to give the industrialised nations flexibility in meeting their targets.  
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) allow 
nations to fund and receive emission reductions credit for actions taken in countries 
with less expensive mitigation options. Figure 7 shows that countries with high car-
bon emissions (country D in 2000 and countries B, C and D in 2010) can buy per-
mits to emit carbon dioxide from countries with surpluses thereby creating a carbon 
trading market. Countries with surpluses can either sell them or bank such carbon 
credits (Perman et al 2003). 
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Figure 7: Example of carbon trading 
Source: Adopted from Perman et al (2003) 
One of the criticisms of the Kyoto Protocol is that it did not set mandatory global 
carbon abatement targets; it also failed to adopt specific policy instruments such as a 
carbon tax to reduce global warming. Further, the refusal by the United States to 
commit itself to a mandatory carbon abatement target and to enact comparable taxes 
diminished prospects of a global carbon tax (Farzin & Kort, 2000). The carbon tax is 
a market-based, economic-incentive of helping to attain the goals of Kyoto protocol 
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but without global harmonisation no country will be motivated to impose a carbon 
tax alone. This means that even if South Africa can take unilateral action on carbon 
tax, this is largely going to be irrelevant in global terms. For export markets this 
option will create trade distortions and induce free-rider behaviour by trading part-
ners who do not pay such a tax. For carbon tax to be effective at an international 
level, it will require ratification and the degree of interstate harmonisation of tax 
bases and rates. The next section discusses policy options that South Africa needs to 
consider for it to migrate to a low carbon economy. 
5. Options to migrate to a low carbon economy: is carbon tax suffi-
cient? 
Challenges faced by South Africa in addressing challenges posed by carbon emis-
sions include uncertainty about the form and cost of regulation, and economic ef-
fects. The LTSM which was adopted and published by government in 2007 sets out 
ambitious environmental objectives and makes combating climate change one of the 
main priorities for the government. This study has argued that carbon emissions 
represent a negative environmental externality. In many cases the value of carbon 
emissions is not easily monetised, since there is no market value currently for carbon 
emissions across all sectors of the economy. 
There are currently several proposals being considered in South Africa for a national 
climate change policy. There are proposals for a national tax on carbon, while other 
proposed policies rely on a cap and trade strategies for limiting and reducing carbon 
emissions. Like a carbon tax (pricing), a cap and trade strategy (quotas) has the 
effect of inducing a price on carbon.  
This study has analysed the efficacy of these policy instruments and has argued that 
on their own these instruments are important but not sufficient for a country like 
South Africa. An assertion was made that in a monopolistic market structure, the 
propensity to pass through the costs of compliance with environmental regulations is 
very high. The burden is ultimately borne by consumers, or the firm. Another critical 
consideration this study advocates is that environmental regulations should make 
sure that the burden of the limiting environmental emissions does not fall dispropor-
tionately on one income or consumer group. 
In South Africa, policy instruments for mitigation against environmental emissions 
should be complemented by other energy conservation and economic policy strate-
gies. South Africa must consider a myriad of policies to redirect the overall economic 
trajectory and limit its dependence on fossil fuels. This must be linked to the issues of 
energy equality and sustainability (Büscher 2009). This an important policy chal-
lenge, especially in the context of shrinking energy resources coupled with rising 
prices.  
The adoption of energy policies and economic choices to migrate to a low carbon 
economy is a complex and sensitive matter which involves trade-offs. Carbon taxes 
are important but insufficient in achieving this policy objective. It is important to 
consider the overall role of energy in the economy. Because energy demand is a 
derived demand, it should be treated as a premier resource or primary feeder for 
economic growth, spatial development plans, human settlements, public transport, 
and sustainable communities (see Figure 8). Investments in the abovementioned 
sectors must be informed by energy considerations which should be priced accord-
ingly as well. 
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Figure 8: The economic role of energy 
There is no doubt that carbon taxes have an important role to play in abating envi-
ronmental emissions, but it should be noted that the optimal tax that maximises 
welfare depends on the market structure of the polluting output (Esoula 2007). Ac-
companying taxes is a need to thoroughly examine the nature, determinants and 
typical values of pollutants. As a result, it is best to implement carbon taxes together 
with other appropriate policies and programmes which promote energy efficiency 
and emission reductions. 
6. Conclusion 
To deal effectively with climate change in South Africa, this study argues, a tax in-
strument is the most efficient way to allocate a price to carbon, but that is not suffi-
cient. Given the scale and weight of the effort required, economic efficiency must be 
given significant weighting in designing and choosing economic instruments. South 
Africa needs innovative solutions that increase overall energy and economic effi-
ciency by reducing energy intensity and extracting more productivity and consumer 
welfare per joule of energy consumed. This means that integrated resource plans for 
housing, agriculture, transport, industries and energy should not be isolated from 
land-use patterns. Land-use policies should also consider the close juxtaposition of 
workplace and residence, and should promote sustainable development patterns. It is 
in this regard that this study recommends that energy should be at the centre stage of 
spatial developments, failing which South Africa will be hardest hit by new global 
environmental regulations debated and adopted in Copenhagen in 2009. Intergov-
ernmental coordination and business partnerships are critical in ensuring that there 
are synergies between energy policies, economic policies and spatial development 
plans. New methods for dealing with the critical challenges of economic growth and 
spatial development plans are needed. This will require innovative thinking for 
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changing the economic structure and improving efficiencies of the South African 
economy 
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THEME 5: CARBON TAX VERSUS 
EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEMES 
A comparison of emissions trading and 
carbon taxation as carbon mitigation 
options for South Africa 
Michael Goldblatt 
Abstract 
There is consensus that carbon pricing is required to support a lower carbon pathway 
for South Africa. However, there remains debate on the most appropriate mecha-
nism to introduce such a price. Although theoretically similar under restrictive as-
sumptions, carbon taxes and emissions trading have very different environmental 
and economic implications in practice. The well understood differences between 
price and quantity instruments remain fundamental but there are other important 
criteria when comparing instruments. On the basis of a broad set of public policy 
criteria, carbon taxation appears to have many merits for a middle income develop-
ing country. Fundamental considerations are the relative political credibility, welfare 
impacts and long term stability of either instrument. The concentrated market struc-
ture of the South African energy sector raises further concerns about the ability to 
construct a competitive and efficient emissions trading market and supports taxation 
as the more appropriate instrument. A comparison of the instruments should not, 
however, be treated as a simplistic polarity and there are mechanisms that can be 
used to modify either instrument. The evaluation of the instruments in South African 
circumstances suggests potential criteria for evaluation and instrument modifications 
which may also be useful for other developing countries.  
Keyw ords: carbon tax; emissions trading; regulatory options; climate mitigation 
 
1. Introduction  
While South Africa has not committed to any binding emissions target, the Cabinet 
(RSA 2008) has outlined an intended future emission trajectory for the country. 
Under this trajectory greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions would grow till 2020, plateau 
from 2020-2025 and begin to decline in absolute terms from 2030-2035 (DEAT 
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2009a). The trajectory has, as yet, not been incorporated into formal government 
policy or legislation. Given historic trends in emissions this emissions pathway re-
quires significant changes to both demand behaviour and energy supply over the 
next two decades.  
There is a sound argument that energy and carbon pricing measures will be required 
to effect the needed change in South Africa’s emissions pathway. The wide-ranging 
adjustments required in consumption, production technologies and energy supply 
are likely to be best promoted through economy-wide price signals rather than spe-
cific sector by sector regulatory control (Fullerton et al 2008). At the same time, it is 
unlikely that pricing policies alone will be sufficient and a range of other measures 
will need to be utilised. 
The National Treasury in South Africa is leading the development of economic 
instruments to manage GHG emissions, with the primary medium-term focus being 
the introduction of a carbon tax of some kind. There is no full carbon tax policy yet, 
and in the interim the National Treasury has been developing a set of environmen-
tally-related taxes and tax incentives which largely effect the energy sector. A number 
of these have many of the elements of a carbon tax though none are true carbon 
taxes (National Treasury 2008). 
Scope and structure of the paper 
This paper outlines the key carbon pricing instruments available to national govern-
ment in South Africa and compares them on a number of public policy criteria. In 
particular, the paper compares carbon taxes and emissions trading on theoretical and 
practical grounds based on a review of international literature and experience. There 
is not a similar depth of experience or policy analysis with GHG regulation in devel-
oping countries as with developed countries. There may well be important differ-
ences between countries at different development stages in the appropriate type of 
instrument and in the application of policy choices, and this paper also helps to 
outline some of these distinctions. It should be noted here that the paper generally 
refers to ‘carbon’ as a shorthand for GHGs. For the most part, the measures under 
consideration relate to carbon dioxide emission reductions with a lesser focus on the 
other GHGs of concern. 
2. Description of policy options 
There are a wide range of policy measures which can be used for GHG emission 
reductions. These measures include quantified limits on emissions, carbon taxes, 
energy efficiency standards on vehicles and building stock, renewable energy subsi-
dies, and research and development support for clean technology sectors. There is, 
however, increasing acceptance that a major plank in the mitigation regulatory struc-
ture, will be economic instruments which create a price of GHG emissions within the 
economy. There appears to be broad consensus that without internalising the exter-
nal social costs of emissions there is unlikely to be the required short, medium and 
long term responses required by consumers and producers to significantly alter the 
emissions profile of the economy (see for example, IMF 2008; Nordhaus 2007; CBO 
2008, Stern 2007).  
Economic instruments are typically divided into the two distinct options of taxes or 
emissions trading:  
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 Carbon taxes are a ‘price instrument’ which directly establishes a price on 
GHG emissions. Emitters therefore face the full price of their emissions and 
take this into account in investment and output decisions. 
 Emissions trading is a ‘quantity instrument’ which directly establishes an 
emissions quantity through a cap on emissions imposed on emitters. Emis-
sions trading allows for emitters to trade their emission allowances and hence 
indirectly establishes a price on GHG emissions.  
These two mechanisms can be shown to be economically equivalent under a rela-
tively restrictive set of assumptions – both leading to emissions taking place at least 
cost to the economy. Conceptually, emitters facing a carbon tax will reduce emis-
sions up to the point where marginal GHG abatement is less costly than the tax. 
Therefore marginal costs of emissions will be equivalent through the economy and 
equal to the emissions tax rate. Emitters under an emissions trading scheme will 
reduce their own emissions as long as these are lower than the prevailing market 
price for emissions. Under competitive conditions, this will lead to the situation where 
the marginal costs of emissions will be equivalent throughout the economy and 
hence economically efficient.  
The two approaches would lead to an equivalent outcome if the tax rate was set at 
such a point that it led to the same abatement level as would be set under the emis-
sions trading scheme. If the restrictive assumptions are not met, the equivalence 
between the approaches no longer remains and this gives rise to some of the consid-
erable policy debate over the instruments. 
Prices versus quantities 
Regulation of GHG emissions is a special case of the more general problem of pollu-
tion control. There has been substantial consideration of the application of economic 
instruments to pollution and in particular to the relative merits of price (tax) versus 
quantity (tradable permits) schemes (see Baumol & Oates 1988; Norregard & Rep-
pelin-Hill, 2000). A key area finding in economic analysis is that uncertainty about 
the abatement costs and benefits introduces important asymmetries between the two 
instruments. These were first formalised by Weitzman (1974) and his analysis forms 
the basis for much of the evaluation of these options subsequently. His results are 
summarised in the Stern Report (2007) which explains that: 
 Price instruments are preferable where the benefits of making further reduc-
tions in pollution (i.e. the marginal benefits of abatement) change less with 
the level of pollution than the costs of delivering these reductions (i.e. the 
marginal costs of abatement). In economic terms, prices are preferred when 
the marginal damage curve is flat relative to the marginal abatement cost 
curve, as emissions increase. 
 Quantity controls are preferable, conversely, where the benefits of further 
reductions increase more steeply with the level of pollution than do the costs 
of emission reductions. 
Although this analysis greatly advances the understanding of when and how to apply 
different instruments it is not complete and still relies on a number of assumptions. 
One particular issue is whether this result changes from the short term, where capital 
stock and technology is fixed, to the long term, where adjustments in capital stock 
can be made. This difference is important in the case of climate change. 
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Unfortunately, not all policy analysts agree on the policy implications flowing from 
the economic literature – one grouping arguing that the theory suggests that quantity 
approaches are to be preferred since the potential impacts and costs of climate 
change are likely to be rapidly increasing and may have unforeseen catastrophic 
consequences. Others, such as Nordhaus, take a different policy message from the 
uncertainty inherent in climate change policy development. Nordhaus (2007)notes 
that  
the structure of the costs and damages in global warming gives a strong pre-
sumption to price-type approaches. The reason is that the benefits are related 
to the stock of GHGs, while the costs are related to the flow of emissions. This 
implies that the marginal costs of emissions reductions are highly sensitive to 
the level of reductions, while the marginal benefits of emissions reductions are 
close to independent of the current level of emissions reductions (Pizer 1999; 
Hoel & Karp 2001). This combination means that emissions fees or taxes are 
likely to be much more efficient than quantitative standards or tradable quotas 
when there is considerable uncertainty.’  
The divergence between policy analysts is demonstrated by a recent study under-
taken by the Government Accountability Office (GAO 2008) in the US. The GAO 
was asked by the US Congress to elicit the opinions of experts in the field of climate 
change economics on actions the Congress might consider to address climate change 
and what is known about the potential benefits, costs, and related uncertainties of 
these actions. The GAO reported that  
all of the economists on the panel agreed that the Congress should consider es-
tablishing a price on GHG emissions using a market-based mechanism but ex-
pressed differing views on the type of mechanism and its stringency. In addi-
tion, a majority of panelists recommended implementing a portfolio of actions, 
including at least one complementary policy action in areas such as research 
and development, adaptation, or international negotiations and assistance. In 
terms of the mechanism for establishing a price, 8 panelists preferred a cap-
and-trade system with the government having the ability to use a cost control 
mechanism (called a safety valve) if the price of permits exceeds certain levels, 
7 preferred a tax on emissions, and 3 preferred a cap-and-trade system without 
the safety valve. 
Thus one can see that the policy debate, at least amongst the US economic policy 
community, is relatively evenly divided – with some small tendency to quantity-
based instruments. 
Combinations of instruments 
The polar distinction between price and quantity mechanisms excludes some pro-
posed approaches which combine elements of both instruments. The options are also 
not mutually exclusive and can co-exist in an economy, addressing different sectors, 
or even overlapping. Although these mixed approaches are noted, for the purposes 
of helping to clarify the policy approaches most appropriate to South Africa there 
remains value in first considering tax and trading as opposing instruments, to high-
light their distinguishing positive and negative features. The comparative evaluation 
of the two instruments also exposes the respective limitations of the options and 
implicitly therefore provides some insights into modifications that could improve the 
application of either. 
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3. Comparison of policy options 
In addition to the distinction created by imperfect information there are additional 
distinguishing factors between the instruments. This section of the paper compares 
the two instruments using a set of public policy criteria that includes, but is broader 
than, the basic price-versus-quantities distinction. 
3.1 Criteria for comparison of policy options 
A wide range of criteria have been used by various analysts to compare carbon taxes 
with emissions trading. Common amongst these include the following public policy 
considerations (see, for example, Aldy et al 2008; GAO 2008; IMF 2008): 
 Economic efficiency: the extent to which net social benefits are maximised. 
 Administrative complexity and cost: the administrative capacity, cost and 
regulatory effort required to implement the policy . 
 Relationship to international GHG reduction policies: the potential ability of 
the policy to interact with GHG reduction regimes in other countries or re-
gions.  
 Certainty of result: the predictability of the impacts of the policy by the regu-
lator, such as the likely impact on economic activity and on the behavioural 
responses by firms and consumers. 
 Environmental effectiveness: the extent to which the policy achieves its envi-
ronmental (emission reduction) objectives.  
 Price volatility: the certainty and stability of the market signals that are pro-
vided to firms and households. 
 Coverage and exemptions: the degree to which the instrument affects all 
emissions in the economy. 
 Public finance considerations: the extent of revenue raised by the instrument, 
the ease of revenue raising, stability of revenue raised and other issues re-
lated to the impact of the policy on the public fiscus. 
 Welfare impacts: how the benefits and costs of the policy are distributed 
across different income groups as well as their distribution across economic 
sectors and areas of the country. 
Other considerations that have been raised include the political feasibility of the 
policy; the impact on technology development and deployment, the degree to which 
rent-seeking and corruption are minimised, how independent the policy is from 
political influence, the distribution of costs and benefits across generations, the level 
of emissions leakage from the national economy, the transparency of costs and 
benefits, and the flexibility afforded policy-makers to respond to changing circum-
stances and information (GAO 2008).  
It is difficult to determine which of these policy criteria are the most important, al-
though the consideration of economic efficiency, cost effectiveness and environ-
mental certainty appear to be those most consistently raised. The criteria are also not 
completely distinct from each other and there is significant interaction and correlation 
between some of the criteria. The table below therefore attempts to categorise the 
main criteria used to compare carbon taxes and emissions trading into a manageable 
set.  
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Table 1: Public policy criteria for the comparison of policy instruments 
Public policy criteria Sub-criteria 
Economic efficiency • Price volatility 
• Impact on investment 
Environmental effective-
ness 
• Certainty of results  
• Coverage and exemptions 
• Ability to monitor and enforce 
Public finance considera-
tions 
• Ability to raise revenue 
• Cross country revenue flows 
• Tax incidence and interactions 
Welfare impacts • Distribution of costs and benefits across income groups, 
economic sectors and generations 
• Transparency of costs and benefits 
Administrative complex-
ity 
• Institutional capacity 
• Costs of administration 
• Minimisation of corruption  
Relationship to global 
GHG reduction 
• Level of emissions leakage 
• Ability to harmonise global carbon pricing efforts 
3.2 Comparison of options 
The policy options are compared against these criteria below. It should be noted that 
the comparison is not a formal multi-criteria decision-making analysis with scaling 
and weighting of the ‘scores’ of policy options against criteria. It is rather a qualitative 
attempt to show how a rounded comparative consideration of these economic in-
struments can provide policy insights for national government. 
3.2.1 Economic efficiency 
Although the basic economic result is that either instrument would arrive at an 
equivalent marginal cost of reductions across the economy there are some arguments 
that the greater flexibility allowed to firms by a carbon tax of selecting the timing of 
emissions reductions under changing economic conditions makes taxation a more 
efficient instrument. This analysis suggests that is more efficient to allow emissions to 
vary annually because short-term changes in economic conditions can affect the 
costs of emissions abatement. On the other hand, since the benefit of emitting one 
less ton of carbon in a given year is roughly constant, the precise timing of emission 
reductions does not affect damage costs significantly.  
Under a carbon tax, firms can choose to abate less and pay more when abatement 
costs are high, and abate more and pay lower taxes when the costs of emission 
reduction are low (Parry & Pizer nd). Firms will typically be better able to smooth 
and manage their abatement costs than will regulators. A standard emissions trading 
system does not provide the same flexibility because the emissions cap has to be met 
within the particular regulatory period, whatever the prevailing abatement cost. The 
US Congressional Budget Office suggests that in the US the net-benefits of a tax 
could be five times greater than those of an inflexible cap (CBO 2008).  
It is important to note that the analysis above relates to an inflexible cap. An emis-
sions trading programme that includes some form of price ceiling and price floor to 
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contain prices within a known band, or the banking and borrowing of credits, is likely 
to be significantly more efficient than an inflexible cap. These hybrid policies could 
be superior to single policy instruments. For example, raising the level of the safety 
valve over time could allow for the targeting of emission prices over the short run 
while targeting the quantity over the long term (IMF 2008; Pizer 2002). However, 
this flexibility comes at the price of relaxing the controls over the quantity of emission 
reductions.  
Price volatility 
A corollary of the inflexibility of the timing of emissions reductions under an emis-
sions trading system is that supply and demand for credits will tend to fluctuate 
considerably. Emissions trading, in theory and in practice, will give rise to volatile 
pricing in the face of either changing demand conditions or in the face of regulatory 
changes. This has been seen in practice in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) 
where prices have moved sharply in response to information on the national alloca-
tion plans and on progress towards these. 
Price stability is important to provide the right signals to firms making long-term 
investment decisions as well as decisions about research and development and 
innovation in emissions reduction. This stability is also important for national eco-
nomic development – as carbon prices become more important within the economy, 
price fluctuations will become increasingly disruptive. 
Emissions taxes, by their nature, provide a much more stable price for emissions. 
Taxes are themselves subject to change and political influence. However, they tend 
to be changed less frequently and to be set for at least an annual period. As has been 
discussed by Winkler and Marquard (2009), there are options of structuring a carbon 
tax that responds to revealed emissions reductions, for example on an annual or two 
year basis – rising in the case of emission reductions below a target and falling in the 
case of over-achievements. This would introduce a degree of volatility to emissions 
prices, with the advantage of more closely targeting a level of reductions, but this 
volatility would be significantly smoother than the within-period volatility of an emis-
sions trading scheme and would also be more predictable – with the tax being in-
dexed to a specific emissions path. 
3.2.2 Environmental effectiveness 
All else being equal, an emissions trading system with an inflexible cap is most likely 
to achieve defined emissions targets. The degree of reductions under a tax is less 
certain – in the short term because emissions will vary from year to year with eco-
nomic conditions, and in the long term because of the uncertainty about whether the 
tax rate has been set at the appropriate level. The emissions certainty of a emissions 
cap is clearly a strong argument in support of the instrument but it must be recog-
nised that this is not an economic argument. The increased certainty of outcomes 
comes at an economic price, which may well be considerable.  
Coverage and exemptions 
The certainty of emissions trading with respect to the environmental outcome is 
dependent on the coverage of the emissions cap. The cap is clearly only of relevance 
to those sectors falling within it and hence the proportion of emissions covered within 
the cap will determine its ultimate impact on national emissions. This consideration is 
significant, as current emissions trading schemes are far from comprehensive – for 
example, the EU ETS accounts for approximately 50% of the EU’s total CO2 and 
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about 40% of its overall GHG emissions (EC 2009). There are some reasons to 
suggest that a carbon tax is likely to be more broadly-spread than a carbon trading 
scheme, largely due to the administrative differences between the two instruments. 
However, this is not an absolute difference between the instruments as a tax can be 
circumscribed, and an emissions cap can be structured in such a way that its cover-
age is broad.  
3.2.3 Public finance considerations 
Both carbon taxes and emissions trading schemes can raise revenue for government. 
The main consideration differentiating the instruments is the scale of the revenue 
raised and related factors – such as stability of the revenue for government. In princi-
ple, an emissions trading scheme can include the full auctioning of allowances and 
hence can match the revenue raising ability of a carbon tax. In practice, however, 
this seldom occurs and there is often considerable limitations on the revenue raised 
from the process of allowance allocation. For example, in the EU ETS, more than 
90% of allowances were freely allocated in the second phase from 2008 to 2012 (EC 
2009). In comparison, the revenue raised by carbon taxes is likely to be consider-
able, and carbon and energy taxes already account for almost 5% of tax revenues in 
the EU (EC 2008). Experience, if not theory, therefore, suggests that the scale of the 
revenue raised is likely to be higher under a carbon tax system than from a cap-and-
trade system. 
A number of analysts suggest that the efficiency losses from carbon pricing can be 
mitigated by the appropriate recycling of carbon revenues to decrease these losses 
(Nordhaus 2007; Parry & Pizer nd; CBO 2008). These authors raise the concern that 
if the government does not fully raise this revenue, then there is no mechanism to 
mitigate these efficiency losses.  
The price volatility under an emissions trading scheme also suggests that public 
revenue based on allowance auctions may similarly be subject to volatility. The 
revenue raised from a carbon tax is likely to be more predictable and stable and 
hence can allow for better planning of revenue recycling or tax-shifting programme. 
Of course, a carbon tax will tend to undermine its own tax base and it can be ex-
pected that tax revenues will decline as the tax has an increasing incentives impact. 
This effect may itself be offset by a rising tax rate.  
3.2.4 Welfare impacts 
Carbon pricing through any mechanism will affect the level and distribution of the 
real income of households. The size and distribution of these effects depends on the 
patterns of production and consumption in the economy and on how much of the 
price burden is felt by final consumers. The conventional economic assumption is 
that in the short-run there is a full pass-through of costs in a competitive economy 
and in general, it appears that in developing countries increased fossil fuel prices are 
likely to be regressive (IMF 2008b). 
The degree and manner in which revenue raised by governments from carbon pric-
ing is used to offset other distortionary taxes or to reduce the regressive impacts of 
the instrument will affect the distributional consequences of carbon pricing. Since 
there is not likely to be any difference in government revenue-use decisions based on 
whether the funds were raised from tax sources or from allowance sales, the more 
important difference between the instruments is likely to be the scale of the revenue. 
As discussed above, the scale and predictability of carbon tax revenue is likely to be 
greater than that from emissions trading. On the other hand, the probability of 
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greater coverage of a carbon tax, for example the easier coverage of private transport 
fuel use, suggests that a carbon tax may be more regressive than a trading scheme. 
An economy-wide tax is less likely to exclude the household sector, as is typically 
excluded in an emissions trading schemes, and evidence suggests that increases in 
household energy costs are likely to be regressive in both developed and developing 
countries.  
3.2.5 Administrative complexity 
A commonly advanced reason for the preference of carbon taxes over emissions 
trading is that taxes offer some administrative advantages over trading systems. 
There are a number of reasons for this. The first is that a carbon tax can be based on 
existing tax instruments and mechanisms of tax collection. For example, the view of 
the US CBO (2008) is that an upstream tax is likely to be easier to implement than 
an equivalent cap-and-trade programme because many of the entities that would be 
covered by either policy are already subject to excise taxes and a carbon tax could 
build on the existing tax structure. The CBO argues that implementing an ETS, 
however, would probably require a new administrative infrastructure. The CBO does 
acknowledge, though, that experience with the US sulphur dioxide emissions trading 
programme indicates that the cost of administering such a program could be rela-
tively modest.  
On the side of the regulated community it is arguable that compliance for utilities and 
firms may be less burdensome under a carbon tax system if existing tax schemes are 
built on rather than new trading mechanisms created. However, this is possibly a 
weaker argument and the administrative burden depends more on the point of 
regulation rather than the nature of the policy.  
Point of regulation 
A second argument for the greater administrative ease of a carbon tax programme is 
that carbon taxes are more easily applied at an upstream level in the fossil fuel use 
chain and therefore do not require the monitoring of emissions needed in an emis-
sions trading scheme. This argument is valid only if an emissions trading scheme is 
not similarly established on fossil fuel providers high in the value chain. Analysis of 
emissions trading suggests that an upstream point of application is rare. Most emis-
sions trading schemes in operation or under investigation are based on emissions 
somewhere lower in the chain than the primary supply of fossil fuels.  
A counter-argument against the cost effectiveness of a carbon tax is raised by the 
International Emissions Trading Association (IETA nd). They argue that under a 
carbon tax ‘a crediting system would have to be devised for downstream projects 
that eliminate emissions (e.g. a carbon capture and storage project). Crediting would 
then require project oversight, measurement and verification, adding to complexity.’ 
While this is correct, similar administrative complexities would be needed to bring 
such projects into an emissions trading scheme and there do not appear to be an 
major conceptual or administrative problems with including some form of tax credit-
ing under a carbon tax system. 
Corruption 
A not insignificant consideration differentiating tax and trade systems is their suscep-
tibility to corruption. Nordhaus (2007) argues that, in principle, 
quantity-type systems are much more susceptible to corruption than price-type 
regimes. An emissions-trading system creates valuable assets in the form of 
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tradable emissions permits and allocates these to countries. Limiting emissions 
creates a scarcity where none previously existed. It is a rent-creating program. 
The dangers of quantity as compared to price approaches have been demon-
strated frequently when quotas are compared with tariffs in international trade 
interventions.  
Although these arguments are applied to countries rather than companies, they do 
carry weight at the firm level as well. 
3.2.6 Relationship to global action 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the full picture of the relative merits of 
tax and trading schemes with regards to global climate policy. Theoretically it is 
possible to develop global systems of carbon pricing based on either carbon taxes or 
emissions trading. For example, countries can establish agreed-on carbon taxes that 
are harmonised internationally and which would produce a consistent global incen-
tive for cutting emissions or countries can link trading schemes through fungible 
credits. There are, however, asymmetries between taxes and emissions trading with 
regards to international linkages. For example, the IMF (2009b) notes that currency 
rate adjustments would be more complex to manage under a tax than a linked trad-
ing system. Counter-examples favour harmonised taxes and there are theoretical 
benefits and risks to both instruments that certainly need to be considered in policy 
development. 
3.2.7 The real-politik of carbon pricing 
The review of the theoretical literature, consideration of carbon pricing in practice 
and a criterion-by-criterion comparison suggests that there is no clear a priori pre-
ferred carbon pricing approach in all circumstances. The objectives and priorities of 
the policy-maker will play a large role in scoring options and weighting the criteria 
(more often implicitly than explicitly) and therefore in determining final policy 
choices. 
The practice of carbon pricing in developed countries appears to be trending rela-
tively strongly towards emissions trading mechanisms. The reasons cannot be ex-
plored here in detail but may include such factors as: 
• greater political acceptability of emissions trading than new taxation; 
• preference for the greater emissions reduction certainty provided by 
cap and trade systems; 
• political influence and lobbying by emissions trading advocates; and 
• better fit with global agreements focused on time-bound quantifiable 
emissions reduction commitments  
South African authorities should take into account the reality of pre-existing emis-
sions trading schemes in many developed countries. This may well affect the choice 
of policy instrument but, in itself, should not be a determining factor in the choice of 
regulatory instrument. 
4. Considerations specific to South Africa 
The section above has provided a generic comparison of carbon taxes and emissions 
trading, with reference to South Africa where appropriate. However, the eventual 
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choice of carbon pricing approach in the country should also take into account some 
specific local considerations. 
4.1.1 Emissions uncertainty 
An overriding consideration is the degree to which South Africa (and most develop-
ing countries in general) is able to predict a ‘business-as-usual’ emissions trajectory. 
Even with the best efforts of planners this is fraught with difficulty as there are cur-
rently significant uncertainty about the future energy supply mix and domestic de-
mand growth. This uncertainty suggests that it would be extremely difficult to estab-
lish a credible emissions cap that could serve as the basis for allowance allocations 
under an emissions trading scheme.  
A number of concerns arise about the consequences of an incorrectly calibrated 
emissions cap. If it were set significantly too high, it would be meaningless and result 
in an ineffective market with no impact on the real economy. If it were set too low, it 
would be constraining on the domestic economy, i.e. having significantly higher 
economic costs than predicted. In such a case there would be enormous credibility 
concerns in the face of inevitable political resistance to the continued existence of the 
constraint. Under conditions of expansion of the real economy, and with a growing 
population with unmet basic needs and socio-economic aspirations, more flexible 
carbon pricing instruments than a simple emissions cap are likely to be needed to 
create credible, long-term price signals for emissions reduction. 
4.1.2 Market structure 
An emissions trading scheme relies on a competitive and liquid market for the eco-
nomic efficiency benefits to be realised. If there is market power on either side of the 
market this will introduce distortions that reduce the efficiency gains of the system. 
An initial allocation of allowances that concentrates ownership in a small number of 
firms will give those firms monopoly power in any subsequent trading (Smith 2008). 
Insufficient market liquidity will also reduce any gains available from trade even in 
the absence of the abuse of market power.  
Market structure is particularly pertinent in South Africa where there is high concen-
tration in the energy and fossil fuels sector. The design of an upstream emissions 
trading system would face challenges in addressing market power and in ensuring 
sufficient trading liquidity. Primary fuel supply in the country is dominated by coal 
and imported crude oil and there are remarkably few individual points through which 
the vast majority of the country’s primary energy resources flow. There are about 71 
collieries, six refineries (including coal-to-liquids plants) and two gas plants (including 
gas-to-liquids) refining (SAPIA 2008). This primary energy supply is even more 
concentrated if looked at on a company basis, rather than on the basis of individual 
plants. 
The table below shows that of the total coal mined in South Africa in 2006, 61% was 
used for electricity production (and therefore purchased almost entirely by Eskom) 
and 30% was used by industry (of which a significant proportion is purchased by 
Sasol for coals-to-liquid processing). Two firms, Sasol and PetroSA, provide or pur-
chase almost all the natural gas in the country. There is therefore also significant 
demand-side energy market concentration. This demand- and supply-side concentra-
tion has important implications for the regulatory options selected and suggests that it 
may be difficult to establish an emissions trading scheme with the characteristics 
required to deliver economic efficiency. 
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Table 2: Coal demand in South Africa, 2006 
Source: DME (2006); Chamber of Mines (2007) 
Transport Electricity Mining Industry Metallurgical Merchants / Domestic Total 
0% 61% 0% 30% 5% 3% 100% 
 
Regulated prices and incentives structures 
A further important consideration for the application of any carbon pricing instru-
ment in South Africa is the interaction between these instruments and current energy 
sector regulation. There is significant economic regulation and administered price-
setting which affects the incentives structures in the energy sector. All final liquid fuels 
prices are government regulated, as are most consumer prices of electricity through 
the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA). NERSA is the economic 
regulator of Eskom and determines which costs can be passed through by the utility 
to the consumer and to what degree. 
The eventual incidence of carbon price interventions, and hence also their incentives 
impacts, will depend on how these interventions are incorporated into price regula-
tion. The nature of economic regulation of the energy sector in South Africa does 
not, a priori, suggest any particular preference for either emissions trading or quantity 
approaches or price based approaches. Detailed consideration of the current regula-
tory framework may favour one approach over the other. However, the introduction 
of any large-scale carbon pricing intervention would need to be done in collaboration 
with the economic regulators in the energy sector and are likely to require a review 
and alignment of economic regulatory approaches with the carbon pricing approach 
adopted. 
A closely related matter is the existence of some significant subsidies within the elec-
tricity pricing system. An important example is the long-term, special pricing ar-
rangements that a number of highly energy-intensive energy users have entered into 
with Eskom. Although the details of these agreements are confidential, it is highly 
likely that they represent significant price discounts to the marginal costs of electricity 
in the country and are implicit subsidies to energy use by these industrial users. This 
is an issue that also needs to be considered in the process of establishing the correct 
price incentives in the South African energy sector. 
New entrants and independent power producers 
An emissions trading scheme will face different challenges from a carbon tax with 
regards to new entrants into the power sector. The distribution of a fixed number of 
allowances may impose barriers to entry for new entrants into the energy sector. 
There is a policy intention that 30% of power generation is provided by new entrants 
in the medium term. If new entrants are required to purchase allowances from a 
fixed pool it would provide a means for incumbents, such as Eskom, to erect barriers 
to entry through market power over the allowance price. A carbon tax would not 
provide a similar constraint because it will apply equally to new entrants and to 
incumbents.  
5. Conclusion 
There is reasonable consensus that some form of carbon pricing will be required to 
support a transition to a lower carbon pathway for South Africa. This paper has 
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started to explore the relative merits of the alternative mechanisms of introducing 
such a price. Although theoretically similar, under conditions of perfect markets and 
perfect information, it is readily apparent that there are significant practical differ-
ences between emissions trading and carbon taxes. The primary difference, when the 
‘pure’ forms of both instruments are compared is that emissions taxes will provide a 
fixed price for carbon, have wide coverage through the economy, are relatively easy 
to administer and will generate significant and relatively stable revenue – but will not 
provide certainty on the levels of emissions to be achieved. On the other hand, 
emissions trading will provide greater certainty of the level of emissions but at the 
expense of more uncertain economic costs, the probability of volatile prices, difficult 
administrative requirements, and complexities related to coverage across the econ-
omy. There are also concerns, based on experience, that emissions trading is likely to 
result in lower revenue generated for government. 
The issue of revenue generation is important, not to fill government coffers but be-
cause it gives government the ability to use this revenue to address the distributional 
impacts of the carbon pricing – particularly mitigating these impacts where they fall 
on poor or vulnerable households. An emissions trading system that provides free 
allowances and therefore has limited revenue raising ability will not provide govern-
ment with this flexibility. International experience with carbon and energy taxes has 
shown that tax systems are themselves not immune from interest group pressure and 
that exemptions of one kind or another are rife in these instruments. Such exemp-
tions will tend to reduce revenue raised, will increase distributional concerns and will 
reduce coverage of carbon taxes. 
Importantly, adjustments to emissions trading systems can address a number of the 
concerns raised about such systems in their pure form. These adjustments can lead to 
many of the features of a carbon tax being included in an emissions trading scheme 
and start creating a continuum between pure price and pure quantity instruments. 
Safety valves in emissions trading schemes will ensure that such schemes can be 
limited in their overall cost to the economy. However, it must be recognised that the 
use of a safety-valve comes at the expense of discarding the certainty of the level of 
emissions and makes the trading scheme look much more like a carbon tax. 
Some of the other key design issues of carbon pricing, such as the most suitable 
point of regulation, apply in theory in an equivalent way to emissions taxes and 
trading systems. However, this theoretical similarity is altered in practice. In particu-
lar, when the particular market structure of the South African energy sector is exam-
ined, it is apparent that the existence of concentrated energy supply markets, mo-
nopoly power in power generation, and a small number of liquid fuels refineries 
impose serious concerns about the ability to construct a competitive, liquid and 
efficient emissions trading market.  
The existence of administered prices and economic regulation in South Africa, as 
well as state ownership of Eskom, introduce other important incentives issues which 
would need to be considered in detail in the design of either an emissions trading or 
carbon tax system if such a system were to achieve its aims. Importantly, this suggests 
that the design of a future carbon pricing regime will require close coordination 
between the economic regulatory framework for the electricity, liquid fuels and gas 
sectors and the carbon pricing instrument. 
Whatever instrument is selected, a key feature determining its effectiveness in chang-
ing investment behaviour and innovation is the long-term credibility the instrument 
has. An emissions trading scheme faces the problem of uncertain economic costs and 
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the real potential that a cap would be adjusted or abandoned in the face of signifi-
cantly higher costs to the economy than anticipated. An emissions cap that was 
visibly constraining economic growth would face huge political pressure. A carbon 
tax is therefore likely to be a more credible long-term instrument, one which will have 
continued state support because of the revenue generated and one which provides a 
consistent, albeit possibly inadequate, pricing signal to power generators, producers 
and consumers. 
On balance, there appear to be strong reasons to favour a carbon tax as the appro-
priate instrument for South Africa at this point. However, as noted, there is also merit 
in understanding that carbon pricing approaches do provide the ability for regulators 
to select programme features that allow somewhat of a continuum between taxes 
and emissions trading – acknowledging that trade-offs will be made in this process 
between certainty of costs and certainty of emission levels. If an emissions trading 
regime was preferred in South Africa, the introduction of such a system without 
strong recourse to some of the price flexibility mechanisms would seem to be inap-
propriate to the country’s economic development path and industry structure. 
It would be naïve and overly economically purist to imagine that a carbon pricing 
instrument alone is sufficient to address climate change objectives. Energy and cli-
mate policy in all countries operates within the context of a range of development 
imperatives. Alternative regulatory measures and climate change strategic choices 
should not be seen as running independently parallel to carbon pricing approaches 
as there are strong interactions between the two which should be understood and 
used to enhance the effect of both. For example, the size of price elasticities in the 
liquid fuels sector, i.e. how much consumers reduce fuel use in the face of increased 
costs, will depend to a large degree on the availability of alternatives. If substitutes 
are available in the form of affordable and efficient public transport, safe cycle lanes 
and compact and safe urban areas for pedestrians then these elasticities are likely to 
be much higher. These alternatives are public goods that can only be effectively 
provided through efficient government with a clear strategy towards developing a 
lower carbon, more socially equitable economy. For any carbon pricing policy to be 
effective it will need to supported by other government led interventions. 
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Abstract  
Economic instruments are proving to be the mainstay of carbon mitigation policy 
globally. South Africa’s position is consistent with this, and government has indicated 
its intention to move away from regulation as an emissions reduction tool. However, 
it is not yet clear what form this economic instrument, or instruments, should take. 
Two approaches arise from theory and early international carbon pricing designs: 
taxation or emissions trading, and they differ in a number of ways. Whilst under 
strong assumptions, economic theory shows a tax and an auctioned cap and trade 
scheme to be equivalent, in the real world, under conditions of uncertainty and 
imperfect information, their different designs lend themselves to different contexts. 
This paper compares the use of a carbon tax and emissions trading scheme as the 
central instrument for South African GHG mitigation policy. The analysis is based on 
economic theory and the limited international experience of the two instruments, 
combined with detailed consideration of the South African context. The paper con-
cludes that a tax is likely to be more appropriate in the immediate future, but that the 
choice could be different in the medium to long term; particularly if an international 
emissions trading framework is agreed upon. The paper also identifies number of 
areas for future research to inform policymaking. 
Keywords: carbon tax, emissions trading scheme, theory, South Africa, developing 
economy 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The rationale for using economic instruments to mitigate climate change is to achieve 
a transition to a low-carbon economy at the least overall cost to society. Economic 
instruments effectively ‘put a price on carbon’ so that firms and households take the 
environmental cost of their actions into account when they are making decisions. 
This is generally accepted to be less costly than imposing rigid emissions controls on 
firms. Since the costs are eventually passed on to consumers, demand shifts away 
from carbon-intensive goods and services and towards those with a lower carbon 
footprint. Over the medium-to-long term, this will lead to a structural change within 
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economies (Australian Government 2008). The South African government is in the 
process of developing domestic carbon mitigation policy. In line with environmental 
policy developments internationally, it has signalled its intention to move away from 
command and control regulatory mechanisms and to focus on economic instruments 
going forward (National Treasury 2006). 
Two economic instruments have emerged from theory and international practice as 
being the most appropriate for consideration as greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation 
policy choices: a carbon tax, or an emissions trading scheme. These will similarly be 
the focus of this paper. A carbon tax achieves reduced emissions through imposing a 
price on producers proportional to the volume of their emissions in order to provide 
them with the necessary incentive to abate. A carbon or emissions trading scheme 
(ETS), on the other hand, is based on allocating a certain number of permits to emit 
GHG s to producers, who need to demonstrate sufficient permits to cover their emis-
sions at the specified compliance date, and then allowing these producers to trade 
permits amongst themselves in accordance with their compliance needs. Scarcity is 
created in the scheme through the allocation of fewer permits than emissions, result-
ing in emitters having to choose between reducing their emissions in line with their 
allowance allocations or purchasing additional permits to cover their excess emis-
sions levels. 
The paper will consider whether a carbon tax or ETS is more suitable for South 
Africa from a macro-economic perspective. It will focus on the short-to-medium term, 
and will touch on how this analysis may change as the country moves towards 2050 
(the period considered by the Cabinet’s vision of a peak, plateau and decline emis-
sions trajectory for the country.  
The primary aim of this paper is to advance the dialogue around appropriate eco-
nomic instruments for carbon mitigation in South Africa by establishing a framework 
for discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of carbon tax and trading, and appli-
cation of these instruments to the South African context. Whilst it is conceivable that 
the eventual policy choice may comprise a hybrid instrument or even the use of both 
instruments (as in a number of European countries), this paper assumes that the 
choice is between the two and uses the instruments’ pure form as its point of depar-
ture. This abstraction is considered necessary to understand and highlight their rela-
tive advantages and disadvantages when applied to the South African context. Pos-
sible hybrid forms are touched on in the discussion where they can alleviate some of 
the key problems associated with the pure form instruments, but a detailed evalua-
tion of all possible forms of each instrument is beyond the scope of this paper. The 
discussion arrives at some early conclusions, and identifies areas for further research 
and debate.  
The paper begins by defining and describing carbon tax and carbon trading as eco-
nomic instruments to reduce GHG emissions. Next, an analysis of international 
experience in the instruments is conducted, in order to extract lessons for their im-
plementation in South Africa. Features of South Africa’s specific carbon policy con-
text are then described in order to help build a framework for the comparison of the 
instruments and their applicability in South Africa. This analysis is then conducted, 
considering both the main strengths and weaknesses of each instrument in the con-
text of South Africa. The paper concludes with initial findings, and identifies areas for 
future research.  
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2. Carbon tax and carbon trading: theoretical and design considerations 
As economic instruments, both taxes and trading schemes put a price on GHG 
emissions. In both cases, according to economic theory, this GHG mitigation will be 
achieved at a smaller overall cost to the economy than if command and control 
instruments are used. However, each instrument does this through slightly different 
means. A tax is a conventional price instrument, the regulator sets the price per tonne 
emitted, and emitters pay or reduce their emissions accordingly. A trading scheme 
can be understood as a combination of a price and regulatory instrument. The ac-
ceptable quantity of GHG emissions in the system is determined by the regulator, 
and permits issued for this amount. These permits are then traded between emitters, 
with a price being established by the market.  
Whilst the price / regulatory difference is the defining one, there are other differences 
between the instruments, stemming from their respective designs. Under the strong 
assumptions of general equilibrium, full information and perfect functioning of mar-
kets, economic theory states that the design differences between carbon tax and cap 
and trade schemes do not impact their relative economic efficiencies, and that, in 
equilibrium, both achieve the optimal degree of abatement at the lowest possible cost 
to society (Weitzman 1974; Fischer 1996; Perman et al 1999; Sin et al 2005). How-
ever, these strong assumptions bear little relation to reality where, particularly in the 
area of carbon mitigation, there is uncertainty, incomplete information and imperfect 
market functioning.  
Under more realistic assumptions, theorists find that the relative efficiency of the two 
instruments depends on the nature of the marginal costs and marginal benefits of 
mitigation. Both internationally and, particularly, in South Africa there is insufficient 
information available around the costs and benefits of mitigation at this time to 
usefully pursue this line of enquiry further, since the outcome of the analysis depends 
on the exact slopes and correlation between the slopes, of the two curves.1  
In practice, however, there are a number of design features which distinguish the two 
instruments and which embed different advantages and disadvantages in each, and 
which inform the tax versus emissions trading debate. These design features are very 
                                                 
1  The presence of uncertainty around the marginal costs and (or) benefits of reducing emissions changes the 
trade-off between the two instruments (Weitzman, 1964; Newell & Pizer 1999; Pizer 1999; Pizer 2002; Hoel 
& Karp 2001), with the outcome being dependent on the slope and correlation of the marginal cost (MC) 
and benefit (MB) curves. Weitzman initially found that if the MB is relatively flat and the MC steep, and 
there is only uncertainty around the MC, resulting in a choice of the wrong quantity of emission reductions 
being more costly for the economy, and pointing to a tax as a more suitable instrument. Later studies ex-
tended this analysis to look at when there is uncertainty about both MC and MB, at which point the litera-
ture has concluded that the outcome becomes dependent on the slopes and correlation between the two 
curves.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore in depth the level of uncertainty or slope of the 
South African MC and MB.  However,  from the authors’ experience, and from the findings of the 
FRIDGE project which considers abatement cost curves in various sectors of the South African economy 
(forthcoming, 2010), it is assumed that there is a significant degree of uncertainty around the MC and its 
slope.  For the purposes of domestic policy, Sin et al (2005) argue that the shape of the MB curve is mostly 
dependent on the benefit of adhering to internationally agreed action on climate mitigation, rather than the 
environmental benefit of reducing emissions (which is the marginal benefit typically considered in the litera-
ture). This is since the mitigation actions of one country will not have a significant impact on worldwide 
emissions and so is cannot directly lead to benefits for the country in terms of avoided environmental dam-
age. Adhering to international regimes governing mitigation can, however, have direct benefits to a country 
(e.g. the avoidance of punitive measures or border taxation on exports, improved relationship with the in-
ternational community). This suggests that for South Africa (and other countries) there is therefore also a 
significant degree of uncertainty around the MB and its slope currently as the international situation is very 
unclear.  
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briefly summarised below, whilst section 5 discusses them in more detail within a 
‘real’ context, that of South Africa. 
Overview of carbon pricing instrument design features 
A carbon tax provides a stable carbon price upon which firms can base production 
and investment decisions. It generates fiscal revenue, and is more transparent than a 
trading scheme, and therefore less susceptible to corruption. A tax is a known and 
simple policy instrument, and government does not need access to firm level emis-
sions data upfront to implement a tax. On the negative side, a tax does not deliver a 
certain volume of emissions reduction, and therefore cannot guarantee domestic 
compliance with an international target. Taxes are also inherently disliked by indus-
try, which makes building consensus around a tax regime difficult. 
An ETS provides mitigation volume certainty. It also allows for price discovery, 
providing important information to policymakers. A trading scheme is a complex 
instrument, offering sophisticated risk management mechanisms to firms to smooth 
their integration of carbon pricing over time. If emissions allowances are grand-
fathered (allocated free based on past emissions levels), an ETS is less punitive to 
firms in the short term. If emissions trading is adopted internationally, it provides a 
mechanism for global least cost compliance. ETS weaknesses include the presence of 
carbon price volatility and uncertainty, which is problematic for encouraging long 
term mitigation investment. An ETS is complex and sophisticated, and can be dis-
trusted by the public, particularly if allowances are grandfathered. Grandfathering 
requires a high level of information on historical emissions at a firm level, which is 
often unavailable or unreliable. After the financial crisis, there has been reduced 
support internationally for the use of markets, and the development of new, complex 
and unfamiliar markets.  
3. Lessons from international experience 
Experience with economic instruments for emissions mitigation is still in early stages, 
having begun in the 1990s with the sulphur dioxide and nitrous oxide schemes in 
North America, and carbon taxes in Scandinavia. ETS for GHGs has only been in 
operation from the beginning of the current century. Given this, it is too early for 
conclusive retrospective analysis of these schemes. However, there are a few early 
examples and lessons which can be drawn, although these are largely context spe-
cific.  
Prospective carbon taxes have tended to be politically less popular than trading 
schemes to date, primarily because it is easier for emissions- and energy-intensive 
industry to achieve protection through favourable permit allocation methods in 
trading schemes than through more transparent tax rebates. This is specifically true in 
the USA where there is strong opposition to any mechanism likely to increase the 
cost of energy, but particularly a carbon tax. Most industrialised countries or regions 
seriously pursuing mandatory emissions mitigation policy have opted for emissions 
trading above taxes (EU, Australia, US, Japan, Canada, New Zealand, South Korea, 
Switzerland). However, recent indications suggest that there may be a shift underway 
towards the reconsideration of taxes post the financial crisis (this will be discussed in 
more detail below), and a number of EU countries have recently decided to imple-
ment carbon taxes concurrently with their participation in the EU ETS.  
Despite the relatively limited experience with taxes, there are examples of where they 
have been highly successful; in particular, a number of European countries, including 
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Denmark and Sweden have had broad-based carbon and energy taxes in place for 
some years (Speck 2008). Since Sweden’s carbon tax was put in place in 1990, 
emissions in the country have reduced by 8% while the economy has grown by 48% 
(Shapiro 2009). An analysis reported by Andersen (2008) suggests that in all six 
European countries considered, environmental tax reforms contributed to lower fuel 
demand and lower GHG emissions between 1994 and 2004 compared to their 
projected levels without carbon taxation. In Finland the reduction in GHG emissions 
totalled 5.9% over the period. 
The largest cap-and-trade system in the world currently is the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS), covering all 27 EU member states, which has been in 
operation for just under five years. The scheme is set to be extended to cover three 
non-EU European countries from 2013. The mandatory scheme began in 2005 and 
is now in its second phase (Phase 1 concluded at the end of 2007).  
The EU ETS has run into a number of problems during the first phase of implemen-
tation. The over-allocation of permits in Phase 1 led to a price crash at the beginning 
of 2006 (Runge-Metzger 2008), which undermined confidence in the mechanism. 
This experience was similar to that of the US SO2 trading scheme where price volatil-
ity was also a problem. Nordhaus (2007) shows that the price of permits from 1995 
to 2006 was more than twice as volatile as the S&P500 index and almost as volatile 
as the oil price.  
The second major issue for the EU ETS was that of windfall profits. Power producers 
are perceived to have benefited unfairly under the scheme as they received free 
permits (the majority of permits were grandfathered in Phase 1 and Phase 2) and 
power prices have increased significantly since the scheme’s inception, prompting 
concerns that firms had passed on more than the increase in costs (Wettestad 2007). 
A study by Sjim et al (2006) found that under the EU ETS firms who were allocated 
emissions permits had passed on between 60% and 100% of the opportunity cost of 
permits to their customers, resulting in significant windfall profits for polluting firms.  
The remaining main examples of implemented emissions trading schemes to-date 
and available analysis of their impact are summarised in Table 1. As the discussion of 
the EU ETS and the table show, the lessons that can be deduced from international 
experience to date are limited given the infancy of these policy instruments, and the 
number of teething problems that have been encountered. Emissions inventories are 
in early stages of development, and substantial inaccuracies still exist. This reduces 
the ability to accurately measure the success of any instrument to date. However, the 
following points can be taken from international experience in economic instruments 
to mitigate GHG emissions to date: ETSs are highly complex to establish; full auc-
tioning is a political impossibility, reducing revenue generating potential; the problem 
of price volatility and lack of price certainty for planning is significant in the first years 
of a scheme. Norwegian tax examples are all we have, but seem to have been very 
successful at a low level. The problem of political resistance towards a tax seems to 
have been significant in the past, but may now be lessening as the performance of 
ETS in practice has proven ambiguous and confidence in markets have been un-
dermined due to the financial crisis. 
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Table 1: International emissions trading schemes:  
Description and analysis  
Trading 
scheme 
Type Coverage Effectiveness Lessons 
US SOx and 
NOx  
Mandatory, 
SOx and NOx 
(not GHG), 
but longest 
running. 
Electricity 
generating 
facilities and 
large indus-
trial boilers. 
Phase 1 low prices, 
little investment due 
to over-allocation 
(EPA, 2002).  
Significant price 
volatility (Parry and 
Pizer, 2007; Nord-
haus, 2007). 
Stakeholders 
believe it lowered 
compliance costs 
(Tyler et al, 2009). 
UK ETS Voluntary 31 partici-
pants from 
wide range of 
sectors. 
Achieved aims of 
capacitating firms 
and government 
around trading plus 
substantial over-
compliance in terms 
of. emissions reduc-
tion 
50% of sales came 
from 3 large sellers 
– concentration 
issues important to 
consider (Smith et 
al, 2007). 
New South 
Wales GHG 
Reduction 
Scheme. 
Mandatory and 
voluntary 
participants, 
permits allo-
cated. 
Electricity 
suppliers, 
customers 
and genera-
tors. 
Thought to be overly 
complex and dis-
rupted by plans for 
national ETS. 
External develop-
ments can have big 
impact on carbon 
market – price 
volatile. 
Regional 
GHG 
Initiative 
(USA). 
Mandatory, 
majority 
auctioned. 
Power plants 
burning fossil 
fuels. 
Too soon to say – 
began September 
2008. 
 
 
4. The South African context 
The foregoing discussion has illustrated that the choice of instrument is not clear-cut 
in the abstract, and therefore context becomes all-important when considering the 
relative advantages and disadvantages of a tax or trading approach to economic 
policy instruments. This section describes aspects of the South African economy of 
relevance to carbon pricing. 
4.1  Developing country context 
South Africa is different from many of the countries which have so far implemented 
economic instruments to mitigate GHG emissions in that it is still a developing coun-
try with serious problems of poverty and unemployment to tackle. It has, however, 
committed in the Copenhagen Accord to a reduction of 32% below projected emis-
sions by 2020, and 42% by 2025, subject to international financial and technical 
assistance. The country is committed to the long term decoupling of emissions from 
economic growth within a development context.  
Climate change mitigation policy could have serious negative consequences for the 
economy which is based on access to cheap coal for power. Despite government’s 
commitment to GHG mitigation, it faces other political imperatives, most importantly 
Carbon pricing and industrial policy in South Africa 202 
Putting a price on carbon: Conference proceedings 
the need for economic growth and a range of development spending priorities which 
impose a constant strain on fiscal resources. Therefore, mitigation policy needs to be 
designed with South Africa’s key development challenges at the forefront of thinking. 
In this context, an important point to note is that it will prove politically very difficult 
to implement any instrument which has regressive distributional implications. 
South Africa is experiencing a serious skills shortage, particularly in the public sector, 
and has no experience in emissions mitigation. This may limit the sophistication of 
mitigation instruments that the country can work with. Furthermore, an instrument 
which utilises existing institutions rather than requiring the creation of new and po-
tentially expensive institutions would be at an advantage. 
4.2  Availability of data 
The lack of available data on everything related to GHG emissions in South Africa is 
a major constraint to the development of policy. Recent studies go some way to-
wards addressing the deficit: the LTMS (Winkler  2008) considered a number of 
sectors, mitigation options and transition paths. The recently released draft National 
GHG Inventory for 2000 (DEAT 2009) provides the most accurate assessment of 
South Africa’s emissions, broken down into broad sectors. Information can be drawn 
at a high level (broad economic categorisations) from both of these sources, and 
indeed some data is available at a sectoral level for selected sectors. A third source, 
Blignaut et al (2005), computes sectoral emissions for the economy at a more disag-
gregated level based on the National Energy Balance for 1998 published by the 
Department for Minerals and Energy (DME). However, to understand fully the im-
pact that an economic instrument will have on the economy, much more detailed 
information is required on emissions, as well as the availability, potential and cost of 
abatement options at a sectoral and even sub-sectoral level for every sector in the 
economy. A project initiated by the Fund for Research into Industrial Development 
Growth and Equity (FRIDGE) which is currently being undertaken highlights this 
through the study of seven sectors. The study (expected to be released early in 2010) 
derives ‘indicative abatement cost curves’ for each sector, and considers some early 
policy options, but is severely constrained in its reach due to the lack of data. This 
lack of information would present a barrier to the efficient distribution of permits 
under an ETS, which requires some knowledge of abatement opportunities available 
at a sectoral level. 
4.3  Emissions profile 
In 2000, 79% of the country’s emissions profile was made up of emissions associated 
with energy, with the remainder being industry process emissions, and methane from 
waste management and agriculture (DEAT 2009). The high contribution of energy is 
largely due to the country’s reliance on coal as a primary energy carrier. Coal burned 
for electricity generation makes up 39% of all emissions (DEAT 2009). From an 
institutional perspective, two organisations dominate South Africa’s GHG emissions 
landscape, accounting for 56% of total emissions. 12% of emissions are attributable 
to the liquid fuels manufacturer Sasol (part energy and part process emissions), and 
44% to Eskom, the state-owned electricity utility (ERC 2008; NBI 2008). This poses 
particular challenges for any climate change mitigation regime since it suggests that 
strategic decisions made by these two firms will have the potential to influence South 
Africa’s GHG emissions more than any other factor.  
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4.4  Energy context 
The South African economy is extremely energy-intensive as a result of energy, and 
particularly electricity, prices remaining amongst the lowest in the world for an ex-
tended period. This has attracted energy-intensive firms and projects to South Africa, 
and large capital investments then caused the economy to become ‘locked-in’ to a 
pattern of high energy consumption (Marquard & Winkler 2009). Commercial and 
residential users of electricity have had little incentive to pursue energy efficiency 
measures.  
The state-owned utility Eskom operates as a long standing monopoly in the electricity 
sector, and has not seriously deviated from its focus on cheap, coal-fired electricity as 
a mode of energy service delivery over its lifetime. The 2007 electricity supply crisis 
highlighted a broader crisis of governance, leadership and co-ordination in the elec-
tricity and energy sector. The liberalisation of the sector has been a stated objective 
of government for some time, and it has mandated that in future 30% of new capac-
ity must be generated by private suppliers or independent power producers (IPPs) 
(Eskom 2009). In practice, however, the institutional arrangements to facilitate such a 
transition are not yet in place, and there is considerable uncertainty about the future 
of the sector. Response attempts by government, business, Eskom and other energy 
sector players have only served to entrench this confusion. Most recently, President 
Zuma announced an Inter-Ministerial Committee on Energy in his 2010 State of the 
Nation address, which may go some way to addressing this issue. The Committee 
will be considering a twenty year integrated resource plan as one of its first tasks. 
Eskom has in the meantime embarked upon an investment programme which in-
volves de-mothballing of coal generation and the new build of two additional coal 
power stations within the next decade.  
The intention and mechanism to enable some renewable power onto the grid is in 
place with the Renewable Energy Feed In Tarriff (REFIT), although renewable en-
ergy targets are way below those required to address government’s international 
climate mitigation commitments. Energy efficiency, a central component of all stalled 
electricity crisis responses, is a driving factor in short term emission reductions for the 
country.  
4.5 Mitigation policy targets and prospects for international cooperation 
Climate mitigation is a global challenge, and one which all countries will need to 
respond to in some form in order to avoid the escalating damage from climate 
change. South Africa has indicated its commitment through its conditional Copenha-
gen Accord targets, and Cabinet’s endorsement of a target of 30–40% reduction of 
GHG emissions from 2003 levels by 2050 (van Schalkwyk 2008), in accordance with 
science and the country’s ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ (UNFCCC 
1998).  
Global co-operation on climate mitigation is optimal, with a negotiated commitment 
to mitigation activities, and a synchronised policy response. However, this is far from 
a given outcome at this point in time. Should co-operation fail, bilateral actions 
through the trade regime could be an alternative, and sub-optimal, approach for 
small open economies like South Africa. No mitigation is the worst outcome, as 
South Africa will be badly affected by unmitigated climate change.  
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5. Comparison of tax and trade in the South African context 
The following section explores the potential performance of tax and carbon trading 
in South Africa, predominantly from the theoretical perspective of the instruments’ 
design, but incorporating relevant findings from international experience. The discus-
sion is organised according to criteria considered to be of particular relevance to the 
country when considering climate policy design.  
This paper began by acknowledging that the country’s eventual policy choice may 
comprise a hybrid of tax and trading, or even the use of both instruments simultane-
ously. Since the paper’s objective is to understand and highlight the instruments’ 
relative advantages and disadvantages when applied to the South African context, it 
focuses on the instruments in their pure form as a point of departure. However, in 
this section particularly it becomes important to note how an instrument can be 
customised to combat its inherent disadvantages when applied to the South African 
context, or to enhance its advantages. Therefore this section necessarily expands to 
encompass hybridisation at a low level. Also, where one instrument would be best 
suited to one part of the economy, and the other to a different portion, this is identi-
fied. 
A point to note in relation to hybrid instruments is the importance of proportionality. 
Whilst in some cases it has been suggested that a hybrid system can actually be 
preferable to either of the pure tax or trading instrument options (Robert & Spence 
as cited in Fischer (1996)), design ‘tweaks’ to instruments are only appropriate inso-
far as they do not create greater distortions or inefficiencies than the problem which 
they are trying to solve. In general, the further the instrument is from its theoretically 
‘pure’ form, the less efficiently it will function, as each additional element which is 
incorporated has both a distorting and administrative implication. 
5.1 Emissions certainty 
In a situation of scarce information, emissions trading provides far greater certainty of 
emissions reduction volume compared to a tax (assuming that enforcement of the 
two is equal). Thus, if coverage is broad, it can give a reasonable degree of certainty 
of the amount of abatement that will occur in the economy as a whole. The more 
urgent the need to reduce emissions, the greater the benefit of a mechanism which 
can guarantee to hit a given emissions target. This, however, may not be the South 
African government’s immediate top priority when it comes to mitigation. As a de-
veloping country, it has time on its side in any international negotiation around fixed 
emission reduction targets.  
Government cannot tell accurately in advance what degree of abatement will be 
achieved by implementing a given tax rate, as this depends on the cost of abatement. 
However, by slightly altering the design of a tax, the predictability of emissions reduc-
tion can be increased. Marquard and Winkler (2009) suggest a mechanism by which 
a target path for emissions levels is set and then the tax level adjusted so that if emis-
sions in a given year lie outside a pre-determined band around the target, this trig-
gers an adjustment of the tax level to bring emissions back within the target range. 
This would also provide transparency and certainty about future tax levels, which is 
important in ensuring firms make the correct investment decisions and in incentivis-
ing the development of abatement technologies. 
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5.2 Incentives for innovation and investment 
Price stability 
The major benefit of a tax is that it provides a stable carbon price up front, which is 
critical from the perspective of encouraging investment in abatement and innovation. 
This point is of particular importance to developing countries where high levels of 
uncertainty tend to already impact negatively on the investment climate. Without 
price certainty firms may delay investment in emissions reducing technology as future 
payoffs are unclear (Parry & Pizer 2007). A tax provides consistent incentives to 
firms to change their behaviour, allowing them to plan accurately for the future and 
adapt at a pace appropriate to their business. Once a tax is established as a policy 
instrument, it is relatively easy to increase slowly over time. On the other hand, the 
flexibility to adjust the tax rate only once a year, compared to the constant self-
adjustment of an ETS in response to new information, may be a weakness of a tax. 
The main weakness associated with an ETS, however, is price volatility. The price of 
permits can vary substantially based on a broad range of factors such as break-
throughs in mitigation technology, the demand for and supply of energy, general 
economic conditions, availability of information, compliance dates and specific 
demand and supply conditions in underlying product markets. This was borne out in 
practice when the EU ETS allowance price fell from a high nearing 30 euros to al-
most zero, based on an untimely announcement of emissions data by the scheme 
regulatory body. This price volatility not only undermines the effectiveness and 
credibility of an ETS but also disincentivises long-term investment by firms in mitiga-
tion technologies (Parry & Pizer 2007). Furthermore, it can have implications for the 
wider economy. A changing carbon price will contribute an added element of vari-
ability to already volatile energy prices (Shapiro 2009). In South Africa, which faces 
uncertain future prices of electricity in particular, a volatile carbon price could be 
especially damaging. 
The introduction of a ‘safety valve’ can counteract the price volatility associated with 
an ETS. This involves a trigger price at which firms can buy unlimited permits from 
government, effectively providing a ceiling for the permit price. Economic analysis 
(CBO 2008; Pizer 1999; 2002) suggests that this type of hybrid scheme could lead to 
substantial efficiency gains. However, Mason (2009), notes that price caps have the 
potential to undermine the benefit of certainty of emission reduction, which is one of 
the main advantages to emissions trading, and that this may make the relative sim-
plicity of a tax more attractive. 
Transparency 
A price-based instrument is much less susceptible to corruption than a quantity-based 
instrument (Nordhaus 2007). This is because a tax level is known to all stakeholders 
and the amount of tax paid by individual firms is known, at least by government. 
Firms cannot manipulate the carbon price and consumers can understand the in-
creased costs firms are facing, making it more difficult for firms to increase prices 
excessively. Permit allocation on the other hand encourages rent-seeking as the 
permits to be distributed are valuable assets. According to the US Climate Taskforce 
(Mason 2009), indications are that the design of the EU ETS was to a significant 
extent influenced by dominant interest groups. 
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5.3 Cost to society 
Potential for international co-operation  
The economic instrument most heavily in use internationally currently is the ETS. 
Should the opportunity arise in the future, there are benefits to linking a domestic 
scheme with these international schemes, as it gives participants access to a greater 
pool of abatement opportunities, and therefore a potentially lower cost of compli-
ance.  
Sin et al (2005) find that the existence of an international permit market changes the 
theoretical comparison of the two instruments and it may become optimal for the 
country to also introduce an ETS. The reason for this is that the quantity target im-
posed by the cap is effectively relaxed, since firms can choose to comply by purchas-
ing permits from other countries and no abatement need happen in South Africa at 
all. This is obviously dependent on the relative cost of emission reduction in South 
Africa versus elsewhere. It is anticipated that South Africa will have surplus emissions 
to sell due to the high level of energy inefficiency in the economy. Sin et al (2005) 
argue that in the case that an international trading regime exists, a tax and an ETS 
would have the same environmental outcome but the trading scheme would be more 
efficient since the price of permits would adjust quickly to any market developments 
whereas a tax stays fixed over a given time-period. A counter- argument against the 
ETS, however, is that South Africa would be at the mercy of international price 
volatility, with little power to control the underlying causes.  
Revenue generation 
By definition a tax is a revenue-raising instrument. In the context of a carbon tax this 
means that a significant amount of money could be collected, boosting the fiscal 
budget position. An auctioned or partially auctioned trading scheme could create 
equivalent revenue for government, but, as noted in section 3, in practice trading 
schemes have been predominantly grandfathered to begin with, as this allows the 
impact on firms to be offset, and perhaps explains a large part of the attractiveness of 
this mechanism to industry. The EU ETS is, however, auctioning a greater proportion 
of permits in each Phase, showing that, albeit slowly, a scheme can eventually reach 
a position where a substantial proportion of permits are auctioned. As noted above, 
as a developing country, South Africa has many competing demands on the public 
purse, and from this perspective the ability to generate additional funds may be 
important. 
Flexibility 
Climate change results from the slow build-up of GHG emissions over time which 
means that emissions in a given year make up only a small proportion of the total 
problem. This means that in order to limit climate change emissions must be reduced 
significantly over a long period of time but that precisely hitting the target in any 
given year is less important. By contrast the cost of abatement may vary quite sub-
stantially from year to year for a range of reasons, such as the level of economic 
activity, energy market disruptions, and the availability of new low carbon technolo-
gies (US Congressional Budget Office 2008). In this context, a tax is efficient, since it 
gives firms the flexibility to choose when they abate; they can emit more or less in 
one year and pay more or less tax. The optimal level of emissions will still be targeted 
in the long term but firms can respond appropriately to business cycle fluctuations 
and periods of high and low demand for their product.  
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A pure ETS does not have this advantage. However, an ETS is easily adapted to 
allow firms more flexibility through the inter-temporal banking and borrowing of 
permits. Banking allows firms to hold onto unused permits from one year to be used 
to meet compliance targets in the following year, whilst borrowing allows firms to use 
part of the following year’s permit allocation in the current year. Generally banking is 
seen as more desirable, since borrowing may encourage firms to delay abatement 
which could destabilise the market later on, undermining the credibility of the 
scheme (UK Department for Environmental, Food and Rural Affairs 2008). All 
schemes in operation internationally make some form of allowance for banking or 
borrowing. 
Distribution 
A tax can be made more acceptable to various stakeholders through a degree of 
revenue recycling. For example, carbon tax revenues could compensate households 
bearing the greatest burden of carbon policies, or insulate the poor from the pass-
through of carbon costs onto items such as food or energy. Alternatively it could fund 
incentives for the development of ‘green’ technologies or be used to lower other 
taxes. This final example has been termed the ‘double dividend’ effect, since it im-
proves the efficiency of the economy twice; first from reducing the negative impact of 
the pollution externality, and second by reducing the distortion caused by other taxes 
in the economy. Computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis conducted by Van 
Heerden et al (2005) suggests that such revenue recycling could have significant 
benefits in South Africa.2 The South African Treasury however is not in principle in 
favour of this ‘earmarking’ approach. An auctioned ETS could have similar benefits.  
Economic growth 
Economic growth is largely seen as important for development. Given the initial 
finding that taxes and trading are equivalent (see Section 2), neither instrument is 
therefore a priori better or worse in its effect on economic growth, assuming each is 
appropriately designed. For example, if price volatility is not contained within a cap 
and trade scheme this will have negative consequences for investment, and therefore 
growth. The greater impacts on growth are more likely to be determined by the level 
of tax or emissions targets and the extent and effectiveness of redistributive policies 
employed to offset the effects of the instrument on households and business.  
Risk mitigation 
An advantage of an ETS over a tax is that it establishes a market, with all the trap-
pings of a market including the ability to sell or buy forward, use derivative instru-
ments, and involve additional players in the form of speculators. All this market 
infrastructure assists emitters to smooth their abatement investment over time, and 
better manage the risk that abatement technologies and emission reduction commit-
ments introduce. A tax has none of these opportunities, although risk is capped at 
the level of the tax in any one year. 
                                                 
2  Such models abstract from the realities of transaction costs and it may be that the cost of implementing a 
carbon tax would outweigh some of the benefits. Importantly, however, a tax would not channel govern-
ment funds away from spending priorities but would rather provide funds which could be used to solve 
other problems. 
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Competitiveness 
An ETS allows the government to protect certain strategic sectors by the imposition 
of weaker or stronger targets through the permit allocation mechanism. A tax does 
not have this flexibility, but it can be created by including a system of tax rebates, for 
example for export exposed industries. 
5.4 Implementability 
The implications of market power 
Market concentrations can be a problem in an ETS, both while the scheme is being 
designed and set up, and during its operation (Muller & Mestelman 1997; Stavins 
1997). If either the permit market or the underlying product market is dominated by 
a small number of firms, then these firms could exert too much influence, leading to 
inefficiencies in scheme design. Once in operation, excessive market power can allow 
firms to manipulate the permit price for their own gain and at the cost of smaller 
players. For example, firms may prevent entrants from joining by over-buying per-
mits to push up the price and they could buy up permits in advance to give them-
selves the option of not abating or just to control the market (Sin et al 2005). In this 
way, permits can be used to further monopolise underlying product markets. In 
South Africa, therefore, unless Eskom and Sasol are excluded from the scheme, 
market concentration is likely to be a problem. However, their exclusion would have 
serious implications for its environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency. An 
alternative would be to choose a point of emissions obligation which dilutes market 
power. For example, targeting emissions at the point of consumption of electricity 
bypasses this market concentration problem (potentially through a White Certificate 
Trading Scheme). Including the dominant companies at the level of business units 
rather than the whole firm is also an option, however, this seems likely to be open to 
abuse in practice as firms will always seek to benefit their own units wherever possi-
ble, and it may therefore be difficult to effectively monitor and enforce. This issue 
presents a substantial challenge to the implementation of an ETS in South Africa, 
which is anticipated to require careful design in order to overcome. Whilst a tax is 
also susceptible to the lobbying of dominant market players in its design, it is inher-
ently more transparent than an ETS.  
Complexity and institutional requirements 
A carbon tax represents an additional tax in a suite of taxes already administered by 
government. In South Africa the institutions necessary to levy a tax are already in 
place and the South African Revenue Services, which would be responsible for 
administering a tax, is one of the most capacitated and efficient of government de-
partments. On the other hand, an ETS is a complex and sophisticated policy instru-
ment, requiring the establishment of new monitoring and compliance systems, insti-
tutions, exchanges, registries and trading platforms. Credibility is a key contributor to 
the effectiveness of an ETS so sufficient skills and capacity to administer the scheme 
is critical. Lack of familiarity with trading schemes by governments can lead to signifi-
cant disruptions (such as the premature and unmanaged release of emissions data to 
the market in the EU ETS, which resulted in the price crash of 2007). 
These considerations, together with the lack of policy precedent for ETS in South 
Africa, suggest that a significant level of skill and institutional capacity would be 
required to implement an ETS effectively, and this will be problematic in South 
Africa. Some economists have also commented that, in the light of the recent global 
financial crisis, it may be wise to reassess the prudence of implementing a global 
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emissions trading scheme. The expansion of carbon markets and complex derivative 
instruments based on tradable emissions permits, although desirable as a means of 
risk mitigation for firms (see above), also has the potential to be a destabilising influ-
ence on the economy (Shapiro 2007; The Australian 2009). The sub-prime crisis of 
2008 provides a striking example of how unexpected events in the underlying market 
(the housing market in that case) can have enormous ramifications for financial 
markets when highly leveraged derivative products are allowed to blossom un-
checked. It is certainly conceivable that, without adequate regulation, a similar crash 
could be triggered by events in the market for emissions permits, particularly since 
the future path of the carbon price is extremely uncertain and highly sensitive to 
unpredictable developments in technologies related to abatement. 
Information requirements 
A low-level (low enough not to cause any significant damage to economic activity) 
carbon tax can be imposed without any need to understand emissions at a firm-level, 
and the impact on sectors and firms can then be monitored over time as the tax is 
ramped up and data is generated. The first few years of such a tax could be designed 
as a data gathering exercise primarily. 
A grandfathered trading scheme on the other hand requires the regulator to have 
accurate historical emissions data for all the firms covered by the scheme in order to 
determine permit allocation. This is a far more detailed level of data (aggregated to at 
least the sector level), than is currently available in South Africa. However, a trading 
scheme with a generous emissions cap could still provide the same information 
gathering benefit of a low tax level, and an auctioned ETS would supply information 
to policymakers immediately. The voluntary UK ETS was such an exercise, providing 
the government and participants with insights and practice in emissions trading, and 
simultaneously generating information.3 Emissions trading also enables the cost of 
emissions reduction to be discovered through the market price, providing important 
information to policymakers. 
Political attractiveness 
Business and industry are typically opposed to a new tax, which is seen as presenting 
only an additional cost to production, and South Africa is no exception. Firms are 
also often concerned about the potential for government to begin using something 
which is meant to be an instrument to solve a specific market failure as simply a 
revenue-generation tool. By contrast, an advantage of an ETS is that the allowance 
allocation mechanism can be used as a tool to generate political support for the 
instrument. Grandfathering favours heavy emitters, with the most to lose through the 
introduction of carbon mitigation policy. It has also been suggested that grandfather-
ing can militate against competitiveness and carbon leakage concerns by insulating 
firms against facing the full cost of their actions, at least in the initial phase of the 
scheme. Note that as a scheme moves to a fully auctioned approach, it loses this 
initial advantage. If auctioning is not introduced, an ETS creates a clear constituency 
of participants who have a strong financial interest in the success of the scheme and 
in its continuing existence (Duval 2008).  
Paradoxically, ETS can also encounter significant opposition from some sectors in 
society which see trading schemes as paying polluters to pollute. Indeed in initial 
                                                 
3  This scheme was actually a ‘reverse auction’, where companies bid in volumes of reductions for incentive 
monies. 
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phases of an ETS when grandfathering is still playing a significant role in allowance 
allocation this can certainly be the case. The windfall profits earned by power com-
panies under the EU ETS described above provide a prime example of this. Firms 
with inelastic demand for their products can pass on the price of permits to customers 
and make extra profit even if they engage in no abatement activities (Mendes & 
Santos 2008).  
The lack of market experience 
Recent developments in the South African electricity sector (crisis, proposed liberali-
sation, electricity price rise) have implications for the design of any economic instru-
ment. The electricity price increase should act as a natural stimulus for the adoption 
of more efficient practices and technologies and so the introduction of a carbon price 
through either a tax or ETS should be considered carefully, as in the short term it 
may well be too much of a burden for firms to face on top of their increased energy 
costs.  
An ETS is likely to work better when it is implemented in a sector already familiar 
with markets. Currently, the South African energy sector is characterised by few 
players and little liberalisation, suggesting a tax is more appropriate. However, the 
potential opening up of the electricity generation sector indicates that the prospects 
for an effective ETS may be substantially better in the medium-to-long term.  
6. Tax or trading in South Africa? 
This paper has attempted to shed some light on the inherent advantages and disad-
vantages of the two most widely used economic instruments to mitigate climate 
change, applied in a South African context. The analysis suggests that a carbon tax 
may be the most appropriate economic carbon mitigation policy instrument for 
South Africa at the current time. This conclusion is based most strongly on the sim-
plicity of a tax, the problems of market concentration issues with an ETS and the 
value of price certainty for the extensive electricity sector investment which is antici-
pated over the next decade. Although the paper has concentrated more on the 
instruments in pure form, the analysis suggests that these arguments stand even 
when different hybrid forms of the instruments are considered. 
Whilst the acceptability of a tax could be problematic, there are signs that interna-
tional opinion is becoming more favourable to carbon taxes, and negotiated rebates 
for key constituents may make the instrument more palatable. However, as with 
grandfathering in an ETS, such rebates should not be offered indefinitely and should 
decrease over time approaching some date in the future where they will be removed 
completely. Over time, however, an ETS may become an increasingly appropriate 
instrument for the country, particularly if international emissions trading becomes a 
reality. South Africa is particularly emissions-intensive and therefore likely to be a net 
seller, resulting in forex inflows. Also, under a linked sheme, concentration issues 
could be overcome. The larger the market, theoretically the more efficient the market 
becomes, and the more stable the price.  
It is clear from the analysis that the policy design process is at a very early stage in 
South Africa, and further research would be helpful on a range of issues, in order to 
allow policy-makers to make informed decisions. Some examples of potentially 
fruitful areas for future research include the following: 
Carbon pricing and industrial policy in South Africa 211 
Putting a price on carbon: Conference proceedings 
 A study of the likely shape of the South African marginal cost and marginal 
benefit curves looking at how these differ depending on whether international 
agreement is reached or if the country acts unilaterally, and the implications of 
this analysis for the choice of policy instrument. 
 Further investigation of the potential for white certificate trading as a way to work 
around the problem of market power in an ETS, building on experience from the 
Power Conservation Programme. 
 An analysis of the ways in which a carbon tax could evolve into an ETS over 
time and the optimal design of a tax which is intended to do this. 
 Further consideration of international experience and literature, in particular 
looking at any analysis considering the application of mitigation policy in other 
countries with similarities to South Africa, such as South Korea and various 
South American countries. 
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